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    To Francisco de Miranda (Caracas 1750 - Cadiz 1816) 
    and Robert Trifﬁn (Belgium 1911-1983)
Two inspiring pioneers of the regional integration process to whom the author is 
indebted and whose ideas indirectly inﬂuenced the REDIMA project.
Miranda was the precursor of Latin American emancipation, and he 
provided the inspiration for the region’s identity and integration. He considered 
a constitutionally based formula for regional integration a necessary condition 
for ensuring genuine sustainable political emancipation and a signiﬁcant socio-
economic modernization of Latin American societies. His visionary constitutional 
projects for a confederation announced the kind of governance the European 
Union eventually set up two centuries later. 
Trifﬁn is the founder of the European Payments Union (EPU; 1949) and 
one of the main architects of the European Monetary System (EMS; 1979) and the 
euro (1999), the single currency of the European Union, which he described as “a 
modest step in what I see as the most promising direction for a reordering of the 
present worldwide monetary chaos”. Like Miranda, he saw that “any innovating 
proposal will be criticized as premature, but... one must be premature to have any 
impact... I prefer to be wrong nine times out of ten, if I can contribute once in ten 
times to divert us from catastrophe, and help build a better future”.   
Their thinking provides universal contributions to modern governance in 
a globalizing world. 
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Foreword
This book is one result of the REDIMA experiment and it is dedicated to the 
memory of two exceptional cosmopolitan citizens who are insufﬁciently 
well known but whose visionary thinking remains useful today for making 
progress on the road to regional cooperation and integration: Francisco de 
Miranda, the “most universal of Latin American citizens”,1     born in Caracas, 
a soldier in and hero of the three main revolutions that shaped the Western 
World —the United States independence, the French Revolution and the 
Spanish American emancipation— and Robert Trifﬁn, the internationally 
renowned Belgian economist whom President John Kennedy described 
as “our ﬁrst Atlantic citizen”.2 Trifﬁn was a key player in the European 
integration process, through his inspiration for the European Payments 
Union, the European Monetary System and the single European currency, 
the euro, and through the advice he gave to many governments and central 
bankers. Although they lived in very different times and acted in very 
different ways, these two precursors share fundamental ideas on regional 
integration and international cooperation as ways to improve national 
governance and ensure higher levels of sustainable development. They 
devoted their entire lives to “trying to make possible tomorrow what appears 
impossible today”. 
1 On Miranda, see Bohórquez Morán, C. Francisco de Miranda, Precursor de las Independencias 
de la América Latina, Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, Caracas, 2002. (A first edition, in 
French, was published by L’Harmattan, Paris, 1998).
2 In a meeting at the White House to assess Triffin’s plan for reforming the Bretton Woods 
system, Secretary of Treasury Douglas Dillon, who had noticed that Triffin was a member 
of the European Community Delegation at an IMF meeting as well as member of the 
President’s Council of Economic Advisers, asked Kennedy if Triffin was an American or 
a European. Kennedy replied, “relax Doug, he is our first Atlantic citizen and we need 
more of them”. Robert Triffin San Paolo Prize for Economics   1987, Instituto Bancario San 
Paolo di Torino, p. 120.
14 ECLAC
Looking back at Miranda is not done out of mere intellectual 
curiosity regarding the numerous federalist utopias. Miranda’s visionary 
constitutional proposals for Spanish America, written from 1790 to 1801 
(Ghymers, 2003), presage with impressive accuracy the kind of government 
that emerged from the long process of Darwinian natural selection among 
political systems and now in practice under the European Union’s Treaty 
of Maastricht (Ghymers and Grisanti), after two centuries of nationalist 
conﬂicts and criminal wars: This is a union in diversity, feasible thanks to 
the pragmatic principle of “subsidiarity”; that is, a generally decentralized 
government structure, respectful of national or local sovereignties, 
except when federal centralization is proven beneﬁcial for governance 
at all levels. Miranda believed, as does the European Union today, that 
very few policies should be determined at a federal level: (i) the general 
institutional framework (such as principles of representative democracy, 
with a genuine separation of powers and, speciﬁcally, an independent 
judiciary to defend human rights and guarantee the rule of law; (ii) defence 
and diplomacy; (iii) trade; and (iv) a single currency. The people’s interests 
are better served when all these policy areas are managed at the federal 
level. It is worth salvaging from the selective poor memory of history 
that what has emerged recently and so painfully from the long trial-and-
error process of European integration had been clearly formulated two 
centuries before by an exceptional Latin American traveller who studied 
the enlightened courts of Europe in search of “the best of the republics” 
to institute in Colombia (i.e., in Spanish America). Unfortunately for the 
region, Miranda’s coherent plan for emancipation through democratic 
integration was snuffed out by Latin American caudillos and rent-seeking 
local oligarchies, which led to poor institutional frameworks unable to 
warrant good government or to bring about regional integration. 
The revolutionary Miranda accurately foresaw that without genuine 
integration to unite the viceroyalties of the former Spanish Empire,3 the 
political and economic emancipation of the former colonies would be 
illusive or untenable. Furthermore, integration was also essential for 
the region to join, from a position of strength, the democratic camp of 
England and the United States and to form with them a comprehensive 
“tripolar” alliance on issues ranging from the political and military to the 
commercial and monetary. A strategic alliance among the only democracies 
at that time was perceived by Miranda as necessary to coordinate 
economic development through free trade and democratic government, 
thus allowing the countries in question to gain new allies and protect 
3 The “Colombian federation” proposed in Miranda’s constitutions would have integrated 
people and territories from Louisiana to Patagonia. 
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themselves from non-democratic absolutist regimes, or, after the French 
Revolution, from radical mercantilism and its totalitarian threats.
 To remember Robert Trifﬁn is an obligation of any economist 
dealing with economic-policy coordination, and all the more for the 
author of this book, who worked closely with him when Trifﬁn returned 
from Yale University and rejoined his alma mater, the Catholic University 
of Louvain, in 1977. With a small group of Louvain economists, Trifﬁn 
drafted a proposal for a European monetary system that was submitted 
to Roy Jenkins, President of the European Commission.4 
More generally, as noted by Paolo Bafﬁ, Trifﬁn was “the ﬁrst thinker 
ever to emphasize that recurring crisis and unrest in external economic relations 
stem from a fundamental dilemma between national sovereignty in economic 
policy decisions and the measure of international incompatibility inherent in 
such ‘atomistic’ decisions” (Bafﬁ, 1987). Trifﬁn is recognized as the specialist 
who identiﬁed the need for economic cooperation among nations and 
regional groups and the ways to achieve such cooperation.
Like Miranda in previous times, Trifﬁn was convinced of the need 
for a transatlantic strategic alliance among Europe, the United States and 
Latin America, which would be easier to achieve if Europe and Latin 
America formed integrated regional entities without foregoing their 
national sovereignties. How far-sighted still is his 1957 recommendation 
to set up a mechanism of incentives for national authorities to commit to 
economic coordination: “[I]n many cases, the centralization of negotiations and 
decisions … would constitute a handicap, an element of paralysis, and a source 
of international friction rather than an effective contribution to the solution of 
our problems” (Trifﬁn, 1957, p. 258). He also noted that “sovereign countries 
should not be expected to undertake and respect international commitments 
which come into conﬂict —real or even imaginary— with powerful national 
pressures or interests. Barring the use of coercion, the efﬁcacy of international 
commitments depends primarily on the provisions that make their implementation 
both feasible and attractive, and their breach unnecessary and damaging for the 
countries concerned. National interests should be made to coincide, through a 
double mechanism of deterrents and incentives, with the collective interests of 
the group. Reciprocity and mutual help are the keystones of such a construction” 
(Trifﬁn, 1957, p. 246). 
Miranda would have agreed with Trifﬁn’s courageous conviction 
that “any innovating proposal will be correctly criticized as premature”, 
although “one must be premature to have any impact”.5 Thus, Trifﬁn wrote —
and Miranda would also have agreed with him on this point: “I prefer to be 
4 The proposal inspired the October 1977 “Discourse of Florence”.
5 Triffin, Robert, San Paolo Prize, 1987, pg. 126.
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wrong nine times out of ten, if I can contribute once in ten times … to help build 
a better future”.6  On the possibility of fulﬁlling such an objective, they 
both were profoundly realistic. Trifﬁn expressed this realism as follows: 
“Innovation is essential, but we must build with the materials at hand”. 
Miranda’s and Trifﬁn’s pragmatic contributions to the principle of 
subsidiarity are the foundation of sound regional integration, which in 
turn is a prerequisite for reforming the international economic order and 
shaping a more regulated globalization, along the lines of the proposals 
currently supported by the Economic Commission for Latin American 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Although the content of this book was not determined by the 
two international institutions —the United Nations and the European 
Commission— that have supported its publication and REDIMA, the 
book clearly makes a contribution to ECLAC efforts to design suitable 
strategies for improving governance in a globalizing world. In particular, 
the book intends to identify and systematize the possibilities of suitable 
regional cooperation for improving policy-making in Latin America in 
the context of globalization (ECLAC, 2002). 
As is well known, globalization diminishes the traditional 
importance of national frontiers, or the power of the “nation state”. It 
translates into a weakening —for better or worse— of national authorities’ 
capacity for discretionary actions, as well as that of local monopolies 
or national vested interests. Consequently, one can observe a clear 
consensus among economists and political scientists on the need to face 
this new reality through strengthening the institutional underpinnings 
of long-term growth, mainly at the national level but also at the global 
level. Nonetheless, the role that regions might play in responding to 
globalization does not  focus their attention much on collective, or regional, 
responses. On the contrary, national authorities tend to react in isolation, 
using national instruments and generally without speciﬁc consideration 
for explicit regional cooperation or for grouping neighbouring partners to 
respond collectively. Theoretic academic models do not generally consider 
the increasing signiﬁcance of the regional context, despite the contagion 
visibly affecting Latin America. Mainstream economic thinking still 
considers countries and their national economies as autonomous entities, 
without asymmetries or externalities among them, in which the growth 
rate depends on domestically determined advantages and policies. 
This paradigm leaves no room for a regional strategy with which to 
respond to the common institutional failures that are a major determinant 
of poor growth performance or to structure reforms able to make Latin 
6 Ibid., 122.
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American economies resilient to shocks induced by globalization. This is 
an inexplicable contradiction between the undeniable internationalization 
of the economic sphere and the rigid concept of economic governance, 
which remains squarely in the national realm. 
However, resolving this dilemma is not simple and raises 
fundamental issues for governance. Consequently, this book, following 
the practices of the REDIMA experiment, attempts to put forth the 
following theses related to this issue: 
• Macroeconomic subregional cooperation is an important factor for 
progress towards regional integration; and regional integration 
could, in turn, enable economies to beneﬁt from the globalization 
process and to have a stronger say in international affairs.
• The regional dimension is a powerful tool with which to make up 
for institutional failures, insofar as it provides tangible net gains to 
national policy makers; this holds to the extent that the chosen formula 
strikes the right balance between cooperation and competition 
among national administrations, breaking the prisoner’s dilemma 
speciﬁcally at the level of national macroeconomic policy makers in 
the context of a strictly subsidiary conception of regional cooperation 
and integration. Such a balance can easily be struck through mutual 
monitoring of macroeconomic policies at the subregional level that 
focuses on their compatibility and acts as a catalyst for cooperative 
attitudes among national policy makers as well as for strengthening 
the institutional underpinnings of economies (which, in turn, leads 
to a higher rate of sustainable growth).
• Subregions, deﬁned by Trifﬁn as a “group established among 
geographically neighbouring countries sharing cultural and economic 
affinities“, are suitable entities for macroeconomic cooperation 
between national administrations, but also for building a broader 
consensus at a higher level, through subregional dialogue (and 
in Latin America, among the three main subregions) as well as 
for interregional dialogue (between the subregions and outside 
regions, like the European Union, the North American Free Trade 
Area countries, or the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
Subregions are indeed an efﬁcient intermediate stepping stone to the 
more ambitious and difﬁcult goal of reshaping the global economic 
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Overview
This work attempts to assemble and synthesize some results of the 
ﬁrst phase (2000-2003) of the REDIMA project implemented in Latin 
America by ECLAC in cooperation with the European Commission, 
which provided technical support as well as co-ﬁnancing for the project. 
REDIMA is the acronym of the Spanish and Portuguese name of the 
Macroeconomic Dialogue Network (Red de Diálogo Macroeconómico), 
which was conceived and implemented in the three main subregions of 
Latin America between the end of 2000 and end of 2003 by the ECLAC—
United Nations headquarters in Santiago, Chile.
This volume is intended mainly for Latin American experts involved 
in setting the macroeconomic policies of their respective countries, but it 
should also be of interest to a broader public concerned with regional-
integration options and strategies. It aims to provide some useful elements 
for addressing speciﬁc issues related to coordinating policies among 
sovereign nations in a world undergoing globalization and subject to 
increasing uncertainty. It is not constructed as an analytic treatise. The book 
has a twofold objective: to provide clear positions regarding and options 
for Latin American integration (on the basis of the author’s personal 
analysis, which, in turn, stems from his own professional experience both 
at the European Union and in Latin America), and to publicize the REDIMA 
experiment, as well as the momentum behind it and the proposals issued 
through it. In addition, the book hopes to elicit reactions from readers and 
promote an exchange of ideas among policy makers, experts and citizens, 
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and thus encourage the formulation of feasible courses of action in Latin 
America. More than arriving at normative conclusions, my purpose in 
staking out positions and debating issues is to encourage endogenous 
processes appropriate to each subregion and use the experience gained 
by REDIMA.
The book is structured as follows: given the theoretical results and 
the indisputable fact that the greatest obstacle to policy coordination lies in 
the lack of appropriate consensus-based models for understanding reality 
(“underlying models”) —a problem which has no short-run solution— 
attention is focused on practical examples and on the attempts frequently 
made in this direction (the Bretton Woods system, the Group of Seven 
[G-7], the European Monetary System [EMS] and the European Economic 
and Monetary Union [EMU], in which the euro is the common currency) 
to draw some initial lessons (chapter I). This effort also examines the 
prisoner’s dilemma situation that hinders cooperation (chapters II and 
III). The examples given in these chapters make it possible to pinpoint 
the speciﬁc elements behind the success of the European experiment 
of encouraging national decision makers to welcome cooperative 
strategies (chapter IV). The European Union case shows that escaping 
planned “centralist coordination” through successive “trials and errors” 
—a pragmatic scheme based on a dialogue between autonomous actors 
gradually creating mutual trust— and recognizing that each government 
legitimately tends to act in its own interest made it possible to arrive 
at a minimum consensus regarding the content of policies and at an 
acceptance of some basic common rules. In the European process, this kind 
of dialogue stimulated self-discipline to protect countries’ own legitimate 
national interests (market-based rewards for or sanctions against national 
political decision makers). 
Next, the book attempts to identify the essential principles allowing 
the prisoner’s dilemma to be overcome (chapter V). In the European 
case, rather than being devised according to a broad institutional plan, 
the solution emerged from the development of personal contacts among 
policy makers within a collective effort to monitor each economy from 
a regional perspective, thereby allowing it to be viewed as a continuous 
game, which, it was hoped, would enhance the credibility of domestic 
policies. This multi-faceted approach created speciﬁc incentives for 
individual participants to cooperate at the regional level, thereby creating 
a positive-sum game in which the positive outcome increased with 
the iteration of the game. Hence, the prisoner’s dilemma was resolved 
through the dynamics of the game: that players had to meet over a long 
and undeﬁned period, that they could not escape the consequences 
their decisions had on fellow participants, that the incentives to defect 
diminished over time and were commensurate with the strengthening of 
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integration, that players learned more and more about each other, that 
rewards and sanctions were administered progressively and allowed 
the balance of beneﬁts and costs to be identiﬁed, reducing uncertainty 
regarding the results of cooperation —all these factors implied that the 
cost of non-cooperation rose rapidly with time, and positive outcomes 
increased with the iteration of the game. 
Next, the applicability of these general principles to Latin America 
is examined, allowing the REDIMA political-economy approach to be 
introduced (chapter VI). In particular, the contextual differences between 
the European and Latin American integration processes are examined. 
This leads to an identiﬁcation of the three essential obstacles to regional 
cooperation in Latin America (chapter VII). 
The book builds on these elements to present the key guidelines 
stemming from the REDIMA political-economy approach for escaping 
the prisoner’s dilemma (chapter VIII). 
To conclude on a practical note, the preceding analysis is summarized 
through an examination of exchange-rate regimes (ERRs) and policies, 
in order to formulate some concrete proposals for debate (chapter 
IX). In particular, since “corner solutions” for the choice of exchange-
rate regime imply either a lack of ﬂexibility or a lack of robustness, a 
regional cooperation scheme could, under speciﬁc conditions, provide 
the countervailing powers, or “checks and balances”, that would lend 
credibility without a loss of ﬂexibility. To complement this information, 
Phase 1 of the REDIMA project and its implementation are brieﬂy 
evaluated (chapter X). 
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Chapter I
“The Remains of the Day”, in terms of 
theory
The coordination of economic policies (both international polices and 
instruments) is a longstanding political-economy problem that has 
become a traditional theme of debates among economists, although no 
clear conclusion has emerged. Despite considerable development of the 
theory since the 1980s, with an impressive growth in complexity, the 
empirical results have been disappointing and it has been impossible to 
devise clear practical recommendations for policy makers.
This chapter presents a very schematic overview of the results of 
some theoretical and empirical studies, although without attempting 
to survey the very abundant technical literature on this subject. For 
readability and to focus on operational aspects, Box I.1 presents, from a 
layman’s standpoint, the key concept of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” used 
in the REDIMA approach. This discussion makes clear that an analysis of 
policy interactions between countries is not limited to the overly simplistic 
one-shot games associated with the prisoner’s dilemma. REDIMA will 
present future works and additional developments that will allow this case 
to be inserted into a more comprehensive and analytical framework. 
Because of closer international ties, policy decisions in one country 
have a stronger impact on that country’s partners. Nevertheless, policy-
making generally continues to overlook these cross-border “spillovers” 
of domestic policies. 
What does theory tell about such a contradiction in a globalizing 
world? It has been possible to establish, based almost solely on evidence, 
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that cooperative behaviour among national policy makers whose 
economies are linked leads to a “better” equilibrium for the group of 
countries involved. Nevertheless, it has not been possible to solve the 
(theoretical and real) problem by which, in practice, the asymmetry among 
economies, as well as the different perceptions of the way the economy 
works (that is, the underlying model and the evaluation of cyclical 
position) and the differences in political objectives (the “weighting” of 
the objective functions of national policy makers), makes it very difﬁcult 
to identify the individual distribution of gains from coordination. The 
combination of these factors of risk and uncertainty greatly limits the 
concrete applicability of the cooperation principle.
In fact, it serves no purpose to show that a group of countries can 
arrive at a better overall outcome when —according to the deﬁnition of 
sovereignty— policy makers’ priorities are determined and approved 
solely based on their results at a national level. Indeed, at the regional 
level (that is, in the case of a group of neighbouring countries) the 
distribution of gains from coordination is uncertain, unknown beforehand 
or skewed through the domestic political game. Moreover, game theory 
has demonstrated very clearly through the famous prisoner’s dilemma 
(see Box I.1) the case in which individual rationality leads to collective 
irrationality: each risk-averse player is rational in refusing to cooperate, 
either because by adopting free-riding behaviour when the other party is 
playing fair maximizes one’s individual reward or because such behaviour 
minimizes loss when the other party defects.7
The mere probability of a partner’s defection strongly biases 
individual behaviour against cooperation in a game where players are 
sovereign powers —i.e., where the opportunity for collusion among them 
is, by deﬁnition, very limited. In this case, the potential for individual 
losses created by the risk of partner’s defection necessarily leads them 
to choose non-cooperative strategies, with highly negative consequences 
for all players. In an economic region, because players are decentralized 
and sovereign —that is, because they lack the normal possibility for 
feasible collusion— domestic economic-policy decisions whose mutual 
external effects are signiﬁcant are destined to be harmful at the regional 
level (leading to suboptimal equilibrium). Furthermore, theoretical 
“bargaining” models show that it is possible to arrive at practicable 
cooperative solutions solely under restrictive hypotheses, with a precise 
weighting of policy objectives (or in the case of complete symmetries 
among players).
7 Strictly, a prisoner’s dilemma is considered to exist when individual gains from not 
cooperating are perceived ex-ante as higher than the individual reward for doing so, or 
the perceived individual loss from cooperating is higher than the expected cost of not 
cooperating (see Box I.1 in this chapter). 
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A path to a less pessimistic theoretical conclusion can be charted, 
however, by considering international cooperation within a more 
dynamic framework. The introduction of a dynamic dimension that 
takes into account linkages between decisions made through a succession 
of negotiations or contacts established over time (“multi-period”, or 
“dynamic”, games) makes it possible to consider an important aspect of 
reality: the interplay of expectations built on mutual learning experience 
among policy makers. Given that in a continuum of successive decisions, 
response strategies are developed among players and are included in the 
behaviour of each (“tit-for-tat” conduct), schemes of evolving cooperation 
can emerge (Axelrod, 1984). This means that players’ individual incentives 
can evolve to favour cooperation, making it possible to overcome the 
individual impasse to the prisoner’s dilemma inherent to the hypothesis 
of rejection of cooperative behaviour. This important insight —which 
does not appear to have been explicitly explored— will be the focus of 
attention for examining what produced successful results in the case 
of the European Union (chapter III), as well as for formulating speciﬁc 
propositions, in chapters VIII and IX.
By contrast, studies using macroeconomic models allowing for 
simulations generally showed empirical results of little impact (Bryant 
and others, 1988; Canzoneri and Edison, 1990): gains resulting from the 
coordination of monetary or ﬁscal policies —although documented— are 
relatively modest: on the order of 1% of the industrialized countries’ GDP 
over the medium term. This seems poor in the light of the margins of 
uncertainty in the models. Moreover, an analysis of noteworthy cases of 
international initiatives (such as those of the G-7 resulting from the 1978 
Bonn Summit, the 1985 Plaza Agreement, or the 1987 Louvre Agreement) 
leads to the conclusion that, whether or not effective, these initiatives had 
a negative impact on several partners as well as on the global economy, 
through a destabilizing ampliﬁcation of the international economic 
cycle.
For several methodological reasons, however, these initiatives are 
not useful for arriving at conclusions on the potential validity or merit of 
the international coordination principle. Here again, these objections are 
rooted in the difﬁculty of understanding and measuring the underlying 
model, which in itself tends to reduce the perceived gains of coordination 
and also represents a serious obstacle to its implementation. In fact, the 
results vary widely, depending on the model and the simulations used.
Although this volume will not survey the existing empirical 
literature, some basic methodological premises point to a deeper 
identiﬁcation problem when an attempt is made to simulate coordination 
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or quantify its gains. The main arguments, in highly condensed form, are 
as follows: 
First, coordination per se does not necessarily generate positive 
outcomes. Coordination is positive only when it allows for implementing 
better national policies. In the case of coordination leading to the 
imposition of inadequate measures, negative impacts tend to accumulate 
and to exacerbate growth difﬁculties. This is the case of past attempts 
to coordinate actions (for example, the 1978 Bonn Summit with the 
locomotive theory or the 1987 Louvre agreement with its huge exchange-
rate interventions). Although these cases are unquestionably examples 
of coordination, they had a negative effect on the observed outcomes, 
on which parameters for potential simulations are estimated. The real 
problem, as mentioned, is not coordination itself but the uncertainty of or 
conﬂict with understanding the real world (referred to as the “underlying 
model”).
Second, in the real world, on which model parameters are estimated, 
there also are cases of implicit or “tacit” coordination (i.e., coordination 
regarding which no agreement is made or announcement is given). In 
such cases, the calculated parameters of the models would also be skewed 
and a simulation of formal coordination would fail to register part of its 
potential positive impact. This undetected part of the potential impact 
would already be included in the baseline case, which is considered to 
represent non-coordinated policies. 
Third, formally agreed coordinated actions could, conversely, be 
imperfectly implemented, or offset by other measures not covered in 
the agreement. In this case, the estimated parameters might include a 
lack of effective coordination, making it impossible for a simulation to 
account for the change of regime that true coordination would involve 
(the dynamic aspects). 
Lastly, an important argument regarding the lack of clear 
conclusions of theoretical works on coordination appears to be the 
endogenous reactions produced by the fact that the cooperative scheme 
comprises only some parameters or macroeconomic-policy instruments. 
Hence, this would tend to generate free-riding behaviour and introduce 
distortions or reactions that create moral hazard; national policy makers 
could take advantage of this situation to change their objectives or blame 
their neighbours, or simply shift the burden to favour themselves. Due 
to its partial and limited nature, the commitment to coordinate does not 
generally involve an objective distribution of the respective roles, and 
the costs of actions are generally not shared in an altogether transparent 
manner. It seems very likely that conﬂicts would arise and, by and large, 
that certain social or political actors would try to take advantage of the 
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agreement to maximize their individual gains. For example, certain actors 
(trade unions or vested interests consisting of sheltered producers) could 
keep the gains for themselves or offset them by asking for supplementary 
income once they become aware that the partners in the agreement are 
able to indirectly assume or make up for part of the costs. This important 
weakness is systemic and inherent to the existence of frontiers.
Although this simpliﬁed overview does not purport to fully 
summarize the sophisticated theory of coordination, it does underscore 
the difﬁculty of ﬁnding a satisfactory theoretical framework, that is, a 
general formula capable of encompassing such a complex reality and able 
to lead to concrete proposals or practical recommendations. In the light of 
this lack of solid facts and appropriate methods to guide economic policy 
decisions, I propose adopting a basically pragmatic focus —ﬁrst, by 
drawing on analogies from elementary game theory to break the complex 
issue of coordination down into more manageable components; applying 
the prisoner’s dilemma to regional cooperation will provide insight on 
elementary mechanisms that explain the lack of cooperative behaviour 
and make it intuitively clear that cooperation is possible only if it is in 
the best interest of each partner. The second way to follow a pragmatic 
approach is to refer to known experiences of cooperation while keeping 





In the past decade, the popularity of traditional game theory —deﬁned, for our purposes, 
as interactive decision theory— as a tool of economic analysis has been rising with the 
development of a set of techniques and tools for analyzing non-cooperative behaviour. 
Within this promising literature, one of the basic concepts that gained prominence for policy-
making analysis was the prisoner’s dilemma (Kreps, 1990). 
Like any other modelling, game theory simpliﬁes reality to shed light on situations in 
which autonomous decision makers have interconnected interests and behaviours. National 
macroeconomic and trade policies —and, hence, regional integration issues— are, a priori, 
excellent candidates for applying a method that explicitly tries to include interactions between 
sovereign states in order to examine the possibility of reconciling opposing or competing 
interests. Moreover, the progress of human societies and their economic development seem 
intimately linked to the ability to transform conﬂicts of interests through institutions that 
allow for sufﬁcient cooperation among economic agents, thereby changing zero-sum games 
to positive-sum games, or “win-win situations”, by reducing the gap between individual and 
collective returns. Macroeconomic-policy coordination in the context of regional integration 
should therefore be analyzed in terms of the game-theory approach used at REDIMA and 
described in its publications.a
Regional integration succeeds when a minimum degree of cooperation among 
sovereign nations emerges. This kind of cooperative behaviour is sustainable and successful 
only if the participants’ cooperative attitude is perceived to be in the best interests of each 
of them acting alone. The metaphor of the prisoner’s dilemma helps us understand why 
such behaviour is not the general rule in the real world, thus opening the way for possible 
solutions. 
The prisoner’s dilemma is the most prevalent example of a basic game that recurs 
in many political, social and economic contexts in which the general rationality of conﬂicting 
preferences prevents cooperative actions and inﬂicts losses on all players. 
The name is taken from the pedagogical story ﬁrst used to illustrate it by A.W. 
Tucker. Two individuals commit a crime together. The police apprehend them under strong 
suspicions but no solid proof of their guilt. The suspects are placed in separate cells and 
cannot communicate with one other. A proposal is made to each of them to confess and 
incriminate the other. (i) If they both confess, they will both receive the same reduced penalty 
for pleading guilty (for example, a ﬁve-year jail sentence); (ii) If only one of them accuses the 
other, the accuser will be set free, while the recalcitrant partner will receive the maximum 
penalty, a twelve-year sentence; (iii) if neither confesses, they will both be convicted of a 
minor offence and receive a one-year sentence. 
Hence, both individuals receive a better deal (a shorter sentence) when they both 
refuse to cooperate and accuse their partner (that is, defect): for each of them, the best 
individual outcome is obtained by accusing the partner, regardless of what the latter does. 
If one partner cooperates (i.e., does not accuse the other), while the other defects (by 
accusing his accomplice), the defecting party goes free; but if his partner accuses him, 
the cost is still lower for him than if he cooperated (by not accusing the partner). The worst 
outcome is obtained when one cooperates while the other defects. The structure of the 
relative incentives makes it impossible to cooperate. Rational, isolated, individual decisions 
(that minimize one’s risks or maximize the gains from acting in isolation) do not lead either 
defendant to cooperate. Indeed, each is guided by the rational fear that if he does not 
implicate the other (that is, if he cooperates with his accomplice) and his partner defects 
a See, especially, Escaith, and Paunovic (2003).
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and implicates him (that is, chooses to not cooperate), he risks receiving the most severe 
sentence. In this example, the defendant receives a twelve-year sentence if he chooses to 
cooperate by not accusing his partner. If, however, his partner cooperates (fails to defect), 
the partner also receives a one-year sentence, thereby forfeiting the opportunity to obtain 
the best option by acting in isolation (release, or no jail sentence). In either case, defecting 
gives each individual a comparatively better outcome, although collectively the outcome is 
not Pareto-optimum, and, clearly, both defendants would be better off by cooperating and 
refusing either to confess or to accuse the other. In game-theory terminology, this is known 
as the prisoner’s dilemma: each player, in pursuing his rational, individual interest, has a 
“dominant strategy” that precludes him from cooperating and locks both of them into a 
suboptimal equilibrium, from a collective standpoint. 
Therefore, decisions that are rational from the standpoint of a single decision maker 
become irrational from a collective standpoint. This simplistic case of a clear divergence 
between individual and collective rationality leading to an effective loss of welfare has drawn 
much attention to the conditions for making cooperative outcomes feasible, which, in turn, 
has popularized the prisoner’s dilemma model. Obviously, this (static) case, with a one-shot 
interaction between players, is the simplest, and it is clear that the dilemma is over as soon 
as the players are able to bargain a credibly binding agreement that prevents the emergence 
of a damaging “dominant strategy”. In our simplistic case of two defendants, merely being 
able to communicate would sufﬁce to make them “cooperate”. 
However, in the real (dynamic) world of international relations, communication is far 
from sufﬁcient or possible, speciﬁcally because of uncertainty about the future (especially 
about potential gains and losses from cooperation that depend on partners’ behaviour), 
about the genuine underlying model, and about the credibility of international commitments 
to binding national decisions; moreover, partners face a “continuously repeated game”, that 
is, they do not meet only once for a speciﬁc matter but have to play forever (or for an 
indeterminate length of time) regarding several concurrent, important issues. As developed 
by Robert Axelrod (1984), this dynamic dimension changes behaviour, insofar as the weight 
of a future outcome in present decisions is sufﬁcient. Indeed, in a repeated game, by 
learning about each other’s behaviour, players acquire the ability to create and develop 
their own incentives (or disincentives) for cooperating (or refusing to cooperate). Reputation 
effects can develop, making spontaneous cooperation attractive for reasons of credibility 
and political economy, which affords opportunities to create additional incentives resulting 
from cooperation itself. This means that cooperative gains become endogenous— i.e., they 
increase with time (as will be shown with the REDIMA proposals for ﬁnancial spreads in 
chapter IX ) and could be encouraged by “commitment technology” like tying a government’s 
hands with regional institutional agreements that increase the cost of defecting (as this 
concept is deﬁned by Persson and Tabellini, 1990) and create signiﬁcant incentives for 
individual players (in line with the REDIMA approach to market rewards and sanctions). In 
the base case (the static example of two prisoners), the endogenous nature of the potential 
gains from cooperation could unlock the dilemma, insofar as the dynamic (potential) gains 
to be reaped in the future clearly exceed the immediate gains from defecting. Here, the 
dominant strategy is no longer to defect but to cooperate, and at this point, the prisoner’s 
dilemma is, by deﬁnition, solved. 
It is clear that the prisoner’s dilemma does not prove anything in itself, but it does 
provide economists and policy makers with general categories of assumptions that break 
a complex issue down into simpler components and allow fundamental relations and their 
intrinsic mechanics to be identiﬁed such that insights and intuitions can be arranged to 
ﬁnd a probable way out of the non-cooperative status quo. This approach to international 
economics promises to yield many more results, and further developments are expected 
from phase II of REDIMA.
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Chapter II
“Gone with the Wind”, in attempts at 
international coordination
Although this volume does not provide a systematized summary of the 
numerous attempts at and experiences with coordination in the world, it 
considers the two most important and clearly related cases, the G-7 and 
the European Union’s EMS. First, it will re-examine the starting point, the 
Bretton Woods cooperation system.
1. The Bretton Woods system, or hegemonic asymmetry 
(1945-1965)
It is well known that much of the disaster of the 1930s (and of the 
totalitarian regimes that thrived from it) can be explained by the non-
cooperative or nationalistic policies of the industrialized nations. At the 
end of World War II, the catastrophic consequences of these policies led the 
United States, the hegemonic Western power, to attempt to reorganize the 
world economic system by imposing certain basic cooperation principles, 
which the war had made possible.
Without giving a detailed presentation, it is useful to recall that the 
initial logic for cooperation rested on three complementary institutional 
pillars: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which 
allowed for the establishment of clear rules on coordinating a progressive 
liberalization of market economies; the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
a monetary agreement imposing a minimum of common discipline for 
ensuring monetary stability and making balance-of-payments adjustments 
less conﬂictual while avoiding distortions; and the International Bank for 
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Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), designed to compensate for the 
“market failures” of international capital movements and especially to 
further European reconstruction and support least developed countries 
(LDCs). Although each of these three pillars pertains to a cooperation-
based institutional construct that attempts to coordinate national policies 
through rules and direct incentives to the actors involved, it is an 
indisputable historical fact that the creation and acceptance of each of 
them was the result of unilateral action by the United States “hegemon”, 
which not only launched these initiatives but also voluntarily offered the 
incentives and/or adjustment mechanisms that would allow for almost 
automatic coordination and, consequently, the successive functioning 
and acceptance of the system.
The examples given below illustrate that a single country’s political 
and economic hegemony allowed it to impose a growth-oriented system 
on the remaining players. The functioning of this system hinged on certain 
simple rules whose observance was made attractive to the other countries. 
Coordination with the other countries thus became automatic: it was in 
the individual interest of the participating policy makers to adhere to the 
system proposed by the “hegemon”. The prisoner’s dilemma situation, in 
which the partners were trapped because of a lack of hegemony among 
themselves, was thus resolved. Let us examine this in greater detail in the 
commercial and monetary spheres.
1. In trade, only the largest economy could impose non-discriminatory 
access to markets by making compliance with multilateral principles 
by its small, divided interlocutors a condition for access to its big 
internal market. This unilateral advantage made it possible to 
unlock the prisoner’s dilemma among the other countries. The 
United States thus achieved its objectives of political security and 
trade-regime and longer-term economic stability at the expense 
of the shorter-term interests of some of its lobbies, while the other 
countries also achieved most of their goals at the expense of the 
interests of some “rent-seeking” sectors. This hegemonic asymmetry 
permitted systemic progress, which, in turn, allowed the dynamics 
of progressive and coordinated globalization to be triggered through 
two key principles of political economy. First, an international conﬂict 
between foreign exporters and domestic producers (which is 
more difﬁcult to rationalize and is prone to be used by simplistic, 
xenophobic populists) was transformed into a merely “domestic” 
conﬂict between national exporters and protectionist lobbies of the 
same country. The acceptance of such a transformation is probably 
easier in representative democracies, given that, in the end, trade 
opening essentially beneﬁts more voters than does protectionism). 
Second, the economic interdependence that develops with mutual 
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trade liberalization gradually imposes greater discipline and 
restrictions on discretionary national policies, while the growing 
need for organization and security —which cannot be achieved 
merely in the domestic sphere— has, increasingly, to be sought 
through the acceptance of supranational or multilateral regulations 
and institutions.
2. In the monetary sphere, because of the failure to establish a 
supranational solution right from the start through the creation of 
an international standard (the Keynes-Trifﬁn proposal), the only 
currency that could act as an international standard at that time was 
the United States dollar, given that it was the only national currency 
that had all the attributes required internationally. Moreover, as a 
reaction to the aggressive depreciations of the preceding period 
(“beggar-my-neighbour” policies) and in the presence of the 
generalized control of international capital movements, a ﬁxed-
parity system was imposed on the n-1 other currencies vis-à-vis the 
dollar. This meant that the n-1 central banks of the rest of the world 
had to commit to buy or sell dollars (the “n” currency) at an agreed 
and ﬁxed (but adjustable) parity, while the United States adopted a 
passive attitude of functional “benign neglect” (inescapable for the 
“nth” countries, since there are only “n-1” degrees of freedom) in the 
currency market. This monetary asymmetry implied a spontaneous 
coordination of the n-1 national policies, while the “nth” economy 
had to renounce its monetary policy and foreign-exchange autonomy 
and was obliged to offer to serve as the adjustment instrument 
for the world system. For the n-1 other countries, the automatic 
coordination of internal policies resulted from the “external” 
discipline imposed by the obligation to maintain a stable exchange 
rate: the external restriction (loss of dollar reserves in the event of 
excessive local money issuance or of an excessively expansionist ﬁscal 
policy) provided an incentive for national authorities to progress 
towards macroeconomic convergence and politically punished any 
“inﬂationary” policy stance (overvaluation and devaluation or need 
to resort to the conditioned funding from the IMF).
2. Limits to the Bretton Woods system, or the lack of a 
common anchor and consensus (1965-1973)
The ﬂipside of this asymmetry, however, was an intrinsic weakness: 
the absence of any external constraint on the United States (excluding the 
more formal, rather than real, anchoring represented by the convertibility 
of the dollar to gold at a price determined with other central banks). In such 
a system, for the external stability of the n-1 other countries to translate 
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into internal stability, it was also necessary for the internal policy of the 
nth country— the anchor of the system —to be spontaneously disciplined 
and on target. Otherwise, the obligatory interventions (dollar purchases 
against national currencies —i.e., issuing monetary base) by the n-1 other 
countries to maintain exchange-rate stability would become a channel 
for increasing the transmission of the anchor country’s lack of monetary 
discipline. In other words, the system was based on the assumption 
that the hegemon would always be lucid and benevolent, renouncing 
its own short-run interests to protect those of the rest of the world, and 
that it would always be in a political position to do so. That meant that 
three difﬁcult conditions had to be permanently met: (1) United States’ 
macroeconomic policy makers had to be willing to impose the necessary 
discipline on themselves; (2) this would have to be accepted and supported 
politically by the United States’ electorate and lobbies, and (3) even if 
the goodwill of the hegemon was guaranteed, the system needed to have 
effective knowledge of the real model behind the United States economy 
and that of the rest of the world. If this was closer to being respected in 
trade matters (GATT), the inevitable errors of judgement (legitimate lack 
of knowledge regarding the real model) by macroeconomic policy makers 
in both the United States and other countries were fatal to the Bretton 
Woods system.
The system worked provided the United States willingly accepted 
not to pursue balance-of-payments objectives, all while addressing 
global pricing stability. Nonetheless, as was vocally denounced at that 
time in the Trifﬁn dilemma, this double commitment contained a logical 
impossibility: if the United States averted global deﬂation (resulting from 
the global scarcity of liquidity), thereby fulﬁlling its stabilizing role, it 
did so by meeting the rest of the world’s demand for reserves through 
the United States balance-of-payments deﬁcits, that is, by accepting an 
accumulation of liquid external liabilities with the potential for an eventual 
crisis of conﬁdence in the dollar. Hence, the amount of reserves that the 
rest of the world could accumulate was constrained by the progressively 
waning conﬁdence in its main reserve currency: either the world would 
be supplied sufﬁcient international reserves and the dollar would be 
condemned to a crisis of conﬁdence, or the United States would be 
tempted to defend the dollar’s credibility through a balance-of-payments 
adjustment, which would put a chokehold on the needed international 
liquidity, giving rise to global deﬂation and the consequent mercantilist 
trade wars. In fact, since the ﬁrst course was chosen, the worldwide 
system —lacking an effective anchor— became inﬂationary. Since the 
ﬁxed-parity mechanism automatically ampliﬁed any Keynesian impulse 
(excess money creation or ﬁscal expenditure) by the United States and 
since the international multiplier of expenditures was greatly enhanced 
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by the role of the dollar standard itself (Ghymers, 1986), the world system 
was predisposed to inﬂation.
This was a direct consequence of the monetary asymmetry created by 
the dollar’s international role: the exodus of dollars from the United States 
created a monetary base abroad without reducing the monetary base 
inside the country, because the dollar reserves acquired by other central 
banks were placed not in liquid deposits at the Federal Reserve (creating 
a monetary liability) but in income-producing instruments, like U.S. T-
bills or certiﬁcates of deposit (CDs) with United States commercial banks 
(creating ﬁnancial liabilities), as a result of the dollar’s international role 
(Swoboda, 1978; Mc Kinnon, 1982a). This investment of external monetary 
reserves by the n-1 central banks into the United States ﬁnancial market 
represented an inﬂow of ﬁnancial capital into the United States, contrary 
to the normal logic of the gold standard or of any other symmetric ﬁxed-
parity mechanism. The reason for this was the monetary asymmetry of 
the dollar standard, which worked as follows:
1. As a peg system, under the dollar standard, excessive dollar liquidity 
led to compulsory purchases abroad by n-1 central banks (the United 
States did not intervene in the foreign-exchange market). 
2. This increased these central banks’ assets (i.e., their accumulated 
foreign-currency reserves in dollars) as well as their corresponding 
liabilities (non-dollar monetary bases), equivalent to a transfer of 
excess monetary stocks from the United States to the rest of the 
world. 
3. N-1 central banks —rather than depositing their dollar reserves 
in their accounts with the Federal Reserve System (or “Fed”), in 
which case these reserves would have represented a symmetric 
destruction of the United States monetary base, by increasing the 
Fed’s liabilities— placed (or “recycled”) them in the more attractive, 
income-producing United States Treasury Bonds or in United States 
bank CDs (that is, liabilities of non-monetary authorities). 
4. These automatic loans from the rest of the world to the United States 
Treasury or banking system impeded an equivalent reduction in the 
United States’ monetary base, instead of allowing the normal logic 
(symmetry) of a corresponding reduction in the monetary base of the 
country with a balance-of-payments deﬁcit. 
5. In such an asymmetric monetary system, the initial excess of money 
creation in the United States economy led to monetary expansion 
in the rest of the world; the international currency did not behave 
as did other national currencies: its monetary multiplier was bigger, 
allowing the United States to act as the world’s banker. 
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Thus, the macroeconomic world of Bretton Woods provided automatic 
coordination, with an ampliﬁcation of the Keynesian impulses originated in 
the United States, which resulted historically in proclivity toward international 
inﬂation. 
Moreover, this proclivity was progressively intensiﬁed, insofar 
as the development of private capital movements undermined the 
ﬁxed-parity discipline. Without free ﬂows of capital, the excess internal 
demand of the n-1 countries could not easily be ﬁnanced and the external 
constraint entered into full force. With the progressive but overwhelming 
combined forces of ﬁnancial innovation and deregulation, the emergence 
of international capital movements that were increasingly attracted by 
interest-rate differentials rendered national ﬁscal policies even more 
effective through the inducement of domestic monetary creation. This 
meant an automatic accommodation of the money supply towards the 
highest levels of overall demand and prices (through the compulsory 
central-bank purchase of the excess inﬂow of dollars). The purported 
automatic discipline generated by the ﬁxed rates thus gave way to 
destabilizing international money waves (a wide ﬂuctuation in international 
liquidity conditions). In fact, automatic coordination continued, though 
rather than disciplining the United States’ policy mistakes, it merely 
went hand in hand and ampliﬁed them in the rest of the world (perverse 
coordination). Without an anchor capable of objectively disciplining the 
dominant country, not only was the source of external stability unable to 
guarantee internal stability but it became a vector for the transmission of 
generalized instability.
Under these conditions, free-ﬂoating exchange rates appeared as 
a necessary response and saving grace. Abandoning the ﬁxed rate of 
exchange vis-à-vis the dollar was the only way to break the disruptive 
link and opt for domestic anchoring through the discipline of a self-
imposed monetary policy (control of the domestic money supply through 
objective indicators) in order to return to domestic price stability or to 
have self-imposed objectives. External stability could thus result from 
each participant’s individual achievement of internal stability —the 
opposite of what was expected from the Bretton Woods system, in which 
internal stability was supposed to result from each participant’s external 
stability. Flotation was supposed to protect each economy from the 
negative impacts of policies chosen by others and in any case to absorb 
the divergences resulting from differences in national policies or from 
idiosyncratic economic cycles.
After nearly thirty years of ﬁxed rates, exchange-rate ﬂexibility 
appeared as an “anti-spillover panacea” by which the autonomy of 
national macroeconomic policies would be re-established while the 
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external impacts of the internal policies would be directly internalized 
in the form of national exchange-rate development. In theory, at least, 
a ﬂexible exchange rate should thwart the external spread of erroneous 
domestic policies thereby transmitting them directly to the external value 
of the national currency. Exchange-rate ﬂexibility then has more visible 
and stronger effects internally and makes it possible to react or to establish 
domestic political sanctions to correct such errors in case of misguided 
domestic choices.
Bearing in mind these features of the Bretton Woods system and its 
limits allows us to draw some conclusions and establish three universal 
principles:
1. The mere existence of coordination is insufﬁcient since policies 
must also be appropriate; in the event of mistakes in the dominant 
country, coordination can even worsen the outcome for everyone. 
This, in turn, justiﬁes non-cooperative attitudes and a return to the 
prisoner’s dilemma situation, in which all players react to more 
powerful incentives to protect their own interests. 
2. Fixed exchange-rate regimes enhance the importance of ﬁscal 
policies, which are no longer capable of self-discipline and therefore 
require a system of rules for imposing discipline.
3. Anchoring to a currency means adopting the monetary policy of the 
anchor country. Therefore, the abandonment of any autonomous 
monetary policy requires that other economic-policy instruments 
be readily available to deal with each economy’s external or cyclical 
shocks.
3. The illusion of ﬂoating rates without cooperation, or a 
return to the prisonerʼs dilemma (1973-1984)
A generalized ﬂoat of the main currencies was inevitable. In an 
increasingly globalized world, with the anchor country exporting inﬂation 
rather than the expected stability, there was no other course. This option, 
however, led to major ﬂuctuations in the real exchange rates, accompanied 
by “misalignments”, i.e., exchange rates that were not only misaligned 
regarding (distant from) the fundamental equilibria of the economies (in 
terms of competitiveness) but also subject to wide cyclical swings with 
alternating periods of under- and overvaluation.
From the very beginning of the ﬂotation policy, the IMF and national 
authorities tried to maintain the principle of coordination, adjusting 
the rules of the system to the new circumstances imposed by ﬂotation. 
First, a posteriori negotiations were necessary to formalize what the 
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industrialized countries had put into practice when they broke off from 
the ﬁxed-parity system. Moreover, these negotiations sought to maintain 
a cooperation-based system with rules and thus pave the way to a more 
complete subsequent reform of the international monetary system (IMS).
The negotiations to give ofﬁcial consent to the de facto generalized 
ﬂoat led to the Jamaica Agreement (January 1976) on the second 
amendment to the Fund’s statutes, which, after ratiﬁcation by IMF 
members, took effect on 1 April 1978. The revision of Article IV called 
for abandoning the gold standard as a monetary benchmark, allowed 
members to choose an exchange regime provided they accept a Fund 
surveillance formula, and promoted the principle of cooperation between 
members and the Fund, as well as among members themselves, to ensure 
“a stable system of exchange rates through domestic [macroeconomic] stability 
policies”.
However, profound disagreements on the speciﬁcs of the stability 
policies, which the general terms of the agreement in principle had 
managed to disguise, made it impossible for the expected cooperation 
to materialize. Moreover, the widespread dissemination of academic 
views on the advantages of ﬂexible exchange rates supported a backlash 
of “domesticism” in the United States, as a political reaction to the 
previous “internationalist” approach (pitting the ﬁrst Reagan economic 
team against its Democratic predecessors). This, in turn, led to the belief 
that any aspiration towards international coordination was ineffectual 
and counterproductive. Although criticism of the previous coordination 
system was well founded, the reaction against it was ideological, in its 
assumption that ﬂexible and freely determined exchange rates and the 
application of sound national policies would automatically eradicate 
the need for international coordination. This strong hypothesis rested 
on the assumption that the economies in question would spontaneously 
internalize sound policies because of the effect on their exchange rates.
Although this “domesticist” reaction correctly emphasized the 
need to ﬁrst have domestic stability policies in place, expectations for the 
internalization allowed by exchange-rate ﬂexibility were overly optimistic. 
This is conﬁrmed by observing exchange-rate ﬂuctuations between 1973 
and 1985 and by the widespread disappointment in the ﬂexible exchange-
rate regime. Currency markets did not achieve the theoretically expected 
degree of efﬁciency (as a result of “bubbles”, “overshooting”, “herding” 
and a lack of stabilizing speculation), and the major international 
currencies failed to place themselves on the same footing as the dollar. 
The dollar remained the international standard, and its de facto status 
as the only completely international currency continued to be a source 
of asymmetries. In practice, it was not possible to apply a policy of 
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generalized “benign neglect” regarding the value of the dollar, which the 
ﬂexible exchange-rate policy assumed would occur. These unrecognized 
and uncontrolled externalities harmed all concerned, giving rise once 
again to prisoner’s dilemma conditions.
The self-anchoring-through-domestic-monetary-policies strategies 
were more complex to manage and costlier to implement. The massive 
substitution of assets between different currencies created new 
disturbances in domestic-currency demands that counteracted the 
application of targets to domestic-monetary aggregates.8 Moreover, the 
lack of consensus regarding a model of how economies really work and 
what policies should be applied, combined with greater than expected 
exchange-rate variations, hindered a spontaneous convergence of 
domestic policies among industrialized economies. 
4. Managed ﬂoating through the “collegial” coordination 
of the G-7 under United States leadership (1985-1990)
These difﬁculties, added to the growing awareness of the 
interdependencies among the main economies, and, above all, to the 
perception that the dollar’s overvaluation in 1984-1985 had triggered a 
massive wave of protectionism in the United States, seriously undermining 
freedom of trade (as evidenced by complaints from the protectionist lobbies 
in the United States and the introduction in Congress of a large number 
of bills to restrict trade), led to a radical change in economic doctrine 
in the United States starting in 1985. This about-face was seen both in 
the exchange rate and in the renewed policy coordination with the other 
G-7 nations, and it was characterized by an unmistakable demand for 
coordination through international negotiation as a way of internalizing 
the new international linkages in an increasingly multipolar world.
Circumstances were now very different from in the past. The idea 
this time was for the major industrialized countries to jointly correct the 
accumulated macroeconomic imbalances among them without “crash-
landing” the dollar, which could have triggered world recession. The 
macroeconomic imbalances had resulted in a vicious circle of domination 
of exchange rates by ﬁnancial ﬂows, which in turn caused further 
imbalances. The economic team in President Reagan’s second term, with 
James Baker as Secretary of the Treasury, considered, with reason, that 
neither the United States alone nor the operation of free markets could 
correct the imbalances at an acceptable cost. Coordinated action and 
8 See McKinnon’s argument in McKinnon (1982a and 1982b).
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the establishment of a macroeconomic directorate among the major 
economies were viewed as a better option.
This turnaround in the United States’ position thus bore out the 
August 1985 report of the Group of 24 (non-aligned developing countries) 
and partly refuted the Group of Ten report, prepared and approved at the 
Bonn Summit in May of that year. The need for exchange-rate intervention 
and for a more “voluntaristic” coordination of macroeconomic policies 
was ofﬁcially recognized.
This change in economic thinking imposed by the new challenges 
of globalization allowed Secretary Baker to build a macroeconomic 
monetary coalition. Initially, in 1985, the coalition was formed by the 
G-5 countries (on whose currencies Special Drawing Rights [SDRs] are 
based,9 that is, the United States, Germany, Japan, France and the United 
Kingdom). The group was subsequently joined by Italy and Canada at 
the 1986 G-7 Summit in Tokyo. It took up the principle of multilateral 
surveillance through objective indicators and set up “G-7 Finance”, with 
the technical expertise of the IMF. Policy coordination was to be submitted 
to the authority of the G-7 heads of state. The main reason for enlarging 
the membership and formalizing policy was the need to intervene not 
only in the (more technical) exchange-rate and interest-rate policies but 
also in the (more political) budgetary policies. The United States hoped 
to achieve effective coordination of national macroeconomic policies 
to support the established exchange-rate objectives (keeping exchange 
rates within “target zones”). The idea, then, was to correct both the lack 
of coordination among domestic policies and the lack of orientation 
regarding exchange rates that by deﬁnition characterized the ﬂoating-rate 
monetary system.
Since exchange-rate target zones were not compulsory, the collegial 
determination of target ranges necessarily involved a collegial deﬁnition 
of macroeconomic policy to allow exchange rates to remain within the 
intended range. Thus, policies had to be brought into line with each other 
through negotiation, unlike the automatic mechanisms imposed under 
Bretton Woods.
With G-7 “collegial management”, the IMS went from a ﬂoating 
exchange rate to target zones, with ﬂuctuation margins intended to 
9 Special Drawing Rights, or SDRs, are an international reserve currency issued (belatedly) 
by the IMF starting in 1969 to solve the Triffin dilemma. They are a basket averaging 
the five major international currencies (United States dollar, Deutsch mark, Japanese 
yen, French franc, and British pound). They also serve as the IMF’s currency unit. A 
total of 21.4 billion SDRs were issued by IMF in two different periods (1970-1972 and 
1979-1981). A third allocation, called for in 1997 by the IMF Board of Governors, is still 
awaiting ratification by the United States Congress. 
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serve only as guidelines. Still, these guidelines were supported by 
policy coordination through peer pressure, which was set up by regular 
“multilateral surveillance” exercises. This pragmatic solution recognized 
the crucial link between external and internal stability but avoided a 
predetermined causal direction (unlike Bretton Woods parities, which 
were predominantly “external to internal”, or free-ﬂoating rates, which 
were predominantly “internal to external”). This made it possible to 
act simultaneously in both directions in search of an international 
equilibrium that would favour global growth. The challenge of this 
attempt at coordination consisted of introducing greater symmetry into 
the adjustment effort between countries with current account deﬁcits and 
those with surpluses, and thus avoiding the traditional deﬂationary bias 
inherent to such an external adjustment in the still-dominant United 
States economy. 
Speciﬁcally, the following agreements were reached:
1. In the Plaza Agreement (New York, September 1985), the G-5 resolved 
to correct the overvaluation of the dollar by bringing inﬂuence to 
bear on currency markets through coordinated actions, exchange-
rate and monetary intervention and signals in communiqués. 
Although mentioned, ﬁscal matters were not speciﬁcally addressed 
and, in fact, could not have been given the lack of consensus: the 
United States favoured a Keynesian budgetary expansion led by 
the two major economies —Germany and Japan— in order to force 
them to cut their growing current account surpluses, while these 
two countries feared inﬂationary risks and were wary of the United 
States’ intentions.
2. The Tokyo Summit institutionalized coordination through the 
monitoring of nine macroeconomic indicators, enlarged the G-5 to 
seven members and placed it under the technical oversight of the IMF 
staff, with the intermediation of G-7 ﬁnance meetings. The purpose 
was to strengthen the credibility of the Plaza Agreement and organize 
the transition from exchange-rate adjustment to a macroeconomic 
“policy mix” adjustment, particularly in the budgetary sphere. IMF 
participation was used to give to this exercise a more neutral and 
multilateral quality. 
3. Through the Louvre Agreement (Paris, February 1987), the G-7 
ﬁnance ministers resolved to stabilize the dollar (halt its depreciation) 
through interventions to keep it within the exchange-rate reference 
zones and to adjust monetary and ﬁscal policies to ensure the 
consistency and sustainability of exchange-rate objectives while 
promoting growth through a Keynesian stimulus of the global 
demand.
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The idea was that exchange-rate stability with growth could only 
result from a compatibilization of domestic policies through an explicit 
sharing of the burden of adjustment between countries with current 
account deﬁcits and those with surpluses in order to sustain global 
demand. Even the United States —perfectly coherent in its wish to provide 
better symmetry— tried to achieve a genuine system of coordination with 
normative indicators. This meant going from mere cooperation through the 
search for consensus by negotiation and peer pressure to a more formal, 
automatic “binding system” that would include commitments from 
the G-7 members, whether the arrangement was minimalistic, under a 
“trigger mechanism” formula with compulsory consultation in the event 
of deviation from the agreed-upon desirable goals, or more ambitious, 
with compulsory policy-correcting actions by any country whose 
performance diverged from the objectives that the group considered 
necessary for preserving policy compatibility. The different assessment of 
world inﬂation risks by the United States and the countries with current 
account surpluses (Germany and Japan) prevented an effective regulatory 
coordination agreement. Hence, Secretary Baker proposed an alternative 
course in September 1987 to ensure fair symmetry, a global anchoring of 
G-7 monetary policies according to the price movements of a basket of 
goods especially sensitive to inﬂationary pressure. This would have made 
it possible to guarantee that policy-adjustment coordination would not 
lead to inﬂation. The purpose of this proposal was to introduce a price 
indicator sensitive to inﬂationary pressures and establish a mechanism 
for non-sterilized foreign-exchange interventions by each country (i.e., 
through automatic modiﬁcations in countries’ monetary base) as a way 
to stabilize this indicator in each domestic currency, thereby providing a 
transparent domestic target and commitment. In the event of a rise in the 
domestic-currency indicator, all G-7 members would buy up their own 
currencies against reserves to appreciate their respective exchange rates 
until the rise of the indicator measured in their own domestic-currency 
was neutralized, thus absorbing imported inﬂation and inducing an 
automatic contraction of the global money supply. This mechanism 
would have provided an objective guarantee against any international 
inﬂationary consequences of G-7 coordination.
However, this ingenious plan was rejected by the other G-7 members. 
Although all the G-7 members were somewhat interested in a system with 
objective rules on sharing the burden of correcting imbalances, the lack of 
consensus on inﬂationary risks and on the content of possible policies, the 
fear of being obliged to waive certain domestic objectives so as to meet 
the agreed exchange-rate targets, and, above all, governments’ inability 
to make credible international commitments regarding ﬁscal policies 
without national legislative support thwarted the credibility of effective 
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coordination of budgetary policies. This combination of exchange-rate 
agreements and excessive rigidity of national ﬁscal policies led to an 
unbalanced coordination detrimental to global monetary stability. The 
burden of the agreements fell excessively on exchange-rate interventions 
and monetary policies. Consequently, global anchoring was the real key 
to the problem of coordination.
Assessments of the chosen policies continue to diverge.10  Stretching 
the limits of the purpose of this generic document, I would venture to 
say that this experience was important for both its achievements and its 
failures, because:
1. It offered a concrete opportunity to analyze the implications, 
challenges and risks of international coordination.
2. Regarding the G-7’s macroeconomic impact, G-7 coordination 
achieved positive short-term results and had negative longer-term 
effects. One positive result was that it permitted the “soft landing” of 
the dollar and avoided a serious crisis in the world economic order 
at that moment. Although the G-7’s action did achieve an orderly 
depreciation of the dollar —i.e., with no major ﬁnancial mishaps, 
serious recession or worldwide deﬂation— it failed to bring about 
the promised stability and —as feared by the current-account-surplus 
countries— led to greater inﬂation and less ﬁscal adjustment, as well 
as to a ﬁnancial bubble in the United States and especially in Japan.
3. Regarding its more systemic impact, the positive outcome was a 
transition towards a more multipolar monetary world in which 
macroeconomic decisions were more “collegial” than in the past. 
The negative aspect was the “(ab)use” by the United States of the 
deﬂationary risk to build a complacent “Keynesian” coalition among 
the G-7 members capable of isolating the “monetarist” Bundesbank 
(the only autonomous actor at that time) and imposing a global policy 
mix more consistent with United States’ and French preferences, 
thereby postponing sorely needed budgetary adjustments by 
industrialized countries through excessive money creation.
4. In conjunction, these results led to another “international money 
wave” (i.e., an excess in the global monetary supply) and to 
overheating (1989), intensifying stock market speculation in general 
and foreign-exchange speculation in particular (the EMS crisis). This, 
10 At the time, very few economists were aware of the inflationary risks. One clear example 
was the manifest issued by a group of prominent economists from various countries in 
1988 asking for additional measures to spark global demand, precisely when an upturn 
was already underway. 
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in turn, resulted in a deepening of the European and worldwide 
recession of the early 1990s. Regarding international cooperation, the 
result was a certain loss of credibility of international agreements. 
Still, this negative experience had the positive effect of contributing 
eventually to unifying a European monetary bloc in search of its 
own stability. That four members of the G-7 also belonged to the 
European Union and three of them belonged to the EMS and abided 
by its exchange-rate mechanism expedited the organization of a 
common response as an original regional system of macroeconomic 
monitoring.
5. Lessons of “G-7-style” hegemonic coordination 
An examination of the G-7 attempt reveals the operation of 
some logical forces, from which more general principles can be drawn. 
Despite its success at short-term crisis management, the United States 
—which no longer had the same relative economic weight it once had 
and whose currency was increasingly being substituted with competing 
emerging currencies— was unable to establish a sustainable scheme for 
macroeconomic-policy coordination through the G-7.
The basic problem was how to achieve effective progress towards 
greater symmetry in the IMS. This could not be done simply through a 
closed club holding a few meetings, mainly due to a lack of effective 
ﬁscal policy coordination. With the G-7, Secretary Baker’s intention was 
for ﬁscal policy to be subordinate to international negotiations, which 
would have highlighted common interests and thus achieved agreed-on 
and more balanced adjustments. Although this was a meritorious step 
in the right direction in both its method and its goals, Baker’s plan was 
predicated on two overdrawn hypotheses:
1. Baker’s assumption that, through negotiations, this closed and 
non-transparent club could reach decisions and implement timely, 
signiﬁcant adjustments in national ﬁscal policies that would be 
democratically approved by the respective legislative bodies (hence, 
there was an institutional problem), and
2. His assumption that assessments of global inﬂation risks would not 
differ greatly among the G-7 members, and therefore that the cost for 
any one of them to relinquish part of its monetary autonomy would 
not be high.
The fundamental asymmetry introduced by the dollar’s monopoly 
as an international monetary standard made the simultaneous fulﬁlment 
of these two key conditions impossible. First, the United States enjoyed an 
Fostering economic policy coordination in Latin America 45
absence of an effective external constraint because it was able to assume 
debt in its own currency and transfer the exchange risk to its creditors (the 
“exorbitant privilege” famously decried in the 1960s by General Charles De 
Gaulle). Hence, the United States’ incentive to reduce its ﬁscal deﬁcits 
was much lower than that of the other partners, causing an asymmetrical 
coordination to the detriment of the more ﬁscally rigorous countries. 
Second, this risk reinforced concern for global stability because the greater 
burden fell on monetary and exchange intervention policies, threatening 
the credibility of monetary policies (especially for the Bundesbank). 
Consequently, the less feasible the ﬁscal coordination, the more difﬁcult it was 
to reach an agreement regarding inﬂationary risks and on appropriate monetary 
policy stances and the greater the need for objective global anchoring, making 
the internal political costs of coordination that much higher. Nevertheless, it 
remains difﬁcult to understand why Baker’s anchoring proposal was so 
quickly and overwhelmingly dismissed, since it provided a concrete and 
objective solution to the differences in assessing the risk of inﬂation. 
Bear in mind that the Bretton Woods system was abandoned due 
to a lack of anchoring, and the other major countries opted for a safer 
domestic anchoring system. Hence, any attempt to return to more rigid 
exchange-rate regimes would have involved replacing the individual 
internal anchoring systems with a credible global one. The coherent 
proposals put forth by Baker (and the IMF) were not enough to make a 
convincing argument that anchoring should stem from the discretional 
coordination of the G-7 (Tokyo 1986 and Louvre February 1987) or from an 
automatic piloting mechanism through monetary rule (Baker’s September 
1987 proposal). The fundamental reason for this was that the asymmetry 
of the dollar, by reducing the likelihood of balanced action vis-à-vis 
national budgets, entailed a greater risk of conﬂict between external and 
internal objectives and increased coordination costs, especially regarding 
the credibility of the central banks. The G-7 thus became ensnared in a 
logical contradiction: asymmetry hindered the valuation of common 
interests and tended to perpetuate distrust, which, in turn, undermined 
efforts to escape from the prisoner’s dilemma situation. Coordination 
was not effective, except in emergency situations, in which a shared fear 
bonded the G-7 members together in the short term.
In general, this review of the G-7 experiment allows us to arrive at 
some initial, basic principles of coordination:
1. No coordination is feasible without a minimum consensus regarding 
the underlying model and in particular regarding the evaluation of 
the risk of global inﬂation as well as how to anchor the global system 
(the problem of assessing the output gap, as well as of aggregating it 
at a global level).
46 ECLAC
2. There is an important linkage between exchange stability and 
national budget policies; hence, coordination of these policies is a 
key issue in any attempt at international coordination.
3. It is illusory and dangerous to think that a closed international club 
can make timely decisions regarding, and implement signiﬁcant 
adjustments to, national ﬁscal policies, which by deﬁnition have to 
be democratically approved by the respective legislatures and public 
opinion.
4. International coordination requires checks and balances and the 
autonomy of central banks to avoid asymmetries that favour the 
dominant countries or that are created through collusion regarding 
short-term interests by political policy makers who answer to 
domestic public opinion. Asymmetry of information favours the 
members of any “international policy makers’ club” and allows 
them to be complacent regarding the policies they implement and to 
impose their own view regarding the general interest (growth) and 
how to achieve national goals. 
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Chapter III
History of the emergence of the 
European monetary pole through 
economic policy coordination 
The preceding chapter gave an overview of some important experiments 
in coordination and the steps taken by industrialized economies to manage 
coordination. It showed that the main difﬁculty of G-7 coordination was 
linked to the lack of progress in the regulation of global liquidity within a 
context of an asymmetric dollar. Such externalities provoked a European 
response, in the form of the development of regional coordination, as 
shown in section 2 of this chapter. Before spelling out this European reaction 
to the IMS caveats, section 1 raises the broader issue of determining the 
optimal level of governance and the kind of regulation a global market 
economy needs to operate smoothly and efﬁciently. The issue is deep-
rooted and goes well beyond technical or economic domains since it 
involves fundamental philosophical choices about the kind of society 
citizens would like to live in, not to mention the contradiction between 
the “interventionist centralism” of Latin culture and the “individualistic 
decentralism” of Anglo-Saxon societies.
As is known, institution-building by the European Union represents 
an original, challenging blending of different cultures. (Roughly speaking, 
the European Union has brought together, for the ﬁrst time in history, 
the three major cultural heritages that the Western World comprises: 
Latin, Anglo-Saxon and German.) This might be an experience of 
special interest for other regions, especially for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, when deliberating the optimal level of government needed 
to cope with ascendant economic globalization. This is all the more so 
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given the precedent of the ongoing implementation of the EMU and its 
single currency, the euro, since regional integration appears more clearly 
a possible option for a more regulated and stable globalization. Further, 
recent trends towards uncoordinated dollarization in Latin America, 
and the Argentine crisis, call for a deeper reﬂection on practical regional 
alternatives. 
Hence, any consideration of the need for reforms should take 
account of the possible contributions of a regional approach of the IMS. 
The most concrete way to deal with this is to examine the euro experience 
and its potential impact on the IMS, which will also entail examining the 
relationship between globalization and regionalization. 
Before addressing this aspect of European monetary uniﬁcation 
and its possible lessons for Latin America, we need, however, to go back 
to the beginning of European integration, in order to assess some longer-
run aspects of governance in a globalizing world as well as the close 
interaction between the development of European integration and the 
international economic system. 
Hence, this chapter begins by looking back to some fundamental 
aspects at work in the European experience, underscoring some basic 
principles that still seem valid and useful for LDCs and, more speciﬁcally, 
for Latin American countries. Following the section devoted to recalling 
these important antecedents, the emergence of the euro is presented as a 
reaction to the externalities of the dollar and the weaknesses of the IMS. 
The following sections build on these two foundational sections to review 
in detail the main steps in the construction of the European Union’s 
coordination scheme and put forth some practical conclusions.
1. The forgotten roots and the basic principles of the 
European regional integration 
From the outset, the European process of integration was closely 
linked to macroeconomic considerations and to the external context, 
especially to the IMS. This is best demonstrated by focusing on the decisive 
contributor to the regional integration approach, who is also famous as 
an important analyst of international monetary problems: Robert Trifﬁn 
(1911-1993). A Belgian economist trained at the universities of Louvain and 
Harvard before World War II, Trifﬁn became a United States citizen and 
served as an adviser both in that country (to the Federal Reserve, the White 
House and others) and to European institutions, namely, the Organisation 
for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the EPU, during the 
Marshall plan, and later for the European Commission, where he was the 
driving force behind the EMS and the euro. Trifﬁn’s thought provides the 
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best insight to understand the European concept of integration and the 
model on which the entire process of regional integration has been built. 
This understanding is a key not just for domestic reasons but also for the 
sake of the international order. 
Trifﬁn perceived very early, and expressed better than others, the 
most fundamental issue of a globalized economy. His work decisively 
shaped the emerging European integration and the promotion of a regional 
approach as a way to stabilize the international economic and monetary 
system. He was the ﬁrst to diagnose and propose a concrete solution to 
the fundamental issue of the proper level of economic governance (later 
named the “subsidiarity principle”). 
Next, the way the international economy works (or, rather, how it 
does not work very well) must be analyzed, in line with two fundamental 
but simple observations: First, there is a need to provide an institutional 
framework for international trade and payments limiting the instability 
inevitably resulting from a clash of national sovereignties. Since 
independent national policy decisions in an interdependent world cannot 
be optimal in themselves, there is a need for economic cooperation 
among sovereign policy makers and especially for a strengthening of 
the institutional framework of international convertibility, to ensure 
monetary and ﬁnancial stability. Second, regional cooperation might 
be a useful tool to construct such an international coordination scheme, 
since it is an intermediate step and an efﬁcient way to launch the required 
institution-building and practices that a workable global coordination 
scheme ultimately needs. Trifﬁn’s conception of a stable international 
economic order and especially of the IMS (the convertibility issue) is based 
on the interconnectedness of global institutions, regional cooperation and 
national policies. In fact, and before the concepts were properly named, 
this was the “subsidiarity” issue in a “globalizing” world. 
The basic issue of what is now called “globalization”, with which 
we are increasingly forced to grapple, was observed by Trifﬁn as far back 
as 1957 when he said, “the fundamental dilemma of international economic 
relations in the 20th century lies in the inadequacy of national sovereignty as 
a framework for policy decisions and their administrative implementation 
in an interdependent world” (Trifﬁn, 1957, p. 303). All Trifﬁn’s work was 
inﬂuenced by this menacing gap, which traps national policy makers 
and their voters into a typical prisoner’s dilemma. Most of Trifﬁn’s 
contributions to international monetary issues resulted from this systemic 
question, which he attempted to tackle by designing workable schemes 
for reducing its costly consequences for the world economy and policy-
making. 
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Although he had “greater faith in market convertibility than in 
intergovernmental agreements and organizations for world trade and payments” 
(Trifﬁn, 1957, p. xiii), Trifﬁn considered that the only stable solution was 
the creation of an institutional framework that could introduce some 
degree of coordination, reducing national discretionary autonomy for 
the sake of preserving external stability. The Belgian economist’s solid 
realism, together with his cosmopolitan idealism, made him perfectly 
aware that this was easier to apply ﬁrst among like-minded neighbouring 
countries sharing common cultures and similar economic conditions.
The most famous contribution he made in that direction —the so-
called Trifﬁn dilemma— was to warn the Bretton Woods institutions 
that the dollar standard, under which a national currency was used for 
international purposes, was a logical incongruity preventing an optimal 
level of international liquidity. Since the very emergence of the dollar 
standard, and thus well before his 1957 book, Trifﬁn had already argued 
that restoring a worldwide multilateral trading and payments system 
through the establishment of the IMF and the reinstatement of the sterling 
as a key currency was doomed to fail and that new methods of regional 
cooperation were required, at least for Europe at that time. Thus, Trifﬁn’s 
transparent bias in favour of regional rather than global agreements led 
him to become one of the earliest proponents of, most active negotiators 
for and most ardent defenders of the EPU, which ﬁlled the vacuum left by 
the failure of the sterling’s convertibility in 1947 and the weakness of the 
IMF in those early days. Indeed, in 1947-1948, the IMF dollar-denominated 
resources had already been exhausted and the cost of the Marshall Plan 
was twenty times greater than Europe’s borrowing rights from the IMF. 
Drawing on the success of the EPU, Trifﬁn advanced the theory that 
“regional arrangements of this character, while admittedly discriminatory in 
some respects, can accelerate and consolidate progress towards global currency 
convertibility, introduce elements of stability in international economic relations, 
and help limit the international spread of recessions and restrictions” (Trifﬁn, 
1957, p.x). 
During the 1950s, his analyses showed that the obstacles to 
restoring currency convertibility in Europe no longer lay “in the weakness 
of its economy, in its inﬂationary proclivities or in the shortage of dollars, but in 
fears and uncertainties regarding the future harmonization of nationalistic trade 
and monetary policies in an interdependent world” (Trifﬁn, 1957, p.86). 
I will leave it the reader to determine to what extent this sentence, 
nearly a half-century old, remains crucially true regarding current-day 
Latin America. Further, in the light of a full decade of successive crises, 
starting with the ERM in 1992-1993 and the Tequila Crisis in 1994, 
followed by crises in Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, Argentina 
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in 2001-2002, with its repercussions in Uruguay, Brazil and Paraguay in 
2002-2003, as well as … the next crisis, it is worth recalling that for Trifﬁn 
maintaining the ideal of full convertibility was impossible among fully 
sovereign national states without triggering a crisis. 
Although, for the most part, this seems reminiscent of the 
propositions put forth in the 1960s in “Mundell’s triangle theorem of 
impossibility”, i.e., the impossibility of simultaneously maintaining 
autonomous national monetary policies, ﬁxed exchange rates and free 
capital movements, Trifﬁn’s position goes further. 
For Mundell, market efﬁciency is equivalent to opting for ﬂexible 
rates as a way of solving the monetary dilemma through the markets. 
As the events after the collapse of the ﬁxed-exchange-rate system tended 
to show, Mundell’s position relied on the implicit hypothesis that all 
currencies are equivalent substitutes of each other, allowing the markets to 
respond efﬁciently to the international demand for money. It is now clear 
that this hypothesis did not hold in the real world. Much earlier, Trifﬁn 
had already perceived the same impossibility but without presuming 
any triangular equivalence. History will increasingly show how right he 
was, and events have already demonstrated the validity of the European 
approach. Historians of European reconstruction and integration 
acknowledge that the solution ﬁnally devised for bilateralism,11 thanks to 
the design of the EPU (with Marshall’s money carrot) 12 and its consequent 
success, was the keystone for the post-war recovery and the creation of 
European Community. 
Less well known but even more important is that Trifﬁn also 
contributed to shaping the European approach to and method of integration. 
First, through the subsidiarity principle, although he did not use that term, 
by explaining the need for cooperation on and limitation of some aspects 
of national sovereignty over economic policies. Still, he insisted that, “in 
many cases, the centralization of negotiations and decisions … would constitute 
11 This was not only regarding monetary issues (convertibility) but also trade policy. 
One of Triffin’s important contributions was to link the two sides. He also wanted the 
IMF jurisdiction to be closely associated with that of the planned International Trade 
Organization, to ensure cohesiveness between the two.
12 Here I must acknowledge the farsightedness and political talent of some United States 
leaders of the time who were eventually able to resist short-term vested interests in 
the United States and other industrial lobbies and adopt a strategic long-run vision 
of a globalizing multilateral world. They saw this as better for the United States than 
exploiting the country’s power in bilateral schemes. They also agreed to allow Europe to 
temporarily derogate the non-discriminatory principle, giving Europeans both the time 
and the wherewithal to rebuild their competitiveness and postpone a faster sustainable 
opening. 
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a handicap, an element of paralysis, and a source of international friction rather 
than an effective contribution to the solution of our problems” (Trifﬁn, 1957, 
p.258). Second, with the deﬁnition of the coordination principle based 
on market sanctions, which would be ﬁnally selected through the “trial 
and error” process, leading to the European Union’s present surveillance 
and coordination of economic policies, “sovereign countries should not be 
expected to undertake and respect international commitments which come into 
conﬂict —real or even imaginary— with powerful national pressures or interests. 
Barring the use of coercion, the efﬁcacy of international commitments depends 
primarily on the provisions that make their implementation both feasible and 
attractive and their breach unnecessary and damaging from the point of view of 
the countries concerned. National interests should be made to coincide, through 
a double mechanism of deterrents and incentives, with the collective interests of 
the group. Reciprocity and mutual help are the keystones of such a construction” 
(Trifﬁn, 1957, pg. 246). The successes in the recent development of the 
European Union stem precisely from the application of these two basic 
principles, demonstrating once again the validity of the precursor Trifﬁn’s 
approach to regional integration.
Hence, the history of the basic principles of and successive attempts 
at coordination in Europe goes back ﬁfty years. It began —at the behest 
of the United States (through the Marshall Plan), and in keeping with 
the lessons learned from the failure of cooperation during the interwar 
period— with the EPU and the OEEC in 1947-1948. 
However, the success of European reconstruction and the speedy 
return to convertibility in the framework of Bretton Woods notably 
diminished efforts to design speciﬁc coordination arrangements, as 
discussed in section 3 of this chapter. Later, the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods regime and the failures of the successive formulas examined in 
chapter 2 (ﬂoating, G-7 coordination) caused by the asymmetry of the 
dollar contributed signiﬁcantly to a European reaction. In each instance, 
it appears that the external context, and especially the IMS, played an 
important role in the development of a regional approach and European 
integration. 
2. The European response: economic and monetary 
integration through coordination
Although, as described in the following sections, the formation 
and design of a veritable European pole of macroeconomic policies was 
very slow and painful, it can be viewed as a response to the externalities 
generated by the asymmetry of the dollar and as an operational modality 
for the construction of a multipolar monetary world. At the very least, the 
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shortcomings of the IMS played a signiﬁcant role in the European process, 
ﬁrst by creating obstacles but also by gradually giving rise to the will 
and the means to overcome them. This does not mean that the European 
integration process would have been either slower or faster without these 
occurrences but simply that regional integration must be analyzed in the 
light of the external context in general and that of the IMS in particular.
Both the ﬂoating-currency regime and the hegemonic-cooperative 
G-7 regime (which systematically ignored the EMS) were initially a source 
of divergence and internal conﬂict within the European Community. The 
general dissatisfaction with and reaction against the asymmetry imposed 
by the dollar and the use of the G-7, however, served as a catalyst for the 
EMS and regional integration. A series of forces was mutually strengthened, 
leading to a regional response of greater import for the IMS.
1. Flexible exchange rates among the currencies of the Common 
Market were perceived from the beginning as a source of conﬂict 
and divergence inconsistent with the Community’s objectives.
2. In addition, ﬂexible exchange rates were perceived as unattractive 
or much less attractive to the small or even medium-sized countries, 
whose exchange rates were used as an intermediary instrument 
of monetary policy in their search for stability. This explains the 
progressive development of a regional European system anchored 
to the deutsche mark (DM), with the latter anchored to an internal 
monetary principle, the “M3” monetary aggregate. This regional 
regrouping via parities with the DM (the “snake”) and subsequently 
via a more symmetrical basket system (the EMS and the ECU) was a 
signiﬁcant step towards a multipolar monetary system.
3. Another step (or at least an additional force) arose from the need 
to overcome the external effects that the increasingly frequent but 
unstable substitution between the dollar and the two emerging key 
currencies (the DM and the yen) generated both inside the EMS and 
for the German anchor. The emergence of the international role of the 
German mark, combined with the wide ﬂuctuations in the value of 
the dollar, caused asymmetrical shocks to European economies beset 
by speculative capital movements, intensifying tensions among 
the Community’s currencies and requiring countervailing national 
monetary policy reactions pulling in conﬂicting directions and 
generally inappropriate for domestic objectives. These speculative 
capital movements jeopardized the EMS and disrupted the 
management of the M3 aggregate itself, threatening the credibility of 
the Bundesbank’s monetary policy as well as weakening members’ 
sense of belonging to a community.
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4. Moreover, in the light of the need for a more collegial management of 
exchange rates and of the policy mixes that sustained them, not only 
did the membership of four of the seven G-7 members in the European 
Community undermine Europe’s leading role but their divergences 
impeded the Europeans from speaking in a single voice. Nor was the 
existence of the EMS, to which three members of the G-7 belonged, 
recognized. The United States managed to build alliances within the 
G-7 that divided the Europeans. The effects of the G-7 agreements at 
the Louvre and in late 1987 demonstrated the need for the European 
Community to achieve greater macroeconomic cohesion to correct 
the asymmetry of the respective impacts: whereas the United States 
exerted much macroeconomic inﬂuence on each European country, 
none of these countries could have sufﬁcient impact by acting 
alone. Even in the monetary sphere, Baker’s collaborative strategy 
pressured the Bundesbank from 1986 to 1988. The German central 
bank’s legal autonomy found its limits when the bank became aware 
that its economic base (the German economy) was much weaker than 
was its de facto monetary role (as the anchor of the EMS and partial 
substitute for the dollar). By continuing to go it alone, Germany was 
exposed to overvaluation shocks and to arousing hostile reactions 
to its autonomous monetary policy. What was needed to achieve 
German monetary stability was progress beyond the coordination 
of European positions in the G-7; this, in turn, required establishing 
a more effective intra-European coordination mechanism capable 
of consolidating the EMS and reducing or overcoming European 
monetary segmentation.
These arguments converged to prompt the different European 
actors to search for a formula for effective coordination among 
themselves, and mainly to improve management of the EMS. Both 
sides —the German government and the independent Bundesbank, and 
the less-stable countries or those requiring major policy adjustments— 
gradually discovered the costs that monetary segmentation imposed on 
their respective policy mixes. There was an increasing awareness that all 
were on board the same ship, that it had sprung a leak, and that those on 
the bridge and in the ﬁrst-class cabins could not survive without joining 
forces with those on the lower decks.
To counteract the effects of the dollar’s asymmetry and the G-7 on the 
EMS, Germany needed more stable monetary policies throughout Europe, 
while its less-stable European partners were interested in leveraging 
German credibility to escape from speculative shocks and reduce their 
punishing interest-rate differentials (which exacted a high cost for growth, 
jobs and public ﬁnance). Germany could accept sharing its monetary 
power in exchange for a system of coordination that guaranteed common 
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discipline in both the monetary and budgetary spheres. This disguised 
promotion of the role of the Bundesbank to the European level was the 
main function of the Euro Project and one of its driving forces, insofar as 
it created a win-win game for all partners.
However, to fully understand how it was possible in the European 
case to design an effective coordination device with the aim of reducing 
European vulnerability to external shocks and consolidate its regional 
integration, we must review, step-by-step and from the beginning, the 
long historical process of its implementation.
The Bretton Woods regime provided a strong boost to European 
reconstruction, by bringing a return to monetary stability and convertibility, 
thereby ensuring a system of automatic coordination, as described in 
chapter II, section 1. It should be stressed that trade integration in Europe 
was possible because the countries put their macroeconomic systems in 
order prior to establishing preferential trade-liberalization agreements. 
The return to macro-monetary stability was thus a prerequisite to trade 
integration, which is often overlooked when monetary uniﬁcation via the 
euro is viewed as merely the crowning moment of the single market (see 
chapter VI, section 2, below).
In the late 1960s, when global inﬂation was accelerating and a 
period of exchange and monetary instability had begun, Europe perceived 
increasing risks to the continuation of its regional integration. The need 
for the Continent to consolidate its own stability through greater regional 
cooperation became more apparent than it had been during the years 
of external stability. The Common Market was threatened by members’ 
ﬂoating their currencies. Even the December 1971 Smithsonian Agreement 
decision to broaden the ﬂuctuation bands regarding the dollar from 1% 
to 2.25% risked potential extremes on the order of 9%, if one European 
currency sank to the ﬂoor of the band and another one rose to upper limit 
(thereby doubling the 4.5% band). In this period of ﬁxed exchange regimes, 
but with a broadened band, the management of a single agricultural 
market was already proving extremely difﬁcult and costly.
This need to react to external shocks and to the asymmetry of the 
dollar explains the existence of a European monetary agreement and the 
subsequent need to strengthen it through a system of coordination of 
other policies.
Let us now examine in more detail the basic principles and the 
successive steps that were followed in the European case, chronologically 
and with a view to drawing some general lessons.
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3. First coordination attempt in the 1960s and early 1970s: 
discretionary coordination 
The Treaty of Rome (1957), which created the European Common 
Market (a customs union with the addition of some common policies), 
envisioned neither the transfer of sovereignty and institutional devices 
nor coordination rules in the macro-monetary sphere. The initial Treaty 
simply established a general principle of coordination of national economic 
policies by the Council of Ministers (former Article 104), and this only 
to the extent necessary to achieve the Treaty’s objectives. Member States 
were allowed to decide the scope and limits of this coordination (former 
Article 6).
The business-cycle policies of the Member States were considered 
“matters of common concern” (Article 103). In the monetary sphere, the 
Treaty stipulated only that the foreign-exchange policy was a “matter 
of common concern”. To supervise this, however, the Treaty created a 
consultative body —the Monetary Committee— made up of representatives 
of the central banks, ministries of ﬁnance and the European Commission 
(former Article 104), entrusted with coordinating relevant policies. The 
Committee played a key role in coordination.
In this context of “subsidiarity”, the European Commission 
proposed giving operational substance to the rather vague principles of 
the Treaty, through the adoption of “secondary legislation” by the Council. 
These Council decisions settled practical modalities of cooperation 
among national administrations under a coordination mandate given to 
the Commission. Through these centralized procedures, the Commission 
organized several macroeconomic committees (the business-cycle policy 
committee, in 1960; the medium-term policy committee and the Central 
Bank Governors Committee, in 1964; the budgetary policy committee, in 
1965) in a centralized framework, with a view to unifying and preparing 
a future federal power in Brussels. 
With the emergence of macroeconomic imbalances in the Bretton 
Woods system and the resulting inﬂationary pressures, national policies 
started to show signiﬁcant divergences, giving rise to monetary instability 
in the Community. In response to this threat to the Common Market, the 
coordination procedures were consolidated:
• 1969: obligatory prior consultation for any economic-policy decision 
at a national level; Barre plan for policy coordination and monetary 
uniﬁcation; The Hague Summit.
• 1970: Werner Plan for monetary union. 
• 1971 and 1972: resolutions on economic policy. 
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• 1974: directive on stability; decision on economic convergence; 
merger of the three non-monetary committees into an Economic 
Policy Committee; establishment of an Annual Economic Report on 
the Community economy. 
All these measures contributed to the establishment of a rather 
sophisticated system, with quantitative objectives and formal procedures 
to coordinate national economic policies through a process centralized at 
the Commission, and as a ﬁrst step towards the transfer of macroeconomic 
sovereignty. This centralist system leaned towards budgetary activism and 
the ﬁne-tuning typical of the intensiﬁed Keynesian stance of the times.
These actions, however, resulted in a serious failure of coordination: 
despite their juridical sophistication and centralist nature, the formal 
procedures were utterly incapable of ensuring a minimum degree of 
convergence within the Community. The reason for this failure lay simply 
in each national administration’s different economic-policy proposals, 
i.e., the lack of consensus on the speciﬁc economic policies. Combined 
with some asymmetries of external shocks, these policy differences led to 
varying economic results and lower growth in the Community.
The failure of this ﬁrst European coordination experiment provides 
two major lessons (Ghymers, 1995) that make it possible to formulate two 
basic principles for economic-policy coordination:
1. No centralized policy-coordinating procedure among a group of 
sovereign countries can succeed if national decisions on their concrete 
content diverge. Stated in the afﬁrmative, this negative lesson can 
be formulated as a general principle: when economic policies continue 
to be the responsibility of national governments, the effectiveness of any 
coordination system depends fundamentally on its ability to contribute 
positively to a consensus among national political policy makers. That is, 
content takes precedence over procedure; what is important is not 
so much the institutional aspect —the establishment of obligatory 
formal procedures— but the ability to narrow down the differences 
in economic analyses and choices through the development of 
appropriate incentives likely to interest national authorities in 
exchanging opinions and information.
2. In this context of decentralized economic policies, and given that 
national governments cannot sacriﬁce their own goals for the sake 
of others’, coordination stumbles into a prisoner’s dilemma: national 
governments tend to act individually even though doing so may 
harm not only their neighbours but also their own country. This 
observation can serve to devise a second afﬁrmative principle and 
escape the dilemma: Priority should be given to cooperative systems 
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capable of further internalizing the effects of national policy or making 
them more visible in order to stimulate self-discipline and protect countries’ 
own interests (market-based rewards or sanctions to national political 
leaders).
4. The second coordination experiment (1979-1987): rules 
for collegial management of the EMS
Towards the end of the 1970s, macroeconomic divergences and the 
associated poor economic results, disappointment in ﬂexible exchange 
rates and a soaring dollar all encouraged political consensus on the need 
to restore cohesion and stability within the Community through some 
kind of common discipline. The negative experience of exchange-rate 
instability encouraged making a top priority of the search for greater 
external stability, considered the most pragmatic way of indirectly 
imposing the minimum discipline required to achieve internal stability.
The 1978 creation of the EMS 13 came in response to this change 
both in macroeconomic strategy (towards favouring policies stability 
policies) and in the approach to European coordination (towards a self-
imposed discipline through exchange-rate stability). Simply stated, the 
EMS constituted a transition from a discretionary form of coordination 
to a rules-based system. A major innovation of the EMS was the shared 
nature of any decision on parities between participating currencies, 
because these parities were deﬁned in reference to a common basket (the 
ecu). Formally, the EMS was a set of bilateral agreements among national 
central banks, which were given greater responsibility and functions in 
a process that would lead to a notable increase in their role in setting 
European policies. This institutionalized participation thus made it 
necessary to hold ongoing collegial discussions on the national policies 
that were causing foreign-exchange pressures, and particularly to change 
discourse between the central banks and the ministries of ﬁnance at a 
national level. Speciﬁcally, political coordination among countries and 
between monetary and ﬁscal authorities was no longer a discretionary 
administrative procedure but the result of a self-motivated discipline, 
13 The President of the Commission, Sir Roy Jenkins, launched the EMS process in October 
1977 through his “Florence speech”, based on papers prepared by the DG for Economy 
and Finance (formerly, the DGII) and by Triffin, with a small consultative group from 
the University of Louvain-la-Neuve. Not until 5 December 1978 did the Council publish 
a resolution to this effect and did the central banks establish operational bilateral 
arrangements, for entry into force 1 March 1979. The EMS was in fact the belated 
materialization of some of Triffin’s early proposals issued in the framework of the EPU 
and its transformation into an EMU, in November and December 1957 (Memorandas 
sur la création d’un Fonds Européen de Réserve). 
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because it was the only way to ensure that the rules of the game would 
be respected and that the EMS stability objectives would be attained, in 
the interest not only of each Member Country but also of each individual 
authority (central bank and ﬁnance ministry). The EMS, with its emphasis 
on exchange-rate performance and the factors that determine it, permitted 
an authentic internalization of the external effects of national policies: 
any divergence in monetary and/or ﬁscal policy had even stronger 
consequences on exchange rates, and the institutionalized commitment to 
parities increased the visibility and political cost of non-compliance. This 
internalization helped solve the fundamental problem of coordination 
—how to impose a common discipline— because, with its “hands tied”, 
each political authority was more motivated to adjust its own behaviour. 
Thus, coordination progressively became the automatic result of an optimal 
combination of national policies under compulsory rules and vis-à-vis 
some markets, capable of genuinely sanctioning national authorities.
During this learning process, the Bundesbank’s credibility and 
anchoring were crucial. The ﬁxed exchange-rate option (ERM) made it 
possible to disseminate the German monetary standard of stability to the 
beneﬁt of all participants: Germany reduced its risk of being harmed by the 
instability of its main partners (and particularly the risk of overvaluing its 
own currency) while its partners were able to diminish their disinﬂation 
costs by “borrowing credibility” from the DM, thanks to the EMS and under 
the threat of the visible political cost of non-compliance. In effect, after a 
difﬁcult start in the middle of the second oil crisis, the strong recession of 
1981-1982 and some last attempts at divergent policies, macroeconomic 
strategy was adjusted in the direction of stability —both external and 
internal— throughout Europe. The resulting convergence restored growth 
and employment and paved the way to stronger integration, especially 
through European currency uniﬁcation.
These successes, based on the intelligent coordination of “market-
conforming” principles, conﬁrm the two negative lessons of the failed 
attempts of the 1960s and early 1970s, which were based on centralized 
modalities, making it possible to more explicitly formulate the two 
previously mentioned basic principles of coordination:
1. Consensus on economic policies is a necessary condition to ensure the 
success of coordination. It requires that countries have a similar vision 
of the workings of the economy, i.e., a minimum degree of agreement 
on “underlying economic model”.
2. Institutional or practical modalities of coordination play two primary 
roles: ﬁrst, in progressively building a cooperative culture and a climate 
of trust through personal contacts among technical decision makers in order 
to encourage emulation and cooperation among national authorities; and 
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second, in establishing, through rules and procedures, some visible 
signals to inform public opinion and the markets of the advantages of 
their policies. This makes it possible to accelerate the rewards or 
sanctions given to national authorities. In the EMS, the most important 
linkage was established between a commitment on parities and the 
credibility of national economic policies, with rewards or sanctions 
being determined by the reaction of the ﬁnancial markets.
5. First multilateral surveillance exercises (1987-1989)
Based on this experience, the Commission submitted a proposal 
to the Council to consolidate, though legal channels, the established 
practices and collaborative work of the national experts in the ERM 
management. By early 1987, a conﬁdential regional-surveillance exercise 
between national experts and the Commission was established in the 
Monetary Committee (based on a technical evaluation presented by the 
Commission) to improve the stability of the parity grid. This initiative 
responded to, and took advantage of, the Baker initiatives in the G-7, 
within the context of the dollar crisis. Macroeconomic surveillance, based 
on indicators and implemented at the Tokyo Summit (1986), would have 
been impossible without the collegial management of the EMS. In effect, 
the Community had to make the ERM operation compatible with the 
commitments acquired by three of its G-7 members —in particular, the 
exchange-rate and intervention objectives.
The positive result of this informal but explicit surveillance of the 
ERM operation, as well as the Council’s decision to carry out the ﬁrst 
stage of the EMU process in July 1990,14  led the Council to establish formal 
surveillance of the convergence required in preparation for the EMU 
during this ﬁrst stage: a new “convergence decision” was issued to create 
a regional system of mutual surveillance.15  This institutionalized the 
conﬁdential exercise already in place, and its implementation served as 
preparation for the provisions set forth in the Maastricht Treaty regarding 
economic-policy coordination. In 1991, a complementary element was 
14 The Madrid European Council, in June 1989, endorsed the Delors Report (commissioned 
by the Hannover European Council one year before) and called for an intergovernmental 
conference to revise the Treaty with a view to establishing an Economic and Monetary 
Union. However, the Delors Report concluded that the first stage of this EMU did not 
require any amendment of the Treaty. Therefore, 1 July 1990 was chosen as the starting 
date for the EMU in order for it to coincide with the complete liberalization of capital 
movements decided on in the context of the single market. 
15 Council Decision of 12 March 1990, EEC 90/141.
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introduced: multiannual “convergence plans” that the Member States 
undertook to abide by and to submit as their own commitments to the 
Council for approval.
At the end of the 1980s and during the ﬁrst stage of the EMU, an a 
posteriori evaluation of this ﬁrst surveillance exercise was critical of the 
results. Because the system was excessively based on peer pressure among 
decision makers, it relied too much on understandings among Member 
State authorities. The “behind-closed-doors” work gave the exercise an 
overly “intergovernmental” character rather than an authentically shared 
approach capable of imposing a common discipline. The system only 
worked during the “good times” and with the implicit understanding 
that it had an anchor (the asymmetrical role of the German DM). In 
fact, when a succession of external shocks (the decline in the dollar and 
the reﬂationary pressure exerted by the United States in the Louvre 
Agreement, the crisis meeting of the G-7 after the October 1987 stock-
market crash, the ﬁnancial consequences of the fall of the Berlin Wall) 
weakened the EMS anchoring, the provisional surveillance system that 
should have been triggered to impose the required discipline went unused. 
The loss of ERM asymmetry gave the false illusion of easy convergence, 
while the “institutionalization” of regional surveillance gave the markets 
the even more misleading illusion that progress was being made towards 
coordination and macroeconomic management in Europe. The result, in 
a certain sense, was biased free riding and moral hazard.16 The markets 
overreacted (out of “Europtimism”, or pro-convergence speculation or 
in response to “convergence trade”), mitigating the pressure on public-
ﬁnance consolidation and relaxing monetary policies through the “ERM 
paradox” (The traditionally weak currencies rose to the upper limit of the 
ERM band, forcing authorities to relax their monetary policies beyond 
what had been agreed). Hence, the blind use of coordination through 
automatic rules resulted in a macroeconomic imbalance that led to poor 
results in convergence and, ﬁnally, to a combination of unbalanced 
policies throughout the European Union that prolonged and deepened 
the 1991-1993 recession. 
Paradoxically, the conclusion is that this failure was caused more 
by a lack of coordination than by shortcomings in the existing system, 
inasmuch as the system was misused for political reasons. 
These errors stemmed mainly from a conjunction of rare events, 
including that the 1990 convergence decision was designed only for a 
16 Ghymers, C., 1991.
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brief, transitory period until a new, more powerful instrument could be 
introduced through the new Treaty, whereas the political negotiations 
on the new Treaty hindered the full use of available instruments: for 
instance, the possibility of making the surveillance documents public 
and publishing the recommendations directed at certain Member 
States in a timely fashion (Aglietta and Ghymers, 1993). Despite these 
understandable mistakes, this experience shows that one of the two basic 
principles taken from the past was disregarded. In not publishing the 
surveillance results and the speciﬁc recommendations to the countries, 
national authorities, in a certain sense, colluded to “cheat the markets” 
and delay their negative reactions, thus attempting to reap only the 
beneﬁts of the positive reactions.
This leads to the formulation of a third universal principle 
of coordination, which explains the difﬁculty during this period in 
applying the second principle. Since, just as does any other organization, 
governments and authorities have their own interests, which do not 
necessarily coincide with the general interest, there is a risk that 
national authorities will collude and become complacent, using any 
coordination system as a tool to enhance their manoeuvring room. This 
risk is a permanent feature of any governmental behaviour, but it is also 
one of the main incentives for national administrations to accept entering 
into coordination systems. Although not necessarily harmful, collusion 
can be a “perverse deviation from coordination” that takes place when 
coordination is badly designed or poorly balanced. The challenge is to 
design a set of arrangements that allows certain countervailing forces to be 
developed to prevent national political authorities from being the sole arbiters of 
their actions. Governments reach agreements to gain time and increase their 
discretionary powers, protecting themselves against market sanctions by 
monitoring the issuing of signals to the public, as occurred in Europe 
with the ﬁrst surveillance mechanism in the 1990-1993 period, in which 
the Council of Ministers acted as judge and jury and encroached on the 
Commission’s role. At other times, governments naturally tend to reach 
agreements to obviate the usual political or macroeconomic obstacles 
—for example, by setting up smokescreens to shift priorities and juggle 
certain rules, strengthening their positions so as to make unpopular 
decisions, or even blaming others for their failure to act. Experience, 
in Europe and in the G-7, shows, however, that this type of damaging 
collusion occurs when there is insufﬁcient competitive pressure among 
the different national governments and/or between ﬁscal and monetary 
authorities (speciﬁcally, when central bank autonomy is insufﬁcient).
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6. Maastricht: surveillance in Stage II of the EMU  
(1994-1998)
Contrary to the predictions of many macroeconomists, the serious 
recession of 1991-1993, aggravated by poor macroeconomic management 
and insufﬁcient coordination during Stage I (see preceding section), 
produced a favourable reaction. It consolidated the consensus on the 
strategy for macroeconomic stability and the need for more effective 
coordination, which was in the interest of each government and central 
bank. The ERM rules had to be changed in August 1993 when exchange-rate 
turbulence necessitated broadening the band to restore a two-way bidding 
in the markets and increase each authority’s individual responsibility for 
exchange-rate performance (one of the Treaty’s criteria for joining the 
euro). And, in effect, national authorities did not use this broader band to 
relax the agreed-upon discipline and change macroeconomic strategy. In 
general, they managed their policies to adjust voluntarily to a narrower 
ﬂotation band and submitted “multiannual convergence programmes” 
to their parliaments and partners for approval by the Council. The 
governments intended to tie their own hands by committing to visible 
and detailed goals. In exchange for demonstrating their determination 
through these self-imposed commitments veriﬁed by the Council (and 
ﬁnancial markets), they hoped to gain credibility in their efforts to meet 
the conditions for entering into the single currency pursuant to the criteria 
and schedule set out in the Treaty.
Towards the end of 1993, once the Maastricht Treaty had been 
ratiﬁed, the new regional surveillance system immediately entered into 
force and was implemented. This gave way to a new range of experiences 
in consolidating economic policy coordination to prepare for the single 
currency regime. Maastricht surveillance, in fact, institutionalized practical 
procedures that had emerged from a process of “natural selection” among 
different attempts over more than thirty years. The Treaty’s articles on 
economic policy (102-A-104-C) formalize pragmatic experiences to 
create an economic-governance system among decentralized political 
authorities.
In Stage II of preparation for the single currency, economic policy 
was designed as follows:
1. Economic policy continues to be the responsibility of the Member 
States, but they are to conduct their policies with a view to achieving 
Community objectives and respecting the guidelines established by 
the Council (Article 98).
2. National economic policies are a matter of common concern and 
must be coordinated within the Council (Article 99.1). The main tools 
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are “the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States 
and of the Community”, the preparation of which follows a detailed 
procedure. (As set forth in Article 99.2, the draft recommendations 
of the Commission are sent to the Monetary Committee, which 
discusses them and from there issues its own draft recommendation 
to the European Council of Economic and Finance Ministers 
[Ecoﬁn].) The Ecoﬁn Council, acting by a “qualiﬁed majority”, issues 
a report and submits it to the European Council. The European 
Council discusses a conclusion based on which Ecoﬁn, by qualiﬁed 
majority, publishes a recommendation for broad guidelines and 
informs the European Parliament. These guidelines are the reference 
point for multilateral surveillance, a collegial process of monitoring, 
analyzing and assessing the economic situation and policies through 
periodic reports submitted by the Commission, by way of the Expert 
Committees, to Ecoﬁn (Article 99.3). Where national policies are 
found to be inconsistent with the broad outlines or with the proper 
functioning of the EMU, the Council may, acting by a qualiﬁed 
majority and on recommendation from the Commission, make the 
necessary recommendations to the Member State concerned and 
may, for dissuasive purposes, decide to make its recommendations 
public (Article 99.4). These procedures may be further speciﬁed or 
improved through derivative legislation (Article 99.5).
3. As a complement to the general principle of coordination and to 
the multilateral surveillance provisions that the system applies 
to any economic policy (whether macroeconomic or structural), a 
set of rules has been established to guarantee a minimum degree 
of budgetary discipline in all Member States (and not only in those 
that wish to join the euro). Given that budgetary policies continue 
to fall under the full responsibility of the Member States, the Treaty 
contains strict mechanisms to avoid conﬂicts between budgetary and 
monetary policies and any imbalance from policy mix (i.e., budgetary 
policies that overburden monetary policy and have negative effects 
for the EMU and the Community). Articles 101, 102 and 103 prohibit 
monetary ﬁnancing of budgetary deﬁcits, privileged access by the 
public sector to ﬁnancial institutions and support to commitments 
made by governments or public authorities, respectively. Excessive 
government deﬁcits are prohibited under Article 104, but this 
provision is not fully applicable during Stage II, and thus Article 
116.4 establishes that prior to Stage III, Member States will attempt 
to avoid such deﬁcits. To allow the Commission and the Council 
to assess these efforts, Member States are to submit multiannual 
convergence programmes aimed at consolidating public ﬁnances and 
through which they commit to achieving quantiﬁed goals.
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This transitory period was difﬁcult, because it focused entirely 
on achieving nominal convergence. Nevertheless, the application of the 
new coordination system was effective and in the end very positive. 
It was largely based on the same kind of market pressures as those in 
Stage I, although the new forms of pressure were much more effective. 
In fact, budgetary conditions had deteriorated notably as a result of a 
combination of unbalanced policies (high deﬁcits and rigorous monetary 
policies), leaving governments no choice but to apply stability policies 
and reap the beneﬁts of belonging to an institutionalized regional system 
to enhance their credibility, in view of the prospect of adopting the euro. 
The last exchange crisis of Stage I, which arose in 1995 because of market 
concern over the credibility of some Member States’ budgetary policies, 
showed the impossibility of deceiving the markets and that compliance 
with the convergence criteria was, in any event, a necessary condition for 
returning to sustainable growth, even without a single currency. When 
credible efforts were made, market expectations contributed signiﬁcantly 
to feed a virtuous circle of convergence through the reduction of the 
high risk premiums on interest rates. Budgetary consolidation was thus 
self-validated by “positive market sanctions” that radically diminished 
adjustment costs for all concerned (lower interest payments on the budget 
as well as to private agents, improving the prospects for future demand 
and activity).
This period offers three major lessons:
1. “Non-Keynesian effects” of credible budgetary consolidation, which 
made it possible for private demand to overcome the negative 
effects of deﬁcit reduction. Growth cannot be inhibited by measures 
intended to improve “the fundamentals” of an economy, because it 
depends more on the prospects for future demand than on the present 
situation. The positive effects on expectations can mitigate the direct 
effect of ﬁscal-deﬁcit reduction, especially if such a reduction is the 
result of lowering expenditures and not increasing taxes.
2. The markets perceived the systemic improvement of the European 
Union’s policy formulation through the EMU and its institutional 
regional surveillance. This contributed appreciably to reducing 
the adjustment cost in most Member States, making their policies 
more credible and less revocable. Coherent regional integration can 
make a major contribution to institutional progress necessary to improve 
conditions for growth. Establishing a pragmatic mechanism of mutual 
surveillance over national policies at a regional level is particularly 
useful for improving national policy credibility.
3. One important aspect of European cooperation on economic policies 
is its “learning by doing” component, essentially based on the 
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interaction of two principles: the exchange of best practices among 
parties (not only among ministers, but, especially, among national 
experts), and market pressures that permanently test and question 
the credibility of the authorities and their policies. These dynamics 
seem to be underestimated by some economists when evaluating 
European policy formulation, because they overlook that this is an 
“intrinsic” mechanism resulting from the broad collegial efforts of 
the experts from the different agencies involved.
Although the European coordination system was left incomplete 
and was biased in favour of the discretionary power of the Council (for 
example, during Stage II, Ecoﬁn did not issue speciﬁc recommendations to 
any country), the race to the euro during Stage II was sufﬁcient for national 
policies to converge to an impressive degree. Moreover, this successful 
application of new approaches to policy formulation in the Community 
led to successive improvements and pragmatic corrections with an eye to 
Stage III —hence conﬁrming the learning-by-doing character of European 
economic governance (application of lesson no. 3).
In effect, the end of Stage II introduced new elements that helped to 
perfect the operating modalities of the coordination process:
1. First, the awareness of the need to progressively consolidate 
coordination in Stage III, in particular with a view to compensating 
for the disappearance of market sanctions on euro-area members, led 
to agreement on the Pact for Stability and Growth at the Amsterdam 
European Council in June 1997.17  The pact was intended to ensure, 
through formal, binding procedures, an effective budgetary 
discipline in Stage III: nearly balanced or surplus budgets under 
normal economic conditions (see following section).
2. The broad guidelines had favoured nominal convergence on the path 
to the EMU; nevertheless, macroeconomic issues such as growth 
and employment, and structural problems with, for example, the 
goods and labour markets, have gradually gained ground during 
the last two years. According to the rationale of the Treaty, the broad 
guidelines not only deﬁne the combination of overall macroeconomic 
policies pursued within the framework of the EMU’s common 
monetary-stability policy but also must indicate the contribution 
that other economic policies, including ﬁscal and structural policies, 
should make towards the objectives of the Community (in particular, 
a high employment rate, as set forth in Article 2). The broad 
17 European Council Resolution of 17 June 1997, Council Regulation of 7 July 1997 EC 
no. 1466/97, and Council Regulation of 7 July 1997 EC no. 1467/97.
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guidelines are, then, an expression of the requirement that economic 
policies be considered “a matter of common concern”. Similarly, the 
Amsterdam European Council issued a Resolution on Growth 
and Employment that proposes coordinating structural policies 
having a strong potential to stimulate the economy. The Resolution 
sets forth the ﬁrm commitment of the Member States, the Council 
and the Commission to expand economic-policy coordination and 
enhance its effectiveness through the broad guidelines, with a special 
focus on employment policies. To this end, the European Council 
outlined different problems and issues to be addressed through the 
broad guidelines in order to make speciﬁc recommendations to the 
Member States. In conformance with the principle of subsidiarity 
(Article 3b), the broad guidelines are to take account of the national 
multiannual employment programmes (or national action plans) 
that the Member States commit to submit, inasmuch as employment 
measures are their responsibility. The Council also requests the social 
partners to live up to their own responsibilities and recommends full 
use of consultation and social dialogue in the coordination process. 
To improve coordination, the European Council, in the Presidency’s 
conclusions, urges Ecoﬁn and the Commission to examine how to 
improve coordination procedures.
3. In addition, the European Council requested the Council to try to 
immediately carry out the relevant provisions of the new Treaty’s 
section on employment, so that the Employment Guidelines —a 
new procedure to coordinate labour-market policies among the 
Member States that should be consistent with the broad guidelines— 
could thereafter be applied to improve job creation. This was put 
into effect at an Extraordinary European Council on Employment in 
Luxembourg on 20 and 21 November 1997, which, in practice, made 
it possible to move up to 1998 the application of future Article 128 
of the new Treaty, on Member State coordination of employment 
policies. Based on this, the Council (Labour and Social Affairs) 
adopted the ﬁrst employment guidelines on 15 December 1997. 
In keeping with these guidelines, in April 1998 the Member States 
submitted their national action plans regarding employment in the 
agreed-upon form and structure.
4. In December 1997, the Luxembourg European Council adopted a 
Resolution on the Coordination of Economic Policy reiterating 
that Ecoﬁn is the only decision-making body in the coordination 
process, in particular regarding the adoption of broad guidelines, the 
main instrument for economic coordination. To exercise multilateral 
surveillance, Ecoﬁn was to meet in restricted sessions (ministers 
plus one) in order to stimulate open and frank debate. However, 
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the Resolution explicitly sets forth that such coordination should 
“respect the competencies and responsibilities of the social partners 
in the wage formation process”. It also calls attention to the crucial 
importance of “an ongoing and fruitful dialogue between the Council and 
the European Central Bank, with the participation of the Commission”. 
To this end, the recently created Economic and Financial Committee 
(formerly, the Monetary Committee), which comprises the ECB, the 
central banks, national Finance and Commission ofﬁcials, provides 
the framework for preparing the dialogue. Moreover, the Council 
requested supervision of the Member States’ structural policies in 
the labour, goods and services markets, which are part of the overall 
economic-policy framework covered by the broad guidelines. In its 
report to the European Council, Ecoﬁn requested the consolidation of 
the role of the Economic Policy Committee (with composition similar 
to that of the Economic and Financial Committee) in the preparation 
of Ecoﬁn meetings, in particular when structural policies are to be 
discussed.
5. The same Luxembourg European Council created the Euro-Council.18 
The Council is informal and allows euro-area members to discuss 
problems related to their shared responsibilities in the presence of 
the Commission and, when applicable, of the European Central 
Bank. This new forum was inaugurated immediately after the May 
decision on Member States that met the criteria for joining the euro, 
and it was decided that it would meet prior to each Ecoﬁn meeting. 
The Council regularly addresses coordination issues and closely 
examines budgetary issues. Although not a decision-making body, 
it has already proved its usefulness and effectiveness in reaching 
and improving consensus on the policy mix in the Euro Zone. The 
shared interest in the common currency is a strong incentive for 
Member States to intensify their dialogue and search for the best 
combination of policies through genuine debate, thereby improving 
the results of Ecoﬁn. The Commission plays a central role in the 
laying the groundwork for these meetings, ensuring their continuity 
and “communal”, non-intergovernmental character. The European 
Central Bank’s president usually attends, which permits an exchange 
of views on monetary and budgetary policies.
6. In May 1998, at the European Council meeting to decide which 
Member States were eligible to join in order to move to Stage III of 
18 The Euro Council became Euro-11 once 11 countries met the requirements for joining 
the Euro Zone, and Euro-12 in 2001, when Greece was accepted and became part of the 
single currency. 
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EMU, Ecoﬁn published a Declaration on the EMU and decided that 
the Pact for Stability and Growth would enter into effect on 1 July 
1998 and not 1 January 1999 as mandated by the regulation.
7. After the informal Ecoﬁn meeting at York on 21 March 1998, 
the declaration of 1 May and the Ecoﬁn of 19 May, the Cardiff 
European Council met on 15 and 16 June and welcomed the Ecoﬁn 
involvement in the work on economic reforms in the labour, goods 
and capital markets, which established a streamlined procedure 
for goods and capital. This involvement —named the Cardiff 
Process— was to consist of multilateral surveillance of structural 
reforms in the European Union economies and translate into political 
recommendations based on the broad guidelines and a system to 
monitor the recommended reforms. The conclusions of the Cardiff 
Council Presidency called for Member States and the Commission 
to submit, before the end of the year, brief reports on their spheres 
of competence related to the goods and capital markets. On the 
basis of the reports, the Commission was to draft a brief report on 
structural issues and policies, to be discussed at the Economic Policy 
Committee and other Council forums in the context of surveillance 
and the preparation of the broad guidelines.
8. The European Council underlined that economic reform must go 
hand-in-hand with social dialogue and be based on speciﬁc studies of 
comparable progress indicators, to ensure the effective contribution 
of the social partners.
7. The macroeconomic regime of the euro: Stage III of 
EMU since 1999
As described in preceding chapters, the pace of the experimentation 
process and of the progressive improvements in coordination increased 
greatly with the introduction of the euro. Aside from the well known, 
traditional argument that greater integration increases the need for 
coordination, a speciﬁc element of political economy was added through 
sharing this common good —the single currency. By deﬁnition, the 
disappearance of national currencies also eradicated the main source of 
accountability for (or identiﬁcation and internalization of) the effects of 
national policies, via market sanctions, on exchange rates and national 
exchanges. This, in turn, undermined (strengthened) the currencies 
of countries that implemented divergent (convergent) policies. It was 
therefore essential to compensate for these new free-riding and moral-
hazard risks, through an adequate reinforcement of the institutional 
monitoring and coordinating mechanism among the countries that shared 
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the single currency. The Treaty had prepared for this with the regional 
“surveillance” mechanism (Art. 99) and the principle of progressive 
sanctions against countries failing to abide by the budgetary-discipline 
criteria (Art. 104). It was the role of the Pact for Stability and Growth 
of 1997 to give more credibility to these principles by specifying the 
operating modalities for their application, and this was complemented 
by a speciﬁc macroeconomic dialogue for gathering the social partners 
with all the other actors of the policy mix in closed-doors meetings twice 
a year (Cologne process of 1999). 
Indeed, the European coordination mechanism designed to 
manage Stage III of the EMU institutionalizes the practical procedures 
that, through various attempts, had withstood a “natural-selection” 
process lasting over 30 years. The Treaty’s articles on economic policy 
(98 through 104) are a formal expression of pragmatic experiences to 
create an economic governance system among decentralized political 
authorities. Each authority faces a single monetary policy, which imposes 
an overarching objective of pricing stability on all actors. 
European economic governance is characterized by a combination 
of three basic principles: subsidiarity, autonomy and regional coordination 
through mutual surveillance. These principles are applied to three main 
categories of independent actors operating at very different levels of 
sovereignty but whose responsibilities are clearly identiﬁed:
1. There is a single, autonomous supranational (i.e., of a federal nature) 
monetary policy with an imposed, formal objective: to ensure 
domestic price stability in the euro area.
2. At the national level, budget and structural policies remain 
decentralized (the Member States are sovereign) but are a common 
concern and are therefore subject to mutual monitoring and formal 
coordination procedures.
3. The mechanisms to establish labour conditions (mainly wages) are 
left in the hands of autonomous social partners (workers unions 
and employer organizations) and operate without any uniﬁed or 
common framework at the Community level —that is, they conform 
to very different types of national practices (whether centralized at 
the national or sectoral level, regulated or informal, geographically 
decentralized, or even determined by individual companies).
This combination of practices is modelled on an experimentally 
tested combination of coordination provisions that clearly deﬁne economic 
policy and the responsibilities of the three main autonomous groups of 
actors, with a view to achieving the Community’s objectives. Within this 
framework of ongoing dialogue and monitoring, the interactions among 
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these three autonomous poles create the euro area’s macroeconomic policy 
mix and lead to an authentically agreed-on stance vis-à-vis economic 
governance. The driving force behind this coordination formula is the 
growing mutual interest that the European Union members ﬁnd in their 
economic achievements.
A brief recapitulation of the architecture of the mechanism, with 
its procedures and instruments, follows.
1. Member States are still responsible for economic policy, but they 
are required to carry out their policies with a view to achieving the 
Community’s objectives and adhering to the Council’s guidelines 
(Article 98).
2. National economic policies are a matter of common concern and 
Member States are to coordinate them within the Council (Article 
99.1); the main tools are the broad economic-policy guidelines of the 
Member States and the Community, which are prepared according 
to a detailed procedure (Article 99.2: the draft recommendations 
of the Commission are submitted to the Economic and Financial 
Committee [formerly, the Monetary Committee], are then sent to 
Ecoﬁn, which issues a report by qualiﬁed majority and submits it 
to the European Council [heads of state]. The European Council 
discusses a conclusion based on which Ecoﬁn, by qualiﬁed majority, 
publishes a recommendation setting out these broad guidelines and 
informs the European Parliament). These guidelines are a reference 
point for “multilateral surveillance”, a peer process of regional 
monitoring that assesses the economic situation and policies by 
means of periodical reports presented by the Commission to 
Committees of Experts (the Economic and Financial Committee 
[EFC] and the Economic Policy Committee [EPC]) for discussion 
and for the drafting of a report that is submitted to Ecoﬁn (Article 
99.3). When national policies are found inconsistent with the broad 
guidelines or with the proper functioning of the EMU, the Council 
may, acting by a qualiﬁed majority and on a recommendation from the 
Commission, make speciﬁc recommendations to the Member State 
concerned, and, for dissuasive purposes, make its recommendations 
public (Article 99.4). These procedures may be further speciﬁed or 
improved through derivative legislation enacted at the Community 
level (Article 99.5).
The general coordination principle and the regional mutual 
surveillance provisions applied to any economic policy (whether 
macroeconomic or structural) are complemented by more speciﬁc 
provisions for certain ﬁelds, when more precise coordination is deemed 
necessary. This takes place in four special areas: (a) budget matters, 
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through the articles of the Treaty and the Pact for Stability and Growth; 
(b) structural reforms, through the Cardiff Process; (c) labour-market 
policies, through the Luxembourg Process, and (d) wage policies, through 
the Cologne Process and its “macroeconomic dialogue”. 
Most important among these are the regulations guaranteeing 
minimum budgetary discipline in all Member States, and not only in those 
that belong to the euro area. (Most of these provisions were explained 
in the preceding section, since they were applied in preparation for the 
single currency by ensuring budgetary convergence to a sustainable 
position.) With the move to Stage III and the participation in the single 
currency, excessive governmental deﬁcits are prohibited pursuant to the 
provisions of Article 104, which sets forth a precise procedure for deﬁning 
and supervising compliance with the required budgetary discipline. A 
mechanism to sanction a euro-area Member State’s non-compliance with 
this minimum discipline completes this arrangement. The modalities 
and periods of application of this discipline were speciﬁed in the Pact 
for Stability and Growth that the European Council enacted with a view 
to launching the single currency, although it is applied to all European 
Union members, with the exception of ﬁnancial penalties in the event of 
infringement of budgetary discipline.
Figure III.1
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This binding pact consolidates and accelerates budgetary 
surveillance pursuant to Articles 99 and 104, provides the operating 
modalities for that surveillance and makes the application of the common 
budgetary discipline fully credible. The pact is reﬂected in two new 
Council Regulations under the guidance of a European Council Resolution 
directed at the Council and the Commission. The intention is to achieve 
and maintain a combination of pro-growth policies that the Member States 
need to ensure that the EMU is sustainable and creates employment. The 
provisions of the pact —especially the objective of approaching budgetary 
balance in the medium term— ratify the budgetary policies previously 
recommended in successive European Council broad guidelines since 
December 1993. The pact has three aims:
1. To prevent pressure on monetary policy that would lead to a 
suboptimal and excessively restrictive policy mix and thus impair 
growth.
2. To support the accumulation of investments that the European 
economy requires to increase its potential output, making greater 
growth feasible: budgetary consolidation makes it possible to 
generate the savings needed to increase investment and put 
downward pressure on interest rates.
3. To restore the manoeuvring room required by budgetary and ﬁscal 
authorities to optimize economic management in a full-ﬂedged 
EMU (automatic stabilizers and discretionary action in the event of 
asymmetrical shocks):
(i) Countries with a sound structural budgetary balance will 
have considerable budgetary ﬂexibility during normal cyclical 
recessions without needing to exceed the limits of the Treaty in 
their budgetary deﬁcits (since the “automatic stabilizers” can 
fully perform their role as a buffer in the economic cycle).
(ii) The achievement of a medium-term budgetary balance in 
normal cyclical conditions (structural equilibrium) requires a 
rapid reduction of the debt/GDP ratio. Thus, the combined effect 
of smaller deﬁcits and lower interest rates lessens the heavy 
burden of national debt servicing, making it possible to lower 
taxes and/or establish other spending priorities, especially 
if necessary because of speciﬁc shocks in a country. This 
contributes to creating a virtuous circle, buttressed by market 
expectations, allowing governments to take sound stabilizing 
measures such as cutting taxes and producing collective goods, 
thus increasing supply and consolidating stability and internal 
sources of growth.
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The secondary legislation introduced by the Pact is structured by 
two Council regulations. The ﬁrst, based on Article 99.5, has a warning 
function. It is a preventive measure establishing national “stability 
programmes” (or “convergence programmes”, for non-euro countries) and 
setting forth the modalities for their application and surveillance. Through 
these programmes, national authorities announce their detailed budgets 
according to a common guideline for at least three years, including all 
measures that might be needed to meet these goals, and they commit to 
make supplementary adjustments should they deviate from the course 
outlined in the programme. In the event of divergence, the adjustment 
measures must be speciﬁed so that they can be monitored each step of the 
way. The second regulation, based on Article 104.14, sets forth a dissuasive 
measure to ensure Member States’ full compliance with budgetary criteria 
and ensure full enforcement of sanctions in the event of non-compliance. 
More detailed provisions were needed to speed up and clarify the 
application of the Treaty’s procedure for addressing excessive deﬁcits, 
in particular by establishing clear deﬁnitions and precise deadlines for 
each stage and by providing quantitative deﬁnitions for the foreseen 
exceptions. 
These complementary provisions to the Treaty clarify the intent 
of the principle of subsidiarity. In the European Union, coordination 
remains in the hands of the States and not those of a higher central 
power, as long as sovereign states are able to adjust their budgets 
on their own. The Community authorities (Ecoﬁn and the European 
Commission) are empowered only to implement speciﬁc supranational 
procedures that allow them to gradually pressure national authorities, 
initially conﬁdentially among peers in the expert committees and at the 
ministerial level, and progressing to a level of public debate, through 
the use of market and public-opinion pressure, with the potential 
reinforcement of ﬁnancial penalties. In essence, sovereign governments 
and parliaments are solely responsible for designing stability programmes 
and deciding which adjustments they require to meet those programmes 
on schedule, but the other Member States, the Commission, the Council, 
the European Parliament, as well as other stakeholders (the European 
Central Bank, national central banks, social partners) provide input and 
conduct monitoring in an ongoing, dynamic debate that constitutes a 
comprehensive formula for “macroeconomic dialogue”.
Macroeconomic dialogue allows the macroeconomic policy mix to 
favour growth and employment as long as the national budgetary policies 
and the wage trends do not counteract the essential objective of ensuring 
the stability of the common monetary policy. This is the basic theorem of 
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the EMU’s macroeconomic policies formulated in the broad guidelines:19 
the more the budgets of the Member States and the wage negotiations of the social 
partners contribute to the common objective of stability, the more favourable the 
monetary stance will be to growth and employment.
In other spheres that provide for explicit coordination, procedures 
are even more subsidiary —that is, Community power is even more 
discrete and is reduced to a mere system of monitoring that allows for 
dialogue through the issuance of speciﬁc reports. For structural policies, 
before the launch of the euro, two dialogue mechanisms were put in 
place: the Cardiff Process, for market reforms and other microeconomic 
measures, and the Luxembourg Process, for labour markets and policies. 
The ﬁrst process only entails issuing a common report, which presupposes 
a review and mutual monitoring of the situation of each national economy. 
The second process consists of two more precise instruments that are part 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam’s section on employment: an annual document 
titled “Employment Guidelines” is issued by the Council based on a 
Commission proposal and national documents, called “National Action 
Plans” (NAPs), which describe how each Member State intends to apply 
the Council’s Employment Guidelines.
After the launch of the euro, structural and supply-side 
policies were addressed through a more general method: the “Lisbon 
Strategy” (European Council, March 2000), which is the generalized 
application of the dialogue method (also known as the “Open Method 
of Coordination”) to all national economic-policy areas relevant for 
reconciling competitiveness with social and environmental objectives. 
This method involves “periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review 
organized as mutual learning processes”20 of the guidelines that each 
Member State is to carry out through speciﬁc action plans, in accordance 
with its particular circumstances, and without formal constraints. The 
generalization of the method is a de facto solution to externalities and 
the need for coordination in areas where the Treaty does not envision 
speciﬁc harmonization, common policies or common actions, or where 
domestic governance remains adequate. This method also seeks greater 
involvement of economic agents, social partners and civil society. 
The European Union and its euro area (which comprised 11 of the 
15 European Union members as of 1 Jan 1999, and 12 two years later) have 
transformed the system of economic governance into a unique experience in 
world history.
19 Council Recommendation of 7 July 1997.
20 Lisbon European Council, 2000: paragraph 37.
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Figure III.2
THE EUROPEAN UNION CONVERGENCE PROCESS: 
ANNUAL INFLATION RATES IN 15 MEMBER STATES
(Private consumption price deflator / Percentage change)
Figure III.3
THE EUROPEAN UNION CONVERGENCE PROCESS: 
NET PUBLIC LENDING IN 15 MEMBER STATES
(Percentage of GDF)
Source: European Commission Services.
Dotted line = ECB inflation ceiling
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Figure III.4 
THE EUROPEAN UNION CONVERGENCE PROCESS: 
LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES 
(10-year bonds)
Figure III.5 
THE EUROPEAN UNION CONVERGENCE PROCESS: 
SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
(3-month notes)
Source: European Commission Services.
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Chapter IV 
General philosophy of the European 
coordination model
Despite the sophistication of the regional surveillance scheme and the 
disciplinary measures and sanctions set forth in the Treaty and in the 
Pact for Stability and Growth, it should be stressed that —apart from the 
monetary sphere, now entirely governed at the supranational level in the 
euro area— economic policy decisions, including coordination, were left 
totally in the Member States’ hands. The Treaty sets forth that “the States 
shall coordinate within the Council”, applying the subsidiarity principle.
Since this book is intended for Latin American decision makers who 
wish to assess the European experience, it will focus on what is essential 
and dispel the myths regarding both coordination and the reality of the 
European Union. Although the achievements made over so many years 
in Europe are very important, they might appear negligible compared 
to initial expectations or to theory: the “only” thing achieved was the 
creation of a “communal” culture and a “collegial” spirit regarding 
national economic-policy decisions, albeit one that is able to enact 
common rules and formal procedures for monitoring their application 
in each member’s self-interest. This framework helps authorities to meet 
their responsibilities and become more aware of the external impacts of 
national policies, but does not signiﬁcantly affect their nation’s individual 
sovereignty. The Community has imposed very few limits on national 
policies. Those limits that exist are intended solely to prevent “gross 
errors”21 by national authorities in a very narrow ﬁeld (the budget) 
21 To use the wording of the Treaty; see Article 104 (2).
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through rigorous procedures based on previously agreed-on criteria in the 
framework of the supranational Treaty. For all other policies, even those 
considered “matters of common concern”22 and monitored by “collegial” 
instruments, the Council of Ministers may issue only broad guidelines 
and, on occasion, recommendations to individual countries.
The European coordination scheme thus appears to be rather 
“minimalist”, insofar as it merely places each Member State under the 
surveillance of its regional partners to avoid jeopardizing the EMU 
common interest. In fact, the operational modalities of this surveillance 
come down to ensuring that each government does what is best for its 
own economy. This situation is a far cry from the illusory coordination 
expounded in economic-theory texts, which envision the search for regional 
optimization through formal commitments imposed on members.
What has been achieved, however, is essential and works because 
it beneﬁts the Community’s members and because this is a “learning-
by-doing” process open to iterated improvements. The system is akin 
to a natural selection of successive attempts and reﬂects the European 
peoples’ political and cultural reality. With this observation —which from 
the outside might appear to illustrate a collective lack of ambition or 
institutional mediocrity— one reaches the crucial point for understanding 
the challenge of coordination and its difﬁcult equilibrium.
Our shared Latin culture often exposes us to dangerous illusions: 
we expect too much from so-called coordination, seen as an effort imposed 
top-down that ignores the subsidiarity principle. That is, we forget that 
doing more would involve greater changes in constitutional systems, 
requiring conditions that do not exist in Europe (and are nowhere near 
materializing). National governments cannot sacriﬁce their own aims for the 
sake of others’. By deﬁnition, the decisions of sovereign national authorities 
cannot be overridden without a change in the institutional system and the 
imposition of a federal regime —a centralized decision-making authority. 
Nor can Member State governments be asked to embrace or abide by 
commitments that entail changing decisions made by autonomous 
parliaments, except within the framework of speciﬁc procedures adopted 
by a supranational treaty in restricted areas and with the acceptance of 
the sovereign national authorities.
This confusion arises from the “Jacobin” illusion that centralized 
(“enlightened”) decisions are superior to those of short-sighted local 
authorities. This type of authoritarian coordination is inconsistent not 
only with existing democratic institutions but, on the whole, with current 
globalized markets. It presupposes perfect regional integration and strong 
22 Ibid.; see Article 99 (1).
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consensus on the underlying economic model. The reality, however, is 
another matter: with economic uncertainty, a diversity of nations and a lack 
of regional cohesion, there still must be multiple (national or subnational) 
intermediary states that, in a certain sense, compete both with one another 
and with centralized decision-making. In this context, “strong” formal 
coordination would expose the Union to a high risk of losing legitimacy 
(since certain nations could perceive themselves as being exploited or 
marginalized by their partners). Such strong coordination could also 
lead to conﬂicts among authority levels stemming from situations of 
moral hazard caused by the mere existence of authoritarian coordination: 
national authorities exposed to the pressure of domestic “policy demands” 
might attempt to blame their neighbours or the coordination scheme itself. 
This inevitable bias tends to favour free-riding behaviour and discourage 
domestic efforts, causing a loss of effectiveness of national policies and 
confusion regarding responsibilities.
The economic governance that the European Union’s EMU has 
recently attained, based on coordination between sovereign states and 
an autonomous central bank, constitutes a unique experiment. It results 
from a natural selection based on successive attempts leading to a 
pragmatic method for developing cooperation among sovereign states 
whose interdependence and common interests are being strengthened. 
In monetary matters, the European Union decided that the best way to 
address the high level of mutual spillovers in a single market was to 
transfer national monetary sovereignty to the Community (with the two 
exceptions set forth in the “opting-out” clause for the United Kingdom 
and Denmark). For all other economic policies, centralization is formally 
excluded, with coordination among decentralized authorities being the 
norm. Such coordination is in fact limited to a formal set of dialogues, 
in which all the authorities meet and organize mutual monitoring. The 
exchange-of-best-practices method leads to agreement on common 
guidelines based on benchmarking against the best. Stability programmes 
and national action plans translate these common guidelines into national 
policies. Emulation among national administrations results from peer 
pressure and market sanctions brought about by enhanced transparency. 
Since the Lisbon European Council (March 2000), this evolving practice of 
economic dialogue has been extended to all supply-side policies (including 
social policies and social exclusion, corporate governance, education, 
research, the environment, etc.). The practice was formally instituted 
as the Open Method of Coordination. In budget matters, however, the 
Treaty and the Stability Pact put in place stricter procedures to enforce 
a common discipline based on quantitative rules and sanctions but still 
contingent on a ﬁnal political determination, without any mechanistic 
interpretation. 
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The basic philosophy of the European Union method allows the key 
players (policy makers and social partners) to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of their action plans by comparing their results with those of 
their peers, in the knowledge that at some stages they will be accountable 
for the observed performance. This emulation among authorities is more 
effective than other controls. In addition, as noted by Rose (1993) and 
Olsen and Peters (1996) and quoted in Dehousse “governmental structures 
are often prisoners of tradition anchored in their history and, except for during 
periods of crisis, rarely seek to learn from the experience of other actors” 
(Dehouse, 2003). 
In conclusion, where “federative” conditions do not (yet) exist (as 
in Europe and, currently, in the subregions of Latin American), centralist 
coordination would be counterproductive; and coordination —trapped in 
the prisoner’s dilemma— would lead to a conﬂict that would undermine 
the community’s goals. Conversely, a more pragmatic scheme based on 
dialogue among autonomous actors, gradually creating mutual trust to 
escape the dilemma and recognizing that each government legitimately 
tends to act in a way that is most advantageous for itself, makes it possible 
to arrive at a minimum consensus on policies and an acceptance of some 
basic common rules. In such a process, dialogue stimulates self-discipline 
to protect a nation’s own legitimate interests (rewards for or sanctions 
against national political decision makers through markets). This is one 
of the lessons of the prisoner’s dilemma: if sovereign partners happen to 
engage in cooperative behaviour, they do so because it is in the best interests of 
each country.
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Chapter V
General principles derived from 
coordination experiences 
The analyses and elements set forth in the preceding chapters make 
it possible to formulate some general principles that synthesize the 
experiments of the IMS and the G-7 as well as those of the European 
Union and the EMS, or EMU.
Coordination presupposes autonomous actors and it protects their 
autonomy. I call this fundamental principle the “coordination paradox”. 
As the etymology of the word indicates, coordination is the opposite of 
centralization: it serves to limit centralization and to defend the sovereignty 
and interests of individual actors when they interact. Coordination is 
inherently related to autonomy, and not its opposite, as often believed by 
those who use the term with an authoritarian or hierarchical connotation 
and depict it as a situation with “one coordinator”  imposing his rule over 
the other players.
A necessary (but insufﬁcient) condition for coordination is that there 
be a minimum capacity for dialogue and consensus among autonomous 
actors, allowing them to agree to act according to certain common rules 
or goals (a common order). Actions remain the sole responsibility of 
the autonomous actors, who, nonetheless, collectively establish a frame 
of reference allowing for a common and transparent evaluation of each 
other and of the interactions among them. This, then, presupposes a 
modicum of institutionalization, without which a common framework or 
a transparent order would be impossible. 
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The greatest problem of coordination is the prisoner’s dilemma — the 
risk that, because of either asymmetry or uncertainty about their partners’ 
behaviour, actors will try to act on their own to minimize the risks to their 
national authorities. This problem is inherent to actors being politically 
but not economically independent.
In the Bretton Woods world, the United States’ hegemonic power 
provided a way out of the dilemma and made it possible to impose a 
system of automatic coordination through parities pegged to the dollar (a 
form of dollarization). The system, however, was asymmetrical and sought 
only to prevent divergence from United States policy. In the event of an 
error by the United States as the anchor country, and failing any means 
of objectively disciplining it, coordination became perverse by forcing 
everyone else to follow its lead. This ampliﬁed the Keynesian stimuli 
created by the United States, which resulted in a global inﬂationary bias. 
This bias not only made it impossible for external stability to guarantee 
internal stability but also made the system a vector for the transmission 
of generalized instability.
A ﬂoat of the major currencies, which was imposed as an 
alternative, led to a return to the prisoner’s dilemma. Internalization, 
which was expected to result from the divergence of policies on exchange-
rate performance, was unsatisfactory, and the asymmetry of the dollar 
persisted. The result was disappointing and unfortunate.
The United States was compelled to react in favour of negotiated 
coordination through the G-7 and exchange-rate management. Struck by 
the common fear of crash-landing the dollar, G-7 members overcame their 
mutual mistrust and tried to correct both the lack of coordination among 
domestic policies and the lack of guidelines on exchange rates that, by 
deﬁnition, characterized the monetary-ﬂotation system. The G-7 attempted 
a consensual deﬁnition of “reference zones” for the exchange rates that also 
entailed a collegial scrutiny and the setting of macroeconomic policies 
compatible with such zones, in particular regarding budget policies. 
But this was not possible in the real world of national politicians and 
further complicated the problem of global anchoring and the difﬁculty 
of assessing global inﬂationary risks. Exchange-rate agreements, 
combined with the excessive rigidity of national ﬁscal policies, led to 
unbalanced coordination, which caused a serious deterioration of global 
monetary stability and a return to mutual mistrust (a prisoner’s dilemma 
situation).
In both its successes and its failures, this G-7 experience illustrates 
the principles that determine whether a coordination scheme is effective:
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1. The need for consensus on policy content, and the evaluation of 
inﬂationary risks, which implies collective analysis;
2. Budget policies’ key role in determining exchange stability, with these 
policies necessarily remaining in the hands of sovereign institutions, 
which will not consent to closed-doors agreements reached by 
technocrats or politicians;
3. The need for transparency and countervailing powers in international 
coordination.
The European experience shows that acting at the regional level is 
an effective means for consolidating institutional progress and designing 
a common response to the asymmetries or external shocks that may affect 
national economies. More to the point, regional cohesion can provide 
a way out of the prisoner’s dilemma through the combination of two 
elements:
1. The gradual development of personal contacts and collaborative 
efforts between decision makers and experts of a region’s countries, 
to encourage a common culture, build a basic consensus and 
create a climate of collegial trust. Since the prisoner’s dilemma 
hinges on uncertainty about other players’ behaviour, increasing 
communication among them and asking them to issue collegial 
opinions clearly improves their chances of ﬁnding a way out of the 
regional suboptimal situation through cooperation.
2. Regionally implemented rules and objective mutual surveillance 
procedures, making it possible to generate individual incentives 
for the players by focusing the markets’ and the public’s attention 
on each government’s individual performance. Coordination thus 
becomes a directly useful and desirable instrument for national 
decision makers by enhancing the credibility of their policies and 
directly helping them carry out their tasks. This ensures consistency 
between national and regional interests: cooperation is based on self-
interest. To use game-theory terminology, the probability increases 
that all games will have dominant strategies that coincide with 
the social optimum. In particular, an important component of any 
successful macroeconomic-monitoring scheme is the incorporation 
of ﬁscal rules with numerical benchmarks and precise procedural 
commitments able to attract public attention and trigger political 
incentives.
In the European case, this combination effectively led to the 
spontaneous development of individual incentives for participants 
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to cooperate (as recommended by Trifﬁn and described in chapter III, 
section 4), creating a positive-sum game in which the positive outcome 
increased as the game was repeated. Hence, the prisoner’s dilemma was 
resolved through the dynamics of the game: that players had to meet over 
a long and undeﬁned period, that they could not escape the consequences 
their decisions had on fellow participants, that the incentives to defect 
diminished over time in inverse proportion to the strengthening of 
integration, that players learned more and more about each other, that 
rewards and sanctions were administered progressively and allowed 
the balance of beneﬁts and costs to be identiﬁed, reducing uncertainty 
regarding the results of cooperation —all these factors implied that the 
cost of non-cooperation rose rapidly with time, and positive outcomes 
increased with the iteration of the game.
The important lesson is that, because of the endogenous nature of 
the gains from cooperation (and integration), the more time goes by and 
the more countries interact (and the more interdependencies emerge), the 
higher the gain from coordination and the lower the interest in defecting 
(Escaith and Paunovic, 2003). Furthermore, as explained by Axelrod 
(1984), “the most promising ﬁnding is that, if the rules of cooperation theory are 
known by the participants in advance, the evolution of cooperation can be speeded 
up”. Hence, given the dynamic dimension of cooperation, the incentives 
to play cooperatively emerge insofar as cooperation is effective, visible 
and credible, and they displace the incentives to act non-cooperatively in 
a static analysis.
This is the key to the guidelines resulting from REDIMA’s approach 
for Latin America in chapter VIII and in their concrete expression in the 
proposal made in chapter IX.
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Chapter VI
Applicability to Latin America: 
The REDIMA approach
Although the principles set forth in the preceding chapters appear to be 
universally applicable, only in Europe has it been possible to implement 
them on a long-term basis and in a concrete and formal manner. Europe 
has thus piloted the case for a successful policy-coordination scheme. 
However, since the differences between Latin America and Europe are 
substantial, the ﬁrst question should be: to what extent is it possible for 
Latin America to think of importing the European model? And, of this 
model, what is valid for the countries of Latin America?
ECLAC, Santiago, attempted to answer to these questions, in close 
cooperation with the European Commission of the European Union 
(Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels). 
This joint experiment was implemented in Latin America through the 
creation of Macroeconomic Dialogue Network (known as REDIMA, the 
Spanish/Portuguese acronym of Red de Diálogo Macroeconómico) at the 
subregional level.23 Because it comprises informal networks of experts in 
charge of national policy, to whom it offers a space for open and conﬁdential 
technical exchanges, REDIMA is already, by its nature, an instrument 
for diminishing the prisoner’s dilemma that inhibits macroeconomic 
cooperation among the countries of Latin America. REDIMA circumvents 
the traditional logic of formal negotiations through its informal nature. 
23 See Chapter X for more details. Also see the REDIMA Internet (WebBoard) site at www.
eclac.cl/REDIMA, or enter through the ECLAC site (www.eclac.cl), click on “Divisions”, 
then “Economic Development”, and then, on the left, select “Macroeconomic Dialog 
Network”.
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No negotiations are undertaken at REDIMA, in that no government or 
institution commits itself to anything other than to participate in technical 
workshops, and no ofﬁcial positions or conclusions on policy choices are 
taken or made. Nor does REDIMA create or replace any regional agency 
or institution, given that its results serve as inputs for ofﬁcial negotiations, 
pursuant to due procedures through existing institutions.
Moreover, REDIMA does not espouse any precise economic 
doctrine or policy, except its speciﬁc focus on the potential advantages 
of cooperative regional strategies for the subregions of Latin America, 
which is the working hypothesis by which REDIMA is guided. Even in 
this speciﬁc area, REDIMA does not seek to propose or select any a priori 
institutional options but only to provide a collegial mechanism for the 
progressive selection of ideas, policies and institutions that might match 
local realities. 
Notwithstanding these reservations, the following chapters draw 
directly on the work of REDIMA and the exchanges of views among its 
participants, although none of its members could be seen as responsible 
for the views and positions expressed in this book. 
1. Identifying the method rather than the model
Not everything done during the integration process in Europe is 
universally applicable or should be replicated in other regions. Although 
the European experience is not transferable as such to Latin America, 
important lessons can be derived from this series of experiments to avoid 
unnecessary delays or a repetition of the mistakes made during the 
learning process. The European process has been very slow and imperfect 
and developed in a very different international context. In launching other 
regional-coordination or integration processes, policy makers have a duty 
to try to compare their own process with other cases. This was the point 
of departure for REDIMA.
Although I do not claim that the European process is the only or 
best course, other regions wishing to develop coordination mechanisms 
and advance on the path to regional integration might proﬁt by gaining 
more insight into the European case and its methods.
The European experiment illustrates a trial-and-error process that 
allows for pragmatic methods while recognizing that other approaches 
have been illusory in economic governance. European integration is still 
being implemented, especially regarding policy coordination in the euro 
area, which as yet has not proven its effectiveness. This has been and 
continues to be a lengthy and painful process, and not always a glorious 
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or very successful one, and progress has frequently resulted from crisis. 
It has been a useful experience for economists, political scientists and, 
above all, policy makers. Moreover, despite the signiﬁcant differences 
between Latin America’s subregions and Europe, European respect for 
national sovereignties might be, a priori, a feasible model for emulation 
by Latin American countries that have no wish to form federal states at 
this time but that share common values and goals.
In particular, the European Union’s fiscal-policy coordination 
—based on rules that pursue higher budgetary discipline while maintaining 
ﬂexibility— provides interesting lessons for Latin America, as explained 
in more technical terms by the European Commission in a paper by M. 
Buti and G. Giudice for the 2002 IMF/WB Conference titled “Rules-based 
Macroeconomic Policies in Emerging Market Economies”.24 
Although an outcome cannot be imported, it is possible to import 
a method for launching a process to be tailored to the needs of a group of 
countries. Regional achievements necessarily result from each subregion’s 
endogenous processes, and, although Latin American subregions are 
very different from one another, they all require the collective efforts of 
Latin American policy makers and technical experts. Only these policy 
makers and experts can launch an exercise in mutual exchange that might 
determine the appropriate formulas for each subregion and tailor them to 
their economies’ speciﬁc features.
This analysis of the applicability or inapplicability of the European 
model is a speciﬁc and useful starting point. In particular, it underscores 
three very important methodological lessons of the European Union 
experiences but also of Latin America’s failed integration attempts:
1. The highest priority must be given to including the macroeconomic 
domain into Latin American subregional integration schemes, 
inasmuch as they condition the success and continued viability 
of the region’s commercial (and even political) integration. This is 
illustrated, for example, by MERCOSUR’s difﬁculties stemming 
from the major divergences and crises from 1999 to 2002. For 
economic operators (external as well as domestic), an attempt only 
to forge trade agreements among the partners of a subregion has no 
credibility, when the results of such agreements can be offset by a 
lack of convergence and can give rise to macroeconomic imbalances 
and concomitant ﬁnancial or exchange crises. Such imbalances entail 
24 Buti, M. and Giudice, G. EMU’s fiscal rules: what can and cannot be exported, ECFIN 
working paper, April 2002 
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costly contagion risks and reactions contrary to regional integration, 
hindering the application of the agreements and undermining their 
credibility.
2. Exchange rate policies and ﬂuctuations are a key to both the 
consequences of regional agreements and the credibility of any 
attempt at macroeconomic cooperation or coordination. Since they 
become “matters of common concern” for a region, they signal the 
convergence or compatibility of national macroeconomic policies and 
thus offer a tangible opportunity to undertake a technical dialogue 
on each country’s internal policies at the regional level. European 
experience, accumulated mainly during this process of exchange-
rate monitoring (through the EMS and subsequently in the run-up to 
the EMU), leads to certain operational conclusions on the limits and 
scope of coordination among sovereign authorities, as well as on the 
fundamental need for a modicum of dialogue and macroeconomic 
monitoring if regional integration is to prove successful. This lesson 
is conﬁrmed by recent events in Latin America, showing that a lack 
of dialogue and cooperation on exchange-rate policies signiﬁcantly 
contributes to the failure of integration. 
3. As discussed in section 2 below, the European Union case also shows 
that regional integration is much more than trade integration based 
on preferential agreements. With globalization, the institutional-
capacity building inherent to integration is becoming an essential 
component for ensuring growth and stability. Consequently, 
regional integration could become a driving force for offsetting some 
institutional weaknesses by speeding up the creation of the checks 
and balances most countries of the region urgently need —or by or 
strengthening existing check and balances. The importance of this 
“political-economy” aspect of regionalism is overlooked. 
2. Macroeconomic coordination and regional integration: 
a political-economy view
It is generally considered that coordination among sovereign 
authorities only makes sense once regional integration reaches a signiﬁcant 
level of intraregional exchanges, creating clear interdependencies among 
a region’s countries. The conventional view is that Latin American 
economies are still far from meeting the conditions for an endogenous 
development of coordination schemes moved by national individual 
interests. Indeed, many articles written from a traditional perspective 
have pointed out that neither the region as a whole nor its subregions 
constitute an optimal currency area.
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This consideration is obvious a priori and is not discussed. Moreover, 
the European Union is often held up as a model in reference to the 
apparent historical progression from trade to macroeconomic cooperation 
and ﬁnally to monetary issues. Indeed, European integration is generally 
presented as a progressive succession of integration steps, starting with 
the customs union, followed by economic-policy coordination within a 
single market and an economic union, and ﬁnally, with a single currency 
to complete the ﬁrst pillar of the European Union.
That intraregional trade is not even one-third as advanced in Latin 
America as it is in Europe is an argument against making it a high priority 
in the region. At the very least, this type of argument makes regional 
coordination of national policies or exchange rates seem like a distant or 
premature ideal requiring prior steps still far from implementation.
Figure VI.1
COMPARISON OF INTRAREGIONAL TRADE AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
REGIONAL GDP OF THE MAIN REGIONS HAVING PREFERENTIAL 
TRADE AGREEMENTS
Source: José Luis Machinea, “Mercosur: en busca de una nueva agenda. La inestabilidad 
cambiaria en el Mercosur: causas, problemas y posibles soluciones”, Documento de trabajo 
IECI series, Nº 06, Washington, D.C., Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)/Institute for 
the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL), December 2003.
However, recent research shows that such arguments are an 
incomplete vision of recent developments. While this book does not 
intend to undertake a technical analysis of previous research articles, 
one article, which evidences signiﬁcant and growing interdependencies 
among MERCOSUR economies, is worth mentioning: an article by the 
Centro de Economía Internacional (CEI, an agency of Argentina’s Ministry 
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of Foreign Affairs) examining not only trade but capital movements and 
exchange-rate regimes shows that shocks affecting MERCOSUR members 
are common and that the countries’ business cycles share the same 
dynamics (Lacunza and Carrera, 2003). An analysis of the covariations 
among these economies shows an increasing correlation with their 
cyclical component. Using a computed-general-equilibrium-model, the 
CEI article demonstrates that a shock affecting one member generates 
signiﬁcant spillovers on that country’s trading partners.
Moreover, J.L. Machinea, merely using a cyclical-correlation 
indicator, shows that interdependencies in Latin America’s subregions 
are not negligible, although lower than in Asia and, naturally, than in the 
European Union.
Figure VI.2
CYCLICAL CORRELATION AMONG PARTNERS OF THE MAIN 
REGIONS HAVING PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
In addition to the issues raised in this counterargument, the 
conventional view appears outdated or biased because it relies on 
a misreading of the history of the integration process: the argument 
positing a sequential progression from trade integration that climaxed 
with macroeconomic cooperation is largely erroneous, for three reasons:
1. It is a superﬁcial and incomplete historical interpretation of European 
integration, because it fails to take account of the high priority placed 
on macro-monetary stabilization at a much earlier date (1947) than 
Source: José Luis Machinea, “Mercosur: en busca de una nueva agenda. La inestabilidad 
cambiaria en el Mercosur: causas, problemas y posibles soluciones”, Documento de trabajo 
IECI series, Nº 06, Washington, D.C., Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)/Institute for 
the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL), December 2003. 
a The average correlation coefﬁcient of economic cycles in each regional area’s members, 
weighted by their share of average regional GDP for 1971-1999. 
Total weighted average a
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the signing of trade agreements through the Treaty of Rome (1957), 
which was a precondition for the implementation of effective trade 
integration.
2. European integration is part of a past that will not return. A more 
economics-oriented interpretation that considers the major trends 
in globalization —including monetary and ﬁnancial issues— that 
simultaneously unfolded and that have completely transformed 
the global economy would recognize that the path followed in 
Europe was partly context-based. This contingent process cannot be 
replicated as such in other regions because the world has changed 
signiﬁcantly in the past decades.
3. In this globalized world, ﬁnancial markets mete out rewards or 
sanctions —with regional contagion— according to the expected 
results of macroeconomic policies or to conditions in emerging 
countries. This imprints a regional dimension on national 
macroeconomic policies, greatly magnifying the externalities of 
national policies among neighbours, that is, creating regional 
linkages in addition to already existing commercial linkages.
Let us examine these three related reasons in greater detail:
1. From a longer-run perspective and as an overall process, the 
European path shows that restoring macroeconomic stability and 
monetary convertibility was a prerequisite for the Continent’s 
economic reconstruction. The EPU mechanism (1949), established 
with the assistance of the United States-backed Marshall Plan 
(1947) and bound by strict conditionality, underscored the need for 
macroeconomic and commercial complementarity in the building 
of regional integration. This mirror image of the same basic premise 
was demonstrated when, after the failure of Bretton Woods, a loss 
of external discipline led to macroeconomic divergence and the 
resegmentation of the Common Market. In sum, the European 
success stems from a combination of the two elements: trade 
agreements and macroeconomic cooperation. However, this success 
story began in the special context of post-war reconstruction, 
followed by the outbreak of the cold war and the emerging Soviet 
threat. Additional contributing elements included the United States 
military protection and its huge conditional ﬁnancial assistance 
(Marshall Plan, OECE and EPU). This might, however, be replicated 
in some respects through a large North-South agreement to provide 
strictly conditional assistance to LDCs emerging from severe crises. In 
Europe, this external stimulus of regional integration was especially 
important as a way to break out of the prisoner’s dilemma, which 
trapped national authorities into non-cooperative behaviour. As 
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a result of the stringent conditions imposed by the United States, 
monetary reconstruction was intimately linked to trade integration. 
In fact, as Trifﬁn insisted at the time, European bilateralism was 
deprived overnight of its major underpinning with the creation 
of the cooperation-based EPU. Hence, the cooperation scheme for 
returning to convertibility was the ﬁrst step on the path to gradual 
trade integration in Europe.
2. However, the international economic context in which European 
integration took place during the 1950s and 1960s was radically 
different from the environment that Latin America faces today. 
European integration through the tariff union was established in the 
1960s, a period of high growth with solid monetary and ﬁnancial 
stability and low capital movements, and during a process of strong 
institutional consolidation (community institutions and legislation; 
common policies). National currencies’ return to the convertibility 
according to a common ﬁxed-exchange-rate system with low capital 
movements (Bretton Woods) ensured compulsory convergence and 
an automatic disciplining of macroeconomic policies (see chapter II, 
section 1). Hence, the progressive building of integration starting 
with trade and evolving towards ﬁnance and currencies was set 
in motion before the more political areas were addressed, with the 
placing of the second and third pillars of the European Union. In 
Europe, one “obvious” pattern prevailed, with integration appearing 
to begin “naturally” in trade long before invading the macro-
monetary ﬁeld. Institutional competencies were, then, inevitably 
and progressively transferred from the national to the supranational 
level, as if according to a natural law of history. The result is an 
“institutionalist view” of regional integration (which continues to be 
the “ofﬁcial” interpretation in Europe) as a legal process that begins, 
ﬁrst and overall, through preferential trade agreements allowing for 
the progressive construction of a single market and moving slowly 
towards ﬁnancial and monetary integration to which a political 
step would eventually be added. This conventional view is less a 
misreading of European history and its integration model than a 
largely misleading understanding of how today’s world works. The 
globalized world has signiﬁcantly changed the issue of regional 
integration and its sequencing.
• In the 1950s and 1960s, global exchange rates and monetary 
stability explain why trade was crucial and the driving force 
behind European integration. The Bretton Woods framework of 
current-account convertibility and ﬁxed exchange rates (a quasi-
monetary union or dollarization, except for capital transactions) 
ensured predictability. This means that the customs union drew 
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most of the political attention while the remaining policies were 
either automatically coordinated through the exchange-rate 
constraint or allowed to diverge through capital controls and 
the complexities of the different national regulations.
• Today, capital liberalization and the GATT achievements impose 
a new dynamics, reducing the attractiveness and efﬁciency of 
the customs-union model for economies whose currencies are 
not yet fully convertible and/or are exposed to wild capital 
movements. Contagion acts directly on international capital 
ﬂows and credit ratings, and indirectly, through a geographical 
area’s business climate. Other ﬁelds of regional cooperation are 
also becoming crucial. Even more than for Europe in the 1950s, 
macroeconomic and monetary stability are today essential 
prerequisites for trade integration. Economic agents would be 
very reluctant to have conﬁdence in a trade agreement in any 
region if the exchange rate among the main partners were to go 
from 1-to-1 to 2-to-1 in a few weeks.
• With globalization, financial integration has become 
fundamentally important for a region’s competitiveness, which 
was less the case in the past and in Europe. The monetary and 
ﬁnancial ﬁeld has become a key to the success of regional 
integration anywhere.
• Market sanctions and power have increased everywhere, putting 
a premium on the efﬁciency and resilience of the regulatory and 
prudential framework as well as the quality of the policies and 
of governance overall, including the transparency of public 
decisions and the degree of effective democracy. National 
authorities and institutions compete for credibility in non-
cooperative situations.
  In conclusion: The globalization process has reversed the 
importance of the advantages of regional integration: the static 
advantages of preferential trade have become less important than 
the dynamic advantages of institution-building and of improving 
the decision-making process. The advantages of regional integration 
are not limited —as generally believed— to preferential access to a 
single market but also include guaranteeing a more stable, credible 
and transparent framework for economic agents, i.e., improving 
the “institutional factor”, which is the key to economic and social 
progress and to beneﬁting from globalized markets. This does not 
mean that regional trade agreements are unimportant but that they 
lose credibility and efﬁciency if the macroeconomic and regulatory 
framework is not reliable (as seen in MERCOSUR recently). Nor does 
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this mean that regional integration is the only way to improve the 
institution-building process or that such a process warrants a regional 
approach in lieu of other economic tools. Rather, it means only that 
these aspects —the political economy of regionalism— are crucial 
in the real world but are not properly addressed by most economics 
textbooks, LDC authorities, international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs) 
or the international community.
  Latin American integration is taking place in a radically 
different context than that seen in Europe. Financial and exchange-
rate stability is not guaranteed, there are signiﬁcant divergences 
in macroeconomic policy, and institutional efforts remain weak, 
without strong agencies capable of taking the initiative for the 
subregional groups and representing regional interests. What little 
motivation there is to “integrate” stems exclusively from commercial 
issues —and, hence, we see customs unions or free trade areas with 
no supranational authority— and practical efforts or mechanisms 
to coordinate other policies are still very weak (although they 
are beginning to emerge). In fact, the difﬁculties tend to increase 
individual countries’ incentives to differentiate themselves from 
neighbouring countries in crisis, while the absence of a credible 
common project or regional strategy dampens the incentive to 
cooperate with one’s neighbours. The likelihood of becoming locked 
into a prisoner’s dilemma is stronger than in the European Union. 
Thus, Latin America ﬁnds itself embarking on new integration 
attempts using obsolete instruments: its institutional modalities 
do not ﬁt the current global context, which requires consolidating 
decision-making at the macroeconomic level with the progress made 
in trade issues. 
  This disadvantage is further compounded by strong asymmetries 
stemming from differences in the relative importance of participating 
countries, mainly because of the presence of one huge economy, 
by far larger than its neighbours (which is not the case in Europe). 
Hence, intraregional exchange-rate ﬂuctuations —always crucial for 
regional integration— become an even more fundamental issue for 
the success of integration based on rapidly growing intraregional 
trade ﬂows. 
3. Globalization has decreased the importance of “nation state” frontiers, 
weakening —for better or for worse— the possibilities for discretionary 
action by both national authorities and domestic monopolies. One 
consequence of globalization during the past decade was the re-
emergence of regional integration in Latin America. The increasing 
proximity of the outside world has logically favoured closer linkages 
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among neighbouring economies. The strategies of multinational 
companies as well as local exporters tend to take account of the 
regional context (suppliers, market size, macro-ﬁnancial conditions 
and socio-political developments). Note that this phenomenon was 
not only a response to the changeover from protectionist policies 
to greater trade opening; it was also the effect of the convergence 
imposed by globalization in the macroeconomic sphere: external-
funding restrictions and market pressure imposed under the 
“Washington Consensus” established the same type of priorities for 
and placed the same type of restrictions on macroeconomic policies. 
The achievement of a minimum convergence on macroeconomic 
parameters and, thus, the attainment of a certain stability greatly 
facilitated the negotiation of preferential trade agreements, both in 
the subregions and at the hemispheric level.
  In a certain sense, globalization has imposed temporary 
macroeconomic stability or a form of implicit coordination by 
restricting options and making the common interests among 
neighbouring countries more obvious. However, not only do 
these interdependencies among economies result from increased 
intraregional trade; globalization also increases externalities from 
national macroeconomic policy decisions through the impact of 
external ﬁnancial ﬂows. Hence, these growing interdependencies tend 
to reduce the effectiveness of national policies (thus diminishing each 
country’s possibilities for independent action); moreover, a country’s 
macroeconomic conditions depends increasingly on policies applied 
by neighbouring economies. The stronger the external dependencies 
on capital ﬂows, the greater the reciprocal effects of the guidelines 
of the neighbouring countries’ macroeconomic policy mixes, in 
addition to the well known impact of reciprocal trade exchanges.
   Given psychological factors and the “herd” behaviour and 
massive nature of globalized ﬁnancial markets, the perception of an 
economy’s ﬁnancial sustainability has come to depend on the macro-
ﬁnancial conditions of its immediate neighbours, substantially 
intensifying externalities from independent macroeconomic policies. 
Immediate proof of this new reality is provided by the establishment 
of a common “risk premium” for the region in ﬁnancial-market 
ratings. Fluctuations in the spreads on bonds issued in the various 
countries in a single region correlate strongly, irrespective of each 
country’s macroeconomic decisions and conditions. This correlation 
constitutes clear evidence that globalization reinforces regional 
importance by putting a common label —whether favourable 
or unfavourable— on groups of countries. This occurred during 
the period of huge capital inﬂows in the early 1990s, which were 
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portrayed in a favourable light. It was also the case during the 
ﬁnancial crises that adversely affected emerging economies. The 
correlation is stronger when its visible effects are negative, i.e., in the 
downturn of the regional economic cycle, such as in 2001 and 2002. 
The deterioration of macroeconomic conditions in the MERCOSUR 
countries and their associated members and the rise in their risk 
premiums in 2000 and 2001 are convincing evidence of the forced 
macroeconomic “convergence” wrought by globalization. However, 
during a downturn, forced convergence, rather than contributing to 
regional integration, tends to exacerbate conﬂicts of interest among 
countries and among sectors or groups within them. Moreover, 
national authorities appear to think only in terms of individual 
reactions and decision-making processes without envisioning explicit 
cooperation at the regional level or utilizing existing mechanisms. The 
depreciation of ﬂoating currencies is a logical response to worsening 
ﬁnancial conditions in countries with ﬁxed exchange rates, locking 
them in an intense vicious circle that may undermine the regional 
cohesion achieved in the previous phase.
Figure VI.3
INTEREST RATE DIFFERENTIALS (OR SPREADS)a 
WITH RESPECT TO THE U.S. TREASURY BONDS  
MONTHLY AVERAGES, 1994-2002
SOUTHERN CONE: MERCOSUR AND CHILE
(Measured in basic points of yields) 
Source: ECLAC and JPMorgan.
a Chile: Shown on a different scale (right axis).
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Source: ECLAC and JPMorgan.
This interpretation of globalization, which takes account of the 
regional context, emphasizes the need to explicitly analyze regional 
integration as an institutionalized construct, and from a broader 
perspective than merely examining trade issues by including the domain 
of macroeconomic management. Such interpretations, however, continue 
to be eschewed by national decision makers. In addition, theoretical 
textbook models also neglect the growing importance of the regional 
context and its possible use as a buffer against the destabilizing effect of 
globalization.
This analytical shortcoming brings us to the case of the European 
Union, the sole example of regional construction successful over a suitably 
long period and in which national sovereignty has been respected. 
Pressure from external competitors and the increasing instability of 
ﬁnancial ﬂows in the early days of globalization created the conditions for 
a drive for integration. Regional institutionalization channelled reactions 
to the pressure from globalization into a methodical, progressive regional 
response. The European Union was thus able to embark on a path that 
Figure VI.4
INTEREST RATE DIFFERENTIALS (OR SPREADS)
WITH RESPECT TO THE U.S. TREASURY BONDS  
MONTHLY AVERAGES, 1994-2002
MEXICO AND MEMBERS OF THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY
(Measured in basic points of yields) 




























































































consolidated its integration. The increased external competition generated 
by globalization stimulated internal demands for further integration 
by both economic and political actors. This translated into a search to 
reduce the transaction costs caused by frontiers, through the creation of 
a single market, while external ﬁnancial shocks —by provoking costly 
speculative attacks among the currencies of its Member States and thus 
jeopardizing the single market’s growth and viability— encouraged a 
search for a lasting monetary uniﬁcation (a single currency). This process 
rested on institutionalizing macroeconomic convergence through policy 
coordination, which focused the attention of the ﬁnancial markets and 
public opinion, thereby prompting market “sanctions” and “rewards”.
Consequently, the need for a similar push for regionalization in 
Latin America, through articles by academics, cooperative attitudes 
among national authorities and initiatives by IFI economists, is abundantly 
clear. 
However, regionalization is not a panacea and its usefulness should 
not be overstated. No initiative guarantees success solely because of its 
regional orientation. Nevertheless, in macroeconomics, there are spillovers 
to address as long as the regional option is not properly used. Economists 
should therefore pay closer attention to the powerful regional dynamics 
and the forces of political economy behind European convergence. 
Latin American countries could ﬁnd in the as-yet-unexplored regional 
(or subregional) dimension the tool needed to compensate for most of 
their intrinsic lack of monetary and ﬁscal credibility. To deliver both 
credibility and ﬂexibility at the national level, a regional arrangement 
must, in essence, be based on a strong and transparent scheme for mutual 
monitoring of national monetary, exchange-rate and ﬁscal policies, backed 
by appropriate incentives and sanctions. Such a scheme implies fully 
abiding by the subsidiarity principle, regarding not only State sovereignty 
but also constitutionally autonomous public entities such as central banks 
and even auditors courts. 
As discussed in chapter IX, regionalization is a realistic option for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, since the region does not require major 
changes but rather a progressive reinforcement of policies already in place 
in the different subregional groups (MERCOSUR, CAN, CACM, and 
the Caribbean Community and Common Market [CARICOM]). Under 
very strict conditions (transparency, technical coherency, institutional 
resiliency) —which have not yet been fulﬁlled— some forms of cautious 
macroeconomic cooperation among neighbouring economies (that 
is, in subregions) could serve as a vehicle for building credibility and 
instituting sound national policies. Indeed, as proposed in the REDIMA 
approach, the regional level could be an alternative instrument to spur 
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institution-building or to compensate for the lack of credible checks and 
balances of national policies. Although not a substitute for strong national 
institutions (which, in any event, are needed), regionalization could 
catalyze or even accelerate reforms of national governance, helping to 
solve the institutional shortcomings. Speciﬁcally, as proposed in chapter 
IX, subregional macroeconomic monitoring could even add credibility 
to already sound national policies, through the added value of more 
stringent scrutiny by competing administrations. Also, for countries with 
questionable credibility or policies, regional monitoring could help bypass 
intermediate steps, shortening the painful process of gaining credibility 
on their own. The basic principle here is that —when such efforts are 
seriously managed— regional competing peers tend to bring about more 
autonomous assessment. As a result, the credibility of regional monitoring 
is not determined by the credibility of any individual country; rather, it 
tends to surpass the highest level of credibility of even the best performer 
in the group. 
This is why, under certain narrow conditions, subregional 
macroeconomic cooperation could even be much more credible than 
purely national rules such as “ﬁscal-responsibility” or “monetary-
independence” laws or dollarization (such as currency boards), while 
also offering the advantages of ﬂexible exchange rates (chapter IX). By 
imposing an institutional discipline from the outside —a supranational 
subregional set of transparent rules for meeting monetary and ﬁscal 
objectives— subregional macroeconomic monitoring could accelerate and 
generalize the institution-building required for both sustainable growth 
and reliable integration. Of course, current regional and subregional 
agreements do not yet meet these conditions. However, this does not 
imply that existing regional agreements cannot be improved along the 
path for dialogue proposed by REDIMA. 
3. Macroeconomic coordination and exchange-rate 
regimes
The ERR is the key tool of macroeconomic coordination. It is 
also potentially the key instrument for triggering and organizing 
macroeconomic cooperation. 
Chapters II and III explained that mutual monitoring of exchange-
rate evolution was the operative method that emerged in past experiences 
for developing cooperation in industrial countries. More precisely, the 
European Union’s coordination scheme was constructed progressively, 
based on the attempt to reduce exchange-rate volatility among Community 
partners to sustain regional integration. The European experience, 
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accumulated mainly during this process of intense exchange-rate monitoring 
(through the EMS and subsequently on the path to the EMU), points to 
a realistic approach: ensuring that the evolution of exchange rates leads 
to the needed convergence and compatibility of national macroeconomic 
policies, creating a speciﬁc opportunity for instituting a collegial technical 
dialogue to discuss each country’s domestic policies, leading policy makers 
to further formalize their commitments by ﬁrst introducing binding rules 
for organizing a cooperative, managed ﬂoat, and, as a consequence, for 
progressively disciplining monetary and ﬁscal policies. The validity of this 
principle is negatively conﬁrmed by recent Latin American crises, which 
make clear that insufﬁcient dialogue and a lack of cooperation on exchange-
rate policies contributed signiﬁcantly to the failures of integration. 
Of course, this does not mean that Latin America is required to 
apply precisely the same formula as was used either in Europe’s exchange-
rate system (the EMS and its peculiar exchange-rate mechanism of 
adjustable mutual pegged parities within bands) or in Europe’s method 
of surveillance of budgetary policies, through Maastricht criteria for ﬁscal 
discipline. As noted in detail above, the European Union model is not 
importable to Latin America, even though signiﬁcant methodological 
aspects of the European experiment are especially useful for Latin 
American economies. 
In particular, as in Europe and elsewhere, exchange rates are the 
key to macroeconomic cooperation and coordination, which is why 
exchange-rate monitoring could potentially be the key to triggering and 
organizing macroeconomic cooperation in Latin America. The need for 
greater compatibility among the policies of autonomous partners in 
a subregion attempting to integrate is unrelated to whether they share 
the same ERR or whether they have plans for a single currency. Regional 
cooperation and coordination result from a quest for credibility when an attempt 
is made to build an equitable single market and become competitive in a globalized 
world. This is an essential lesson to be drawn from the European Union. 
The European-coordination experience simultaneously covers the whole 
range of possible exchange-rate regimes: while 12 currencies have merged 
into the ﬂoating euro, the United Kingdom’s and Sweden’s currencies 
have remained purely ﬂoating, and Denmark’s is narrowly pegged to 
the euro through the ERM II. Regional cooperation or coordination 
is perfectly compatible with different exchange-rate regimes but not 
with macroeconomic divergence and exchange-rate instability. Hence, 
precise schemes for regional cooperation and mutual surveillance were 
put in place to prevent such divergences and exchange-rate instability. 
In these efforts, any exchange-rate movement is analyzed with respect 
to the relative policy mix, which determines the currency position. Even 
when exogenous shocks are the main cause of ﬂuctuations, domestic 
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reactions through the policy mix are crucial for the cost of adjustment and 
the potential stability of newly adjusted exchange rates. These policies 
could proﬁt from cooperative monitoring to increase their credibility and 
transparency. 
Academic and conventional views of macroeconomic policy 
usually present the ERR options in globalized markets as being limited 
by a fatal attraction towards “corner-solutions” —polarized between either 
a free ﬂoat or a peg that should be as irrevocable as possible (Fischer, 
2001). Thus, they portray intermediate formulas as being exposed to 
systemic instability under the pressure of globalized capital ﬂows. In 
fact, all ERRs with relatively free capital movements are exposed to the 
same systemic instability when institutions are insufﬁciently resilient 
or when the underlying policies lack credibility, and choosing the right 
ERR is not a panacea. Although a large majority (92%) of Latin American 
countries currently have ﬂexible (or very ﬂexible) regimes, there are still 
partisans of ﬁxed exchange rates, and even plans to introduce a single 
currency in some subregions. Meanwhile, ECLAC economists such as R. 
Ffrench-Davis and Larraín (2003) and J.A. Ocampo, together with some 
non-ECLAC economists, including John Williamson (2002), advocate a 
return to cautious intermediate options, such as “BBC” (basket, band and 
crawl) regimes, to determine the real exchange-rate level most conducive 
to sustainable development (Williamson, 2003). 
Although I will not take a position on this debate here,25 REDIMA 
provides an opportunity to look for a more consensual approach. The large 
diversity of ERRs might be simpliﬁed into three broad groups of regimes, 
or three basic categories of policy options, covering several subgroups,26 
whose fundamental features might be brieﬂy summarized as follows:
• Fixed parities, or pegs, ranging from “hard pegs”, such as with full 
dollarization or monetary unions, to traditional pegs, which can be 
adjusted and provide signiﬁcant advantages when stability is a 
priority as well as for political-economy reasons. However, this 
regime intends to abandon all or part of national monetary autonomy. 
The major risk of ﬁxed parties comes from exposure to external 
shocks, which may turn stability into a fatal rigidity with negative 
impacts on growth. As recent experiences show, ﬁxed pegs cannot 
supplant deeper reforms to guarantee the kind of ﬁscal discipline 
and market ﬂexibility that are prerequisites for safely abandoning 
effective national monetary policy. Another important drawback is 
25 For more explicit considerations, see Escaith,  Ghymers, and Studart (2002).
26 For a more precise description, see the standard classification proposed by Ghosh, Gulde 
and Wolf (2002).
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that, although these regimes may import stability and even credibility 
(through dollarization), they cannot, in themselves, solve the deep-
rooted causes of a lack of credibility. With dollarization, this illusion 
of easy credibility could tempt authorities to postpone needed 
reforms in the rest of the economy and decision-making bodies, 
while putting a tight straightjacket on monetary authorities. If this 
occurred, the ensuing crisis would be stronger and the exchange-
rate adjustment would be more severe. In emerging economies with 
episodes of a “sudden stop” of capital ﬂows, all cases of de facto 
dollarization with ﬁxed exchange rates ended in a severe banking 
crisis. 
• Free-ﬂoating regimes (the near-total or total absence of central-bank 
interventions), which can provide an important stimulus for growth 
by cushioning external shocks, sudden stops and real instability 
but which also require strong and resilient national institutions. For 
most Latin American countries, such regimes require very harsh and 
deep reforms, to allow technical inﬂation targeting by a credible, 
independent central bank. The main disadvantage of ﬂoating 
regimes is their potential instability for LDCs and small economies 
and the difﬁculty of rationalizing many exchange-rate movements 
in terms of changes in the fundamentals. (This applies even to 
large industrial economies.) In particular, strong capital inﬂows 
often threaten to overvalue the exchange rate and make nascent, 
non-traditional export sectors uncompetitive, which leads to risks 
of further excessive ﬂuctuations along with pro-cyclical capital 
movements and policy mix, all of which are detrimental to regional 
integration and sustainable growth.
• Intermediate regimes, which comprise a large number of systems 
with varying degrees of ﬂexibility that try to channel market 
forces in an orderly manner. These regimes range from rule-based 
interventions, like cooperative regional interventions to ensure that 
bilateral rates among a group of economies remain stable (e.g., the 
EMS), crawling pegs (parity adjustments to make up for inﬂation 
differentials), target zones (binding or indicative), to discretionary 
interventions (“dirty”, or managed, ﬂoats). This broad spectrum 
of pragmatic options for countries tries to use real exchange rates 
for development purposes (Williamson, 2003), and includes the 
cautious, managed ﬂoat proposed by Williamson’s BBC regime. This 
system seeks to avoid adjustments in response to what need not be 
shocks (movements among third currencies, which are neutralized 
at the macro level by the basket, and relative inﬂation, which can be 
neutralized by the crawl) and to ensure adjustments in response to 
shocks that cannot be neutralized (changes in terms-of-trade, or in 
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underlying capital ﬂows) by small parity changes, as recommended 
by the Real Targets Approach. The disadvantages of such regimes 
are their endemic lack of credibility; the difﬁculty in distinguishing 
between real shocks, which should lead to changes in parity, and 
the expectational froth, which the Exchange Rate Stability Approach 
seeks to eliminate; the costs of sterilized interventions; and the 
difﬁculty in managing durable, efﬁcient capital controls. 
Whatever the textbook ideal system for LACs, there is neither a 
perfect ERR nor a one-size-ﬁts-all model capable of accommodating 
all partners simultaneously. Some options are merely better (or less 
damaging) than others, depending on the speciﬁc characteristics of 
each economy, and especially regarding the trade-off between stability 
and growth faced by policy makers. No obvious common solution has 
emerged. However, all three main categories share a single characteristic (with 
the probable exception of Chile): they all run the risk of being undermined 
by a lack of institutional capacity and suffer to varying degrees from a 
lack of credibility. This is precisely the common malady that a regional 
approach could help tackle, not necessarily as an alternative to an ERR 
but as a complement to it. The REDIMA fundamental argument is that 
whatever ERR a given country chooses, national policy makers (including 
Chile’s which is also affected by spillovers from its neighbours) could 
reap substantial gains by participating in regular dialogues with their 
counterparts from neighbouring countries, as recommended in the 
REDIMA method. 
Indeed, regional cooperation might provide an opportunity to 
compensate for the lack of credibility and institutional resilience 
that needs to be resolved for any ERR to be sustainable. Under some 
conditions (see chapters VIII and IX), a cautious, cooperative regional 
scheme might provide the missing component —i.e., a common solution, 
irrespective of the ERR option chosen— by enhancing credibility through 
the powerful checks and balances that mutual monitoring and the 
consequent regional peer pressure would trigger. Checks and balances 
are very much needed to ensure greater accountability to public opinion, 
economic operators and ﬁnancial markets. Public and market reactions 
provide incentives and sanctions for policy makers able to internalize 
spillovers. In a regional soft arrangement for progressive monetary 
and ﬁscal cooperation, LACs could ﬁnd the needed catalyst of national 
institution-building efforts to compensate for most of the intrinsic lack of 
monetary and ﬁscal credibility.
Thus, the regional option is not an alternative to a rigorous ERR, 
even if it affords greater opportunities to evolve progressively towards 
intermediate formulas (see chapter IX, section 3).
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Coordination is indispensable both for countries that maintain a 
ﬂoating currency —to allow exchange-rate ﬂuctuations to perform their 
fundamental role without hindering integration and the single market— 
and for those that peg their currency or share a common currency. In the 
latter case, coordination has to be stronger and supported institutionally 
because the risk of free riding is higher and less severely punished by the 
markets, as demonstrated by the euro area case.
In both cases, the countries of a subregion have a direct interest 
in joining forces to build a regional-coordination scheme to improve the 
transparency of their macroeconomic efforts and ensure the credibility of 
chosen policies.
One special case is dollarization. Like any monetary union, 
dollarization requires a more active ﬁscal policy than do other exchange-
rate regimes. For dollarized countries, it is essential to complement 
dollarization with an institutional framework that guarantees budget 
discipline and transparency to ensure the availability of a ﬂexible 
instrument to compensate for the loss of autonomy in monetary and 
exchange policies. This framework would, obviously, be more effective 
and credible if decided on regionally than if left to domestic institutions 
and the discretionary political game. Again, this does not necessarily 
mean the imposition of a supranational power on national authorities, 
but rather an opportunity to take advantage of the countervailing powers 
easily provided by peer scrutiny among interdependent neighbours. 
Having different exchange regimes within a subregion poses 
a serious complication but not an insurmountable obstacle to policy 
coordination among members, since cooperative behaviour is needed on 
all sides, even more than in regions with more similar regimes.
Among MERCOSUR countries, the degree of macroeconomic 
instability —on average, very high— varied greatly, such that the extent of 
dollarization has also varied among the economies of the region, leading 
to marked structural differences in the ﬁnancial sectors. These differences 
determined both private and public behaviour and thus affected the 
entire range of policy instruments available. In particular, the role of 
the exchange rate divided Latin American countries into two camps, 
according to the macroeconomic-management scheme applied. In one 
camp was the highly dollarized Argentina, where dollar parity became so 
crucial that authorities found it expedient to tie their own hands, forsaking 
the use of monetary policy for internal purposes and opting for a radical 
ﬁxed-exchange-rate scheme. In the other was Brazil, where monetary and 
exchange tools continued to be used very actively. This difference between 
the two macroeconomic regimes dictates the type of coordination that is 
feasible, by effectively reducing the number of instruments potentially 
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available for regional coordination. Although this difference does not 
impede coordination, it is a potential source of intraregional conﬂict, 
which makes the need to overcome these differences even more urgent. 
Regional integration is compatible with divergent exchange-rate regimes but not 
with macroeconomic divergence. For this reason, it is imperative that national 
policies converge towards common goals for internal price stability and 
balanced budgets. With such a convergence, exchange-rate ﬂuctuations 
among MERCOSUR partners would be softer and tend to accomplish 
their basic tasks without hindering trade integration.
Regardless of the exchange-rate regimes chosen by authorities in 
the region, economic operators and ﬁnancial markets would have little 
conﬁdence in continued attempts at a Southern Cone regional-integration 
project in the absence of tangible progress towards better macroeconomic 
cooperation. MERCOSUR would ﬁnd it difﬁcult to ignore the explicit 
attention beginning to be given to these issues. Conversely, for exercises in 
macroeconomic coordination to begin, no matter how gradual and lenient 
the requirements for ﬁrm commitments, the countries need to adopt a 
long-term perspective on the importance of growth and structural reforms 
in their economies to begin implementing regional projects, especially 
regarding ﬁnancial markets.
Any cooperation attempt of this type will lead to a consideration 
of exchange rates, which play a key role for trade partners on the path 
to integration. This consideration led Europe to the EMU and the euro, 
with an institutionalized mechanism for national-policy coordination. In 
MERCOSUR, the differences between the two main exchange-rate regimes, 
exacerbated by the ﬂoating of the Brazilian currency in January 1999, 
served as the basis for initiating closer macroeconomic dialogue focused 
on a convergence towards macroeconomic stability. Such convergence 
was indeed attempted with the establishment of the Macroeconomic 
Monitoring Group (GMM; “Grupo de Monitoreo Macroeconómico”), 
created by the MERCOSUR Council of Ministers in June 2000; however, the 
divergences were already too great, and the GMM, despite the impressive 
progress made up until the Florianopolis Agreement in December 2000 
(which included convergence criteria), was too informal, too lax and 
came too late.
In each of the other two Latin American subregions, one member 
state had formally adopted the dollar as its currency: Ecuador, in the 
Andean Community, and El Salvador, in Central America. However, the 
issue is broader than the formal exchange-rate regimes since the banking 
systems of the other members are highly dollarized (that is, they have a 
very high proportion of dollar deposits). This structural feature, although 
an additional constraint for macroeconomic policy, also constitutes a 
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major reason for a common approach. It should therefore be dealt with by 
each subregion, and offers an opportunity for organizing cooperation and 
macroeconomic dialogue. 
4. The REDIMA approach and the debate about policy 
coordination
To answer the initial question about the applicability in Latin 
America of the general lessons drawn from historical experiences, the 
arguments and facts presented above need to be understood within the 
larger framework of the policy-cooperation debate in economics. This 
was, in fact, one of the outcomes of the REDIMA work. In particular, some 
external contributions discussed within the groups make clear that a large 
segment of professional economists are rather cautious or even reluctant 
regarding the need or usefulness of regional policy coordination for Latin 
America. Their negative opinion is based on the following reasoning.27
• Regional integration in the European Union has required about a half 
century of hard work involving countries that shared a high degree 
of political will, mutual trade and institutional capacity.
• Latin American countries are still far from meeting those same 
economic, institutional and political conditions.
• Therefore, the region must ﬁrst improve national governance and 
consolidate domestic macroeconomic conditions, including the 
implementation of structural balanced-budget rules or some form of 
anticyclical ﬁscal policies.
Additionally, a number of economists and policy practitioners, 
especially at IFIs, adhere to what can be called “the sceptical view”, 
concluding that preferential regional integration does not seem very 
relevant as a policy priority and could even be of dubious value inasmuch 
as it provides opportunities to delay unavoidable measures or reforms.
The REDIMA project, by contrast, not only makes clear the beneﬁts 
of regional integration; it also focuses on the notion that uncoordinated 
domestic policies can be deleterious to subregional integration by 
causing negative spillovers among the countries involved. Still, REDIMA 
acknowledges the signiﬁcant differences between Europe and the Latin 
American subregions and believes that countries should recover a 
27 For a rigorous and clear presentation of the current conventional view see, for example, 
the address by Klaus Smidt-Hebbel, from Chile’s Central Bank, to the third annual 
plenary meeting of REDIMA participants: “Lecciones del Euro para America Latina y 
para Chile”, Santiago, Chile, October 2003. 
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signiﬁcant degree of credibility and autonomy in domestic macroeconomic 
policies (monetary, ﬁscal, etc) before attempting to coordinate those 
policies with other countries. In fact, REDIMA goes further, supporting 
the view that cooperation and some cautious forms of coordination could 
also have signiﬁcant positive effects on credibility and institution-building 
and thereby spur needed improvements in national governance. 
This positive view of the scope of and opportunity for a regional 
approach has characterized the REDIMA project, which was created in 
keeping with the following tenets:
• Globalization strengthens the role and the importance of institutions 
and the quality of governance, creating or ensuring the conditions 
for high sustainable growth. 
• Open regional integration can be an efﬁcient tool for aligning the 
incentives of the different national governments to improve national 
governance and accelerate institution-building within countries.
• These steps forward allow for further opening and deeper 
integration.
• Fiscal discipline and structural reforms can gain greater credibility, 
sustainability and efﬁciency from a common framework and rules 
agreed on collectively and at the regional level, as shown by the 
European Union experiences.
These reasons make it all the more important for Latin American 
countries to use the regional level and the dynamics of integration 
to ﬁnd the political will for and popular acceptance of crucial reforms 
and convergence policies as quickly as possible. This is a precondition 
for successful regional integration and for taking advantage of the 
opportunities offered by globalization.
5. Policy-oriented conclusions
From both the European Union and the Latin American experiences, 
it appears that macroeconomic convergence and some degree of exchange-
rate stability are important conditions for the success of a regional-
integration progress. 
The European Union experience appears to show that: (1) at 
the beginning (1947 to 1957), macroeconomic stability and currency 
convertibility were preconditions for trade integration with a customs 
union; (2) later (1972 to 1979), policy divergence and the failure to 
coordinate dampened adherence to trade-integration policies; and (3) 
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more recently, convergence has been successful because of a regional 
scheme of surveillance and coordination of economic policies.
The Latin American experiences suggest that sharp macroeconomic-
policy divergences (including exchange-rate regimes) are a major source 
of regional disputes and obstacles to integration, the most famous case 
being the MERCOSUR crisis: disequilibria in Brazil led to a strong currency 
adjustment in 1999 with negative spillovers for the overvalued Argentine 
peso. Recent and current difﬁculties in the Andean Community reﬂect, 
among other factors, the rising overvaluation of Ecuador’s currency 
and sharp ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate between the Venezuelan 
and Colombian currencies. On the positive side, the period of progress 
in trade integration —the better part of the 1990s— coincides with the 
period of macroeconomic convergence resulting from the adjustment 
policies imposed.
The working hypothesis adopted by REDIMA goes as follows: (1) 
improving convergence and exchange-rate stability is crucial for facilitating 
regional integration; (2) regional cooperation among neighbouring 
economies is a tool for enhancing or accelerating convergence, since a 
cooperative game could lead to a superior outcome for participants 
overall; (3) thus, regional macroeconomic dialogue is mainly intended to 
become a lever to seek a consensual, operative mechanism to improve and 
accelerate regional convergence and integration, i.e., to attain a superior 
outcome for the region; and (4) rigorous monitoring among peers could 
quickly trigger emulation, accelerating the credibility building of national 
governance. 
This does not mean that economic-policy coordination is the only 
possible path to regional integration. Indeed, national authorities should, 
ideally, be able to reach such an objective on their own, if desirable for 
the growth of their own economies. However, the real world is not the 
textbook one, and, as mentioned, despite signiﬁcant spillovers among 
regional partners, there are political-economy reasons that explain non-
optimal decision-making. That is why I start from the hypothesis that not 
only could economic-policy coordination be, under precise conditions, an 
advantage, but that it is also a precondition for spurring integration and 
development in Latin America’s subregions. That even Europe’s advanced 
economies, with stronger institutionalization, found it necessary to resort 
to regional mechanisms to make progress in convergence and restore the 
conditions for sustainable growth indicates that this hypothesis deserves 
careful consideration and further discussion in Latin America.
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Chapter VII
Three major obstacles to regional 
macroeconomic cooperation in 
Latin America
In Latin America, obstacles to regional cooperation continue to be strong 
for several reasons, which merit an open and frank discussion. As the 
subject is complex and sensitive, some comments are made below, from 
the author’s comfortable position as an outside observer, to elicit reactions 
from readers.
The countries of the region are generally trapped in a typical 
suboptimal situation of a non-cooperative strategy as a result of uncertainty 
(or mistrust) regarding their partners’ behaviour, including the possibility 
of defection. Security reasons provide more individual incentives for each 
country to remain uncooperative. In game-theory terminology, each player 
is led to apply a dominant strategy against cooperation to maximize its 
welfare (minimize its losses). However, this strategy can be analyzed in 
three different facets, all of which support the global dilemma. These can 
be seen as three different obstacles to regional cooperation.
Two facets also affected European integration: the strict logic of the 
prisoner’s dilemma, and the erroneous belief in a power struggle between 
national governments and regional agencies. The third one, more speciﬁc 
to Latin America, is the lack of credibility and the poor reputation that 
adversely affects most countries in the region, and which includes their 
regional agreements and the laxity in enforcing those agreements. This 
also buttresses the traditional prisoner’s dilemma. 
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1. First obstacle: the traditional prisonerʼs dilemma, or the 
unbalanced incentives for cooperating
Latin American countries are not immune from the traditional 
prisoner’s dilemma that undermines international cooperation in general. 
Hence, although all parties may realize that certain collective actions 
would lead to better economic outcomes for the entire group, a series of 
reservations —perfectly rational from the standpoint of each country at 
the national level— translates into the failure of cooperation and to less 
desirable results for the group (but not necessarily for each individual 
country).
As explained in chapter V, each player perceives the identiﬁable 
gains from cooperation as clearly inferior to the tangible costs, especially 
in the relatively short period that matters to politicians. Hence, this is a 
problem of probability assessment. This suggests that the solution is to be 
found in changing perceptions on overall risks through an organizational 
initiative. Such a change in perceptions is the objective of the REDIMA 
approach, which is keyed to the supposition that an adequate regional 
mechanism might reverse the relative importance of cumulative gains 
from and costs of macroeconomic cooperation.
In addition to more technical issues (structural differences, disparate 
income levels), the nationalist and protectionist past continues to exert 
considerable inﬂuence on economic policy, despite the cultural and 
linguistic similarities that tend to favour strategic rapprochements. This 
explains the persistence of the dilemma. Political decision makers dare 
not take new initiatives because of a series of uncertainties: the difﬁculties 
countries have in evaluating the distribution of effects beforehand; 
wariness of other countries’ reactions; lack of consensus on the situation 
and the best measures to take; lack of continuity among policy makers as 
a result of high turnover in economic teams; fear of having one’s hands 
tied vis-à-vis one’s neighbours and being the target of populist criticism 
from one’s own constituency (sovereignty cult); institutional weakness, 
lack of authority and poor reputation (credibility problems); or even the 
absence of credible regional or arbitration institutions.
However, global and local changes, fallout from the foreign-debt 
crisis, deregulation and structural adjustment policies created strong 
pressure that imposed greater consensus and parallelism in Latin America, 
reducing obstacles and facilitating cooperation in the past decade. In 
fact, Latin American integration schemes progressed signiﬁcantly. They 
now need to advance towards the more crucial macro-monetary stage to 
consolidate and take advantage of this progress and be better poised to 
face globalization.
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A factor favouring a way out of the dilemma comes from the 
growing awareness of the interdependencies among neighbouring 
economies, combined with a recognition of the costs resulting from the 
lack of true regional markets and the divisions vis-à-vis large countries, 
other blocs or globalized ﬁnancial markets. Precisely this type of 
consideration and external pressure allowed Europe to escape its own 
prisoner’s dilemma. As set forth in greater detail below, the solution to 
the Latin American dilemma consists in improving mutual knowledge 
and encouraging communication and joint undertakings among national 
administrations to set in motion the dynamic gains each participant could 
reap from cooperative regional behaviour. The risk of higher turnover in 
economic teams could be addressed by establishing more contacts among 
the technical services themselves and less among ministers’ political 
appointees.
2. Second obstacle: the Latin centralization syndrome
The prisoner’s dilemma is not the only obstacle, however. The public 
often voices concern over a “lack of political will” in countries, which, in 
a vague and resigned way, conveys the perception that the authorities 
would not be willing (or would not be supported by constituencies) to 
surrender prerogatives or powers to regional agencies they do not control. 
Although this perception also reﬂects a manifestation of the prisoner’s 
dilemma, it is useful to focus our attention on a more precise argument, 
which strengthens the perception: the general notion of regional agencies 
as competitors of national governments or administrations. This worsens 
the prisoner’s dilemma with a moral-hazard situation, which leads 
decision makers to show no interest in taking regional commitments 
seriously or effecting integration. Under such circumstances, it is not 
possible to advance the regional integration agenda very successfully, 
because of a deeper logical ﬂaw.
This obstacle arises from a perception — both outdated and 
erroneous— of integration as a centralizing factor. Although regional 
integration requires the transfer of certain speciﬁc powers from a national 
to a regional level (for example, when a tariff union or an economic and 
monetary union are being set up), recent European experience shows 
how limited and infrequent these instances are. Indeed, consensus on 
the importance of subsidiarity made it possible to clarify the nature of 
integration among sovereign states.
This is another example of how essential it is for Latin American 
decision makers to carefully consider the European case and its past 
errors. The tendency in every integrationist scheme in history to centralize 
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decision-making has resulted in a series of resounding failures, not only 
in Europe but also in Africa and Latin America (for example, in the initial 
version of the Andean Pact). As analyzed above, the same occurs with 
economic-policy coordination, which is generally confused with requiring 
nations to subordinate their responsibilities to supranational agencies or 
to more powerful neighbours.
This issue needs to be clariﬁed in Latin America, especially in the 
macroeconomic and monetary ﬁelds. If macroeconomic coordination 
clearly does not purport to impose decisions but to improve national 
decision-making in each country’s self-interest, the conﬂict of interest not 
only disappears but is transformed into a force favouring cooperation, by 
directly beneﬁting national decision makers, as will be underlined at the 
end of section 4 and developed in chapter VIII.
This second obstacle needs to be stressed, because it tends to reinforce 
the ﬁrst by causing mistrust of regional agencies and excessive formality 
in contacts among national governments and administrations, which are 
perceived as negotiations. This inhibits exchanges of information and 
knowledge among countries, thus intensifying the prisoner’s dilemma 
situation. There is a notable lack of regular communication among economic 
experts, except when viewed as “diplomatic negotiation”. Despite several 
ofﬁcial channels of communication and institutional negotiations among 
the countries of the Latin American subregions, there is a need for true 
technical exchange, without any negotiating edge, to reduce uncertainty 
and mistrust and thus work towards the development of a communal 
culture and collegiate work. In Europe, the same shortcoming explains 
the long wait for a communal culture and cooperation spurred by the 
individual interest of each national administration.
European Union and Latin American experiences (but also those 
of other regions) should lead to a recognition that some aspects of the 
organization of diplomatic relationships seem obsolete and might, in 
themselves, constitute obstacles to regional integration. Ministries of 
foreign affairs, as the term conveys, generally put integration with 
immediate neighbours in the same category as formal diplomatic 
interactions with genuine “foreigners”. While, by deﬁnition, an 
integration process implies rendering domestic what used to be seen as 
foreign, the nature of such integration and the procedures used to achieve 
it depend on the speciﬁc development of common goals and interests 
regarding economics, ﬁnance and currency. According to the principle 
of comparative advantage, it would be more rational and coherent (but 
perhaps “diplomatically incorrect”) to transfer regional-integration affairs, 
or at least their technical aspects, to ministries of economy and ﬁnance 
before they are forwarded to the foreign ministry for a ﬁnal decision. 
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This is not a secondary issue. Regional integration cannot be triggered 
in an intergovernmental framework, as the recurrent European attempts 
in the non-Communitarian ﬁelds (like the second and third pillars of 
the European Union) have demonstrated. Regional integration requires 
a Community-based context and procedures. Without further sharing 
of responsibilities among ministerial departments allowing economic 
integration to become a domestic issue, the prisoner’s dilemma will 
continue to thwart or even to quash any genuine initiative for addressing 
common concerns. 
3. Third obstacle: the lack of institutional reputation and 
credibility
This handicap reﬂects the institutional weaknesses of most countries 
of the region as well as of most of its national and regional institutions. 
Although this was also partially the case in some European countries, Latin 
America suffers more from the negative legacy of the past; in addition, in 
contrast with Europe, where the major economy was also the most credible 
one, no large Latin American economy is positioned to immediately serve 
as an anchor. Further, Latin America has no strong regional institutions 
capable of lending immediate credibility to supranational commitments; 
on the contrary, regional commitments suffer from weak institutional 
enforcement procedures and a poor reputation. 
This lack of credibility poses an additional obstacle to the dynamic 
gains essential for providing incentives needed for the cooperative game 
to function, as explained in chapter V. 
4. A comparison of Europe and Latin America with a view 
to eradicating these obstacles
As described in detail in chapter III, the European Union went 
through a long process in surmounting the obstacles to feasible 
coordination. In this lengthy history, numerous forces came together in a 
context radically different from present-day Latin America. A comparison 
of the European Union and Latin America should take into account that 
Europe had both advantages and disadvantages vis-à-vis Latin America:
Europe’s advantages were that, from the beginning, there was 
greater economic interdependency, a relative balance of power between 
several big Member States, greater institutional credibility and a well-
established monetary anchor with sufﬁcient international weight (based 
on the German Bundesbank’s reputation for stability and independence). 
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Inter alia, the European Union had three fundamentally important 
instruments in place:
1. An autonomous regional driving force, the Commission, whose 
main function was to take initiatives based on previously deﬁned 
procedures. This made it possible to experiment successively 
with different formulas and to carry out tasks enabling national 
administrations to meet regularly and to gradually forge a common 
culture.
2. A Monetary Committee, or group of macroeconomic ofﬁcials created 
by the Treaty of Rome (1957), which held closed-door meetings at 
least monthly with experts responsible for national macroeconomic 
policy. These meetings of top-level ofﬁcials —appointed directly 
and not subject to removal, as they came from the civil service 
administrations and not from ministers’ cabinets— enabled mutual 
trust and a communal culture to gradually take hold. The Monetary 
Committee (now named the Economic and Financial Committee) 
comprised two members per country —the director of the treasury 
and a high-ranking ofﬁcial from the currency-exchange markets 
at the national central bank— plus two macroeconomists from the 
European Commission’s Directorate General for Economics and 
Finance and a third who acted as a permanent support secretary, 
responsible for the organization and distribution of studies and 
exchanges among members. Importantly, this specialized committee 
and its members do not depend on national chancelleries or on the 
European Union’s foreign affairs procedures.
3.  A de facto leader in monetary policy, based on its historical low 
inﬂation record and institutional independence. This essential factor 
allowed for a proﬁtable trade-off: the other economies beneﬁted 
from German monetary credibility inasmuch as they were able to 
apply some macroeconomic discipline, and the German economy 
beneﬁted from more domestic stability (see chapter III). However, 
the German leadership was limited to this monetary area, since its 
economic weight was not very different from that of the other main 
European Union partners.
The disadvantages vis-à-vis Latin America were the greater cultural 
and institutional differences among the European Union Member States, 
as well as the broader spectrum of  national policy options; less obvious 
costs of not integrating at that time; and a lower degree of social urgency 
because of higher income levels and greater social protection.
The Old Continent could also afford to take its time and make 
many mistakes, while maintaining the status quo apparently represented 
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a feasible option. The lower degree of globalization at that time meant that 
the pressure of necessity took longer to become evident than is the case 
today. In the end, however, the Europeans succeeded in pressing forward 
towards solutions on a gradually prepared terrain. For this reason, the 
resulting long process of “groping in the dark” provides the observer with 
two speciﬁc lessons on how Europe escaped the prisoner’s dilemma:
1. Successful coordination is based on the individual interests of 
autonomous participants, and coordination is successful only 
insofar as it is directly useful to the participants —a necessary 
condition— and truly protects their sovereignty. The European 
Union countries have effective coordination and accept formal 
procedures because doing so serves their own interests; i.e., national 
administrations take advantage of coordination as an instrument 
directly useful to their decision-making and the credibility of their 
policies. They obtain information and contributions from their 
partners, reducing the uncertainties that characterize the economics 
issues. The willingness to disclose their policies and even their future 
intentions turns into a win-win game when there is a minimum of 
trust. Participants beneﬁt from the critical comments of their peers, 
who, in a continuing game, have no interest in creating problems for 
or disturbing their neighbours. Instead, countries share an interest in 
helping each other’s economies be sound and thrive to the greatest 
extent possible. In such a game, each participant’s involvement in 
monitoring the others and ensuring that they abide by the common 
rules reduces conﬂicts. There is no policeman or supreme authority; 
each actor simply maintains a strict surveillance of its partners. 
Achieving the common good depends on all parties observing the 
effective rules.
2. Personal ties among high-ranking experts normally play a 
signiﬁcant role in European Union coordination building. Ofﬁcials 
responsible for macroeconomic policy who participate in associative 
tasks at the regional level and responsible for the technical aspects 
of national policy mixes are the key actors in the coordination game 
and in setting down the conditions for its emergence and orientation. 
The communal culture, the minimum trust required and the 
successful cumulative participation arise from personal ties created 
and developed among the macroeconomists in charge of technical 
exchange. It is these macroeconomists who, by working together 
regularly, build consensus on policies. The role of national experts 
is dual and “evaluative”: (i) they must become well acquainted with 
their counterparts, understand their difﬁculties and ensure a direct 
channel of communication to avoid misunderstanding or mistrust, 
and (ii) they must convey their counterparts’ assessments to their 
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own ministers or superiors. In this dual mission, experts have certain 
manoeuvring room that enhances the value of their role: access to 
privileged information lessens their daily workload and allows them 
to defuse potential conﬂicts and provide that information to help 
their superiors (either cabinet ministers or central bank presidents) 
devise strategies. As macroeconomists share a common educational 
background and face similar restrictions and challenges, they speak 
the same technical jargon and quickly form a homogenous group 
with a sense of belonging and community. Of course, continuity in 
this task is crucial and depends on the relative permanence of policy 
makers.
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Chapter VIII
Some key guidelines for escaping the 
prisonerʼs dilemma in Latin America: 
political economy at REDIMA 
From the analysis given in preceding chapters and especially from the 
general principles drawn from coordination experiences (chapter V), a 
signiﬁcant conclusion emerges for Latin America: the prisoner’s dilemma 
—which reﬂects incentives for non-cooperative behaviour— can only be 
broken through a regional triggering of dynamic gains, which creates 
countervailing incentives for national policy makers to cooperate with one 
another. To launch such a dynamic process, it is necessary to simultaneously 
reverse the three major obstacles identiﬁed in the preceding section. The 
following political-economy guidelines are organized in line with these 
three obstacles. 
The ﬁrst two obstacles to coordination —one that stems from 
uncertainty (the prisoner’s dilemma) and the other that stems from the 
formal nature of contacts among the administrations of countries, generally 
through foreign affairs ministries, in a single region (the sovereignty 
dilemma)— can be overcome through the implementation of two main 
guidelines: (1) making clear that feasible and realistic coordination 
for Latin American countries entails not a loss of sovereignty but an 
improvement in each participant’s long-term autonomy (the coordination 
paradox, see chapter V); (2) allowing national macroeconomic experts 
to create their own direct network to share information, expertise and 
technical assessments, in which they do not negotiate for their respective 
authorities, so that they will have greater mutual trust when working 
together behind closed doors. This reduces uncertainty and leads to 
identifying differences and raising awareness of the common interests 
shared by all participants. Another advantage of this speciﬁc type of 
120 ECLAC
network is the greater continuity of technicians compared with political 
teams or ofﬁcials directly linked to the cabinet.
The third obstacle —the initial absence of a sound reputation and 
strong credibility— could be overcome through a third guideline, discussed 
below, which consists in accelerating the endogenous development 
of incentives for policy makers. Since at the beginning, the individual 
advantages of playing the cooperative game are still uncertain and 
credibility has not yet been established, temporary external intervention 
from creditors could be useful and would probably be needed to focus 
on the results of the regional commitments made by participants before 
endogenous incentives become sufﬁciently strong. In addition, there is a 
need to stimulate market rewards and sanctions by designing a system 
of adequate procedures. Such a system relies on explicitly gaining the 
attention of ﬁnancial markets and agents. 
The following subsections develop these three guidelines in detail.
1. Using the coordination paradox, or how to gain more 
autonomy through coordination 
Paradoxically, coordination provides sovereign actors with a 
de facto higher degree of autonomy regarding their economic policies. 
From a legal or an institutional standpoint, coordination implies a formal 
limitation of sovereignty since national authorities accept restraint of 
their discretionary actions in speciﬁc areas and situations. However, the 
economic purpose of accepting this constraint is to reap beneﬁts from 
greater credibility and consequently to enjoy greater manoeuvring room, 
as well as to avoid the future costs on partners of negative spillovers or 
policy mistakes. Accepting self-discipline to prevent errors or negative 
spillovers cannot, then, reduce effective national autonomy regarding 
economic policy, since effective coordination brings beneﬁts that directly 
or indirectly increase the manoeuvrability of national policies.
It is necessary to overcome the erroneous perception that 
coordination is synonymous with a loss of national autonomy by making 
clear from the outset that the purpose of coordination is not to submit 
national decisions to foreign or supranational authorities. Speciﬁcally, 
this can be achieved in several ways —depending on the sensitivities of 
each subregion— starting with merely replacing the word “dialogue” 
for “coordination”, until speciﬁc operative content can be given to 
institutionalized coordination through common rules. The essential 
objective is to make clear that coordination is not about transferring 
responsibilities or decision-making, both of which will always remain 
under national control, but about taking advantage of regional synergies 
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to gain margins of autonomy by preventing gross errors, improving the 
efﬁciency of national decision-making and furthering understanding 
among neighbours and regional partners.
We can illustrate this with an analogy comparing national 
sovereignty with individuals’ autonomy in driving. Individuals collect-
ively agree to submit to a minimum set of common rules contained in a 
trafﬁc code. Although in principle this limits their absolute freedom, all 
participants recognize that by applying the code, each individual broadens 
his/her potential freedom of movement. For instance, respect for trafﬁc 
lights, rather than restricting freedom, increases individual driving speed 
when the light is green, given real trafﬁc conditions (e.g., externalities and 
trafﬁc jams). Without trafﬁc lights, all drivers would have to stop, which 
would curtail each individual’s freedom compared with driving according 
to a regulated trafﬁc system. It is therefore legitimate to conclude that this 
type of coordination among individuals, through common rules, does 
not diminish their autonomy, but rather restores margins of freedom that 
would otherwise be forfeited. The explanation of this paradox resides in 
the reciprocal impact of individual decisions: absolute autonomy does not 
really exist, since there are always interdependencies and interactions. 
Hence, effective individual sovereignty is greater when the effects of 
interactions are taken into account by a qualiﬁed system of accepted 
rules.
 The purpose of this analogy is solely to illustrate the paradox of 
coordination formulas that strengthen autonomy instead of restricting 
it. Naturally, this holds true only for coordination formulas that operate 
according to common, agreed-on rules and that include participant 
monitoring. In addition, only these formulas are practicable without major 
institutional changes. They are also the most feasible, given that they offer 
incentives to national decision makers —that is, they are directly useful 
for allowing national participants to attain their goals.
2. Encouraging mutual knowledge and direct 
communication among national administrations 
through the creation of technical networks 
To escape the prisoner’s dilemma it is by definition necessary 
—irrespective of the times, culture and circumstances— to advance in the 
following three directions:
1. Intensifying communication among the parties involved, thereby 
reducing risks of misunderstandings and uncertainty and building 
trust;
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2. Ensuring sufﬁcient continuity or regularity, in the sense of instituting 
an ongoing game that will oblige actors to maximize their longer-
term gains and thus internalize the effects common to the group of 
countries. This requires establishing regular contacts among ofﬁcials 
with more continuity —rather than only among staff members with 
a high turnover— and utilizing their technical services;
3. Ensuring that this communication is multilevel, rather than limited, 
as it usually is, to preparing for or making decisions. Contacts should 
be increased and lead to common tasks and joint, simultaneous 
reﬂections at several hierarchical levels, depending on their purpose, 
with ofﬁcial channels being reserved for ofﬁcial agendas and 
negotiations (among ministers) or for decision-making pursuant to 
formal procedures. Experts need to work together collaboratively 
without aiming to reach policy decisions but simply to improve 
mutual understanding and thus relieve technical exchanges and tasks 
of the encumbrance of speciﬁc purposes and ofﬁcial agendas, and 
above all to allow networking among staff members. An additional 
reason for increasing the number and the raising the level of meetings 
is to respond to the high turnover in economic teams that sometimes 
results from political instability or from shorter missions for decision 
makers.
Moreover, the recommendation that these contacts not be limited 
solely to diplomatic processes or ofﬁcial contacts among ministers is not 
intended as a criticism of existing mechanisms or institutions, which 
are essential, but as a recognition that these processes and contacts are 
insufﬁcient to overcome the constraints on cooperation. The groundwork 
for these processes needs to be laid through joint efforts by national 
administrations. This is the key to spurring new cooperative efforts and 
avoiding unnecessary stages for Latin American integration, which will 
allow the region to make up for lost time. This author’s strong conviction of 
the merits of this approach lies in the personal experience he accumulated, 
mainly during his in-house role, in the construction, from the ground up, 
of the mechanism currently in place in the European Union as well as his 
work in other regions and cases.
This aspect of direct contact at several levels might seem ingenuous 
or simplistic, but it allows for a response to the second obstacle that 
exacerbates the prisoner’s dilemma, namely, excessive prudence resulting 
from ofﬁcial negotiations among administrations or institutions from 
different countries. When international communication is funnelled 
through this mechanism, it validates the rationale of the prisoner’s 
dilemma, inasmuch as communication is kept within the hierarchical 
logic of domestic policy. Interlocutors lose opportunities to improve 
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their shared perception of reality. Since everything is reduced to the 
ofﬁcial negotiating agenda, participants can only go as fast as the slowest 
member, and the logic of cooperation is overridden by the particular ups 
and downs of domestic policies, the high risk of confrontation among 
neighbours and a mistaken fear of power being transferred from the 
national to the regional level.
When contacts are regular and less formal, networking occurs 
more quickly and technical experts can embark on effective cooperation 
initiatives in their own ﬁelds. A group dynamic is created, through which 
participants compete to enhance their roles, their management skills 
and their expertise, and to demonstrate the professionalism of their 
own administration. This induces an “upward-levelling” process and 
creative effort. With the use of new information, important tasks can be 
implemented that could not have been planned —even at a national level— 
if they had to go through a lengthy ofﬁcial agenda before formal regional 
negotiations could be held. Thus, sharing analyses and information on 
difﬁculties encourages gradually building an esprit de corps among 
macroeconomic experts. This unique group identity acts as a catalyst of 
cooperation among participants, because the group helps each participant 
in his/her daily work. Macroeconomists thus gain manoeuvring room 
and contribute more effectively to decision-making. This allows them 
to increase their effective say over internal economic policy-making. 
Increased external contacts and greater participation in collegial tasks also 
improve internal contacts within each country’s technical administrative 
team. The end beneﬁciaries are the authorities (ministers), who beneﬁt 
both from the information they receive and from the motivation of their 
experts, and their experts, in turn, experience personal growth through 
their role in the regional group. This results in a dynamic process that, by 
improving each country’s governance, also expedites the formation of a 
regional consensus on needed measures.
In Latin America this can —a priori— be easier and speedier than it 
was in Europe if more opportunities for regular technical contacts among 
the macroeconomists who set policy are created.
3. Developing incentives for national decision makers to 
use the regional level to promote their own interests 
As explained regarding the prisoner’s dilemma, the challenge is to 
make tangible the dynamic gains each participant expects to reap from 
taking advantage of the regional level, its rules and collective scrutiny. 
The key channel for giving incentives is the credibility-building process, 
which can be created through organized regional monitoring of national 
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policies. The mere existence of an effective system of rules and scrutiny 
should provide individual advantages to participants who try to play the 
game. Indeed, such a system allows them to enhance the credibility of 
their policies and therefore more easily attain their own goals at a national 
level. The credibility factor also acts directly on investment and savings, 
and more generally on growth, by reducing uncertainty and raising the 
expected returns of economic agents’ decisions. 
 For example, the most representative of these incentives is the risk 
premium included in the interest rate on an economy’s external ﬁnancing 
(country risk premium, or what in Latin America is currently called a 
“spread”). A successful cooperation strategy that enhances the credibility 
of national policies also reduces their costs, especially by signiﬁcantly 
reducing the spread between sovereign bonds issued by that country 
and United States T-bills. Hence, the purpose of regional peer monitoring 
must be to accelerate the lowering of spreads. To the extent that regional 
rules and criteria are technically consistent, are effectively enforced 
and are guaranteed by the critical scrutiny of the other countries, each 
subregion could receive the needed incentives and each country could 
reap important beneﬁts much more easily than by acting alone.
Globalization means that each administration (and each country) 
competes with others for credibility in the eyes of international markets; 
however, the legacy of the past is a strong handicap. The purpose of creating 
a regional monitoring with speciﬁc incentives is for the regional level to 
be used as a more transparent and powerful institutional mechanism to 
create the countervailing forces or the checks and balances that developing 
economies ﬁnd difﬁcult to establish on their own. Thus, traditional 
institutional weaknesses at the national level could be circumvented 
(or offset) by more effectively channelling natural competition among 
countries, through an organized mutual monitoring at the regional level, 
thereby creating the checks and balances these countries cannot easily or 
quickly establish on their own. Indeed, the collegial monitoring system 
relies on a certain degree of competition, but within a previously agreed-
on, regulated framework. 
If this regional framework is transparent and competently managed, 
such critical peer scrutiny could have an impact on public opinion in 
each country and on ﬁnancial markets and external creditors through 
an automatic system of rewards and sanctions (and especially through 
risk premiums). It is in the interest of each competing peer to oblige the 
others to respect the common rules (i) for it to beneﬁt from the credibility 
afforded by the regional device, and also (ii) to protect itself from the 
behaviour of its neighbours, which are also interdependent (that is, to 
preclude contagion). This combination of competition and cooperation 
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among autonomous national administrations allows the reactions of 
national public opinion and international ﬁnancial markets to be used as 
an incentive system of rewards and sanctions vis-à-vis national policy 
and governance. This approach for ensuring more accountable economic 
policies enables the countries of the region to internalize their spillover. 
The result is a win-win game for the different national actors as well 
as for their countries overall and for the entire region because regional 
coordination beneﬁts national participants who are motivated to use such 
efforts to become more competitive. 
The analysis of past experiences (chapter III) shows that a practicable 
scheme beneﬁts the participants and is moved by the competition among 
them to respect the agreed-on rules and monitor their neighbours’ 
enforcement of those rules. In this vein, consensus may be reached among 
national administrations to develop common rules and criteria and to 
decide to enforce them at the appropriate regional (or subregional) level, 
e.g., through peer monitoring under the scrutiny of economists and the 
markets. Such a transparent approach would become a powerful catalyst 
for reforms and an appropriate mechanism for institutional-capacity 
building. Most of the urgent reforms needed by each economy could be 
designed, promoted and monitored through this regional cooperation-
based method, allowing for economies of scale, trustworthy accountability 
and genuine regional alignment, triggering endogenous incentives and 
garnering social support from a sceptical public. In particular, exchange-
rate and macroeconomic stability could more easily and sensibly become a 
common subregional issue, contributing both to democratic participation 
and to shaping a regional identity. Of course, as mentioned initially, this 
entire dynamic supposes a non-centralist, non-bureaucratic regionalism 
(strict subsidiarity and transparency) and the permanent possibility of 
opting out, to preclude free riding or moral hazard.
Nevertheless, the most difﬁcult aspect of this mechanism is the 
beginning. Clearly, incentives cannot appear automatically at the onset of 
any regional-monitoring system. In addition to the need for transparency 
and professionalism, opinions and markets have to be convinced that 
regionalism can effectively work and bring something new and credible 
to a region where the record of institutional enforcement is not stellar. 
Hence, a speciﬁc organization is needed to ensure such a “regime 
change”. 
As shown by European integration, and drawing inspiration 
from Trifﬁn’s method applied for the EPU (that is, the Marshall plan 
with speciﬁc conditionality imposed by the United States on European 
countries at the end of the 1940s), the easiest way to create effective 
incentives from the very beginning would be through temporary external 
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assistance, —e.g., through a comprehensive North-South cooperation 
agreement to provide speciﬁc rewards to policy makers for cooperating 
at the regional level. Indeed, it is in a creditor’s interest to cooperate with 
the development of credible regional integration capable of leading to 
better macroeconomic policies and governance. An effective formula to 
encourage such an institution-building process is to establish a formal 
and visible link between Northern external ﬁnancial assistance and trade 
negotiations and the effective use of regional macroeconomic monitoring 
by Southern partners. 
One proposal would be, for example, to create positive discrimination 
favouring subregions able to institute cooperative monitoring of their 
members’ macroeconomic policies. New North-South trade and ﬁnancial 
agreements would reward countries for implementing an effective two-
tier system of macroeconomic dialogue: the ﬁrst tier would be collegial 
monitoring of any macroeconomic policies among peer authorities in each 
Southern subregional entity (whether or not this monitoring is formal); the 
second tier would ensure that each North-South agreement incorporate 
the same kind of dialogue and monitoring between Northern authorities 
and their Southern counterparts organized into subregional groups. This 
second step would be the complementary incentive, since North-South 
cooperation agreements could provide the opportunity for accelerating 
the implementation of the basic cooperation proposal and could reward 
countries that do so. The content of all North-South agreements should 
not necessarily be identical, since each case is unique. However, the 
purpose would be to provide either equitable pressure (offering priority 
negotiations or additional, unrestricted access to Northern markets for 
subregional groups of economies introducing macroeconomic cooperation 
formulas among their members) or more indirect incentives —such as 
offering Latin American countries an effective mechanism to build the 
credibility of their own macroeconomic monitoring (ﬁnancial assistance or 
support to promote credibility through the issuance of joint communiqués 
on consensual views on policy positions between Southern and Northern 
authorities during their dialogue). In either case, effective (and very 
economical) macroeconomic technical cooperation should be established 
and would constitute the main engine of cooperative behaviour among 
sovereign authorities and favour cooperative policies. 
The ideal formula would be “comprehensive North-South-South 
regionalism”. This would mean obtaining conditional support from the 
North (positive trade discrimination, technical assistance) and creditor 
countries or IFIs (technical and ﬁnancial assistance) to give incentives 
for regional macroeconomic cooperation among Southern partners. 
Since such ﬁnancial assistance must respect the Bretton Woods rules, an 
interesting combination of supports would result, and the progressive 
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decentralization of IMF interventions could be envisioned. At a minimum, 
the IMF might be interested in using subregional and North-South dialogue 
to better its own recommendations and conditionality. For example, IMF 
programmes and vigilance could be combined with or even incorporate 
subregional schemes insofar as they contribute to IMF targets. 
The overall formula could be a powerful vehicle for eliciting the 
interest of Southern authorities and strengthening the credibility of South-
South vigilance schemes. It could also help Latin American countries 
set better priorities. In any case, and irrespective of linked ﬁnancial 
assistance or market access, by bringing together the decision makers of 
neighbouring and like-minded Latin American countries, the “collegial” 
dimension might have a catalyst effect as a result of peer pressure, which 
already reduces the likelihood of a prisoner’s dilemma. In the proposal 
presented in the following chapter, additional modalities could expedite 
credibility building.
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Chapter IX
Operational conclusions: applying the 
cooperative REDIMA guidelines for 
facing Latin American macroeconomic 
instability
This chapter summarizes the principles and guidelines set forth above 
in order to translate them into speciﬁc options for possible cooperation-
based modalities that drawn on the issues and proposals discussed during 
this ﬁrst stage of the REDIMA approach.
REDIMA does not seek to bypass existing institutions by becoming 
a negotiating group but only to build consensual dialogue among national 
experts. Hence, the options presented are an opportunity for technical 
debates and for ﬁne-tuning the principles set out in preceding chapters. 
For the same reason, such a dialogue process cannot exclude any topic 
in advance. Indeed, no subject is a priori taboo in an informal technical 
network of peers whose main purpose is to build trust by improving 
mutual understanding and analyses of mutual spillovers. Consequently, 
there is a case for setting priorities and venturing to discuss exchange 
rates. 
1.  The ﬁrst priority: including exchange-rate development 
in regular peer monitoring at the regional level
Exchange-rate regimes and policies are the most visible externality 
of national choices. Hence, mutual monitoring is also the best mechanism 
to catalyze regional technical dialogue and further cooperation among 
the policy makers of interdependent economies. Of course, it must be 
made clear from the beginning that the purpose of such monitoring (or of 
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REDIMA) is not to propose a precise EER but to analyze and shed light on 
the technical implications of existing or alternative EERs and exchange-
rate policies for each economy and each regional context, taking into 
account the best interests of each participant. Therefore, in the application 
of what we have called the coordination paradox (chapters V and VIII), the 
technical discussion of exchange-rate policies and options among peers 
should be viewed not as a cumbersome constraint on national autonomy 
or sovereignty but as a helpful and needed step towards the full legitimacy 
of and respect for requiring responsible, efﬁcient political accountability 
from national authorities. More precisely, this step is the most rational 
way of giving meaning to the fundamental reality that the “exchange rate 
is a matter of common concern” for regional partners. 
Chapters II and III described the emergence, in past experiences 
with industrial countries, of mutual monitoring of exchange-rate evolution 
as an effective mechanism for envisioning a cooperative approach. More 
precisely, the European Union’s coordination scheme was gradually 
built on attempts to reduce exchange-rate volatility among Community 
partners, as a pillar of regional integration. The European experience, 
accumulated mainly during this intense exchange-rate monitoring 
(through the EMS and subsequently during the two ﬁrst Stages of the 
EMU), suggests the possibility of envisioning a realistic process in 
Latin American subregions. The starting point is to focus solely on the 
exchange-rate evolution of partners’ currencies. This inevitably leads to 
technical discussions about the needed convergence and compatibility of 
national macroeconomic policies, providing an opportunity to institute 
technical dialogue to discuss each country’s domestic policies. The 
dialogue process will progressively bring important advantages to the 
participants and lead policy makers to envision further the formalization 
of their exercises. In this subsequent process, several options emerge. 
If a strong consensus is built, they could consider introducing binding 
rules, ﬁrst on organizing a cooperative managed ﬂoat and subsequently 
on progressively disciplining monetary and ﬁscal policies. The validity 
of this principle is negatively conﬁrmed by Latin America’s recent crises, 
in which insufﬁcient dialogue and a lack of cooperation on exchange-rate 
policies signiﬁcantly contributed to the breakdown of integration. 
As stressed in chapter VI, this does not, of course, mean that Latin 
America must apply precisely the same formula either for an exchange-
rate system, like the EMS and its peculiar exchange-rate mechanism of 
adjustable, mutually pegged parities within bands, or for the surveillance 
of other policies, like the Maastricht ﬁscal-discipline policy. As explained 
in detail in chapter VI, the European Union model is not importable 
to Latin America, although important methodological aspects of the 
Fostering economic policy coordination in Latin America 131
European experiment continue to be especially useful for Latin American 
economies. 
In particular, as in Europe and elsewhere, exchange-rate evolution 
is the key for macroeconomic cooperation and coordination. This is 
why in Latin America exchange-rate monitoring could also potentially 
be the key to triggering and systematizing macroeconomic cooperation. 
The need to further the convergence and compatibility of the policies of 
autonomous partners in a subregion attempting to integrate is unrelated 
to whether they share the same ERR or have a single currency project. 
Regional cooperation or coordination results from a quest for credibility 
when the common intention is to build an equitable single market so as to 
be competitive in a globalized world. 
As also shown by the European Union experience, which 
covers the whole range of possible exchange-rate regimes —while 12 
currencies have merged into the ﬂoating euro, the United Kingdom’s and 
Sweden’s currencies have remained purely ﬂoating, and Denmark’s is 
narrowly pegged to the euro through the ERM II— regional cooperation or 
coordination is perfectly compatible with different exchange-rate regimes but not 
with macroeconomic divergence and exchange-rate instability. Hence, precise 
schemes for regional cooperation and mutual surveillance were put in 
place to prevent such divergences and exchange-rate instability. 
Hence, the purpose of presenting our conclusions in this chapter 
is not to foster a debate on the optimum exchange-rate regime for Latin 
America or its subregions but to focus on a pragmatic way to leverage this 
crucial (for both national interests and regional integration) common issue 
as a trigger for cooperative behaviour among national authorities and thus 
avoid unnecessary costs or instability. Indeed, ERR optimality is relative 
and depends on the time horizon, circumstances and national structures. 
Usually conﬂicting academic models and prescriptions are either relevant 
or inappropriate, depending on the circumstances and kind of shock 
besetting the economy in question. In fact, there is an element of truth in 
all the leading academic approaches that focus on the partial determinants 
at work. Here the devil is not in the details but in the real-life and practical 
conditions of implementation. Our purpose is to step back from the type 
of thinking that stems from academic debates to provide policy makers 
methods to escape doctrinal rigidity or paradigmatic dominance. 
2. Emerging economies  ʼERRs share a common character 
Chapter VI stated that all ERRs with relatively free capital 
movements are exposed to the same systemic instability when institutions 
are insufﬁciently resilient or when the underlying policies lack credibility. 
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Furthermore, choosing the right ERR is not a panacea since there is neither 
a perfect ERR nor a one-size-ﬁts-all model capable of accommodating all 
partners simultaneously. 
Inasmuch as the region shares this ERR issue and in the light of 
the consequent risks of exchange-rate crisis and disruption, REDIMA has 
tried to institute a method that will get at the genuine roots of the problem 
—the lack of adequate checks and balances at national levels. This method 
consists merely of using the regional level to compensate for the lack of 
credibility and institutional resilience that needs to be resolved for any 
ERR to work. In a regional soft arrangement for progressive monetary 
and ﬁscal cooperation, LACs could ﬁnd the needed catalyst of national 
institution-building efforts to compensate for most of the intrinsic lack 
of monetary and ﬁscal credibility which explains most of exchange-rate 
turbulences.
If we assume that any ERR option from the three available categories 
(synthesized in chapter VI, section 3) remains potentially attractive, 
depending on speciﬁc national traits and circumstances, its actual 
performance would still depend on the degree to which complementary 
institutional conditions were observed: under dollarization, ﬁscal 
discipline and banking supervision would be crucial; under a ﬂoating 
regime, the credibility of the monetary policy would be decisive; and 
under intermediate regimes, the transparency and coherence of the whole 
decision-making process would be fundamental. The common feature of any 
efﬁcient ERR is strong and credible institutions, with suitable, visible checks 
and balances able to convince markets and national economic agents 
of the policy orientation. The common weaknesses of most countries of the 
region are precisely the difﬁculties in meeting these conditions, basically 
because of a lack of checks and balances within a credible institutional 
framework. 
The stronger the exogenous shocks and the other structural 
difﬁculties to which the region is exposed, the more damaging these 
institutional weaknesses are and therefore the more attractive a regional 
contribution to the institutional capacity should be. The historical record 
of the numerous ERR experiments in Latin America indicates that, with 
very few exceptions, national policy makers have not convincingly shown 
themselves able to guarantee respect for the institutional conditions 
required by each regime. This is why the REDIMA approach proposes 
support at the regional level to strengthen supervision of the intrinsic 
coherence of these sensitive national choices. 
That even in the European Union —with fewer structural and 
institutional problems— most countries were historically obliged to 
resort to the regional level to start to overcome their monetary laxity, 
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their procyclical ﬁscal policy and the excessive rigidity of their economies 
demonstrates the potential power of such an approach. European countries 
were long aware of the need to treat their “exchange-rate policies as a matter 
of common concern” but could not agree on how precisely to apply this 
consensual principle. As described in chapter III, mutual exchange-rate 
monitoring allowed them to be more successful than domestic policy 
makers at analyzing these required conditions as well as all the effects 
that national policy makers must deal with in their own interest.
Similarly, REDIMA provides, on the whole, a method for LACs to 
give operational content to the fact that their exchange-rate ﬂuctuations 
or disruptions (like their economic policies) are also a matter of common 
concern for all, including those very few, like Chile, that have already 
attained satisfactory credibility. Indeed, LACs cannot escape the regional 
realities that also cause them to be adversely affected by their neighbours’ 
behaviour. However, the same interdependence could also be turned into 
a positive spillover once a more resilient economy (like Chile’s) actively 
contributes to spreading stability by “lending” (under strict unilateral 
conditions) its credibility to the regional dialogue. By triggering or 
accelerating the institution-building necessary for any sustainable EER 
for Latin American countries, this regional macroeconomic dialogue 
would decisively contribute to the advancement of regional integration 
and the move towards higher sustainable growth beneﬁcial to all —and 
especially to Chile.
More speciﬁcally, where macroeconomic stability is a crucial regional 
public good but is difﬁcult to achieve through spontaneous cooperation 
in the light of the prisoner’s dilemma, an appropriate macroeconomic 
and exchange-rate mutual-monitoring scheme at the subregional level 
could provide an opportunity to identify these common interests as well 
as divergent ones, and both the common and the divergent interests could 
be better managed cooperatively to the advantage of all participants, 
even of countries that continue to opt for corner solutions. Indeed, this 
scheme creates immediate mutual checks and balances capable of rapidly 
emulating institution-building at the national level and irreversibly 
improving the quality of governance and the resilience to crisis. 
Consequently, due to increased commercial integration and ﬁnancial 
interdependency and the new environment of international ﬁnance, 
simultaneously achieving external and internal equilibrim requires 
something more than a nationally determined ERR. Thus, the “regional 
option” is to be viewed at this stage not as an alternative to any ERR or to 
any policy adjustment but as a complement to advantageously exploiting 
existing mutual spillovers. The formula for giving explicit signﬁcance to 
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the regional dimension, tentatively proposed in phase 1 of the REDIMA 
experiment, is developed after the main principles at work are recalled.
 3. Why regional monitoring of exchange-rate evolution 
and national policies could spur institution-building 
It could be argued that if institutional weaknesses are already a 
major handicap at the national level for numerous LACs, they could 
be an even greater obstacle at the regional level, which has an even 
lower reputation asset. The REDIMA answer to this logical objection is 
the positive counter-experiment that in Europe demonstrates that the 
institutionally weaker regional level has been able to bring considerable 
improvements to the already relatively good institutional workings at 
a national level. Among countries facing more governance difﬁculties, 
the incentive mechanisms that have worked in Europe should be all the 
more powerful. This argument hinges on the possibility of —under strict 
conditions— exploiting the dynamic added value of the regional level to 
solve certain domestic problems. 
The basic principles that make exploiting this added value of regional 
monitoring a realistic possibility must be presented more explicitly, to 
show that there is no a priori logical objection that might impede their 
implementation by LACs. On the contrary, the less credible the national 
policy, the greater will be the net potential gains for a country that plays 
the monitoring game with its regional peers and the more powerful will 
be the “group dynamics” among peers.
Hence, this section describes the creation and exploitation of 
regional added value by referring to the series of arguments set forth in 
preceding chapters. 
• Because of interdependencies among regional partners, a potential 
regional added value is generally not exploited as a result of the 
prisoner’s dilemma created by the uncertainty of identiﬁable gains 
for each partner (see box in chapter 1, and chapters V and VII).
• Regular regional mutual monitoring of exchange rates and 
macroeconomic policies makes a common added value more tangible 
through greater credibility and stronger checks and balances while 
creating self-rewarding mutual acquaintance, better communication 
and trust among autonomous participants (chapters V and VIII, 
section 3). This ﬁrst step is needed to reduce uncertainty regarding 
the existence and the individual identiﬁcation of potential gains.
• The temptation for each player to capture these gains in its own self-
interest means that an endogenous, cooperation-based game tends 
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to emerge and lead to self-discipline, insofar as there is an adequate 
combination of competition and cooperation among players (chapter 
VIII section 3). This emulation among peers ensures an upward 
leveling towards the highest standards (chapter VIII, section 2), 
creating a net gain of credibility, even for the best, which beneﬁt from 
their partners’ improvement. 
• By gradually focusing the attention of national public opinion, 
creditors and markets on national policy performance and 
commitments, the monitoring exercises indirectly generate market 
sanctions/rewards (effects on credibility, chapter VIII, section 3) that 
make the added value of regional cooperation identiﬁable and cause 
it to be internalized; this changes the importance of future gains in 
regional macro cooperation with respect to individual, unilateral 
actions. From the standpoint of game theory, this process leads to 
dominant strategies for each actor, improving the convergence 
between the national and regional optimum. Dynamic gains from 
regional monitoring reverse the incentives structure for national 
policy makers, leading to progressive cooperation based on self-
interest (chapter V).
• This corresponds to a win-win game in which the positive outcome 
increases and incentives to defect tend to diminish with time, as 
effective cooperation develops and as the game is repeated and is 
seen as becoming an ongoing process (the endogenous nature of 
gains at the regional level in an ongoing game). 
• This endogenous positive-sum game is even sped up through the 
effect of expectations (as noted by Axelrod; see chapter V), which 
creates a need for cooperative actions, thereby pointing to the 
deﬁnitive escape from the prisoner’s dilemma.  
The core of the REDIMA argument for enabling LACs to resort 
to the regional level to improve their national governance is the 
aforementioned emulation process among players, which emerges from 
peer pressure backed by market sanctions. This emulation is driven by a 
peculiar combination of competition and cooperation resulting from mutual 
monitoring: participants vie for credibility in the eyes of international 
ﬁnancial markets or creditors but they cooperate not only to contribute to 
an increase in the common pool of credibility generated by monitoring but 
also to capture a part of that credibility, proportional to their individual 
efforts to present and meet individual commitments (adjustment and 
convergence plans). It is in the interest of each competing peer to be 
rigorous with its partners, obliging them to respect the cooperative rules 
of the monitoring game (to ensure regional added value and protect its 
own interests). However, an important condition for enabling such a 
136 ECLAC
combination is the proper implementation of the subsidiarity principle in 
both its dimensions, not only to ensure that sovereign national authorities 
are exclusively responsible for national policies (since they compete to 
apply the rules of the game and to perform better under peer scrutiny 
and the potential of market sanctions) but also to allow regular regional 
monitoring (since they cooperate to allow the exploitation of a net added 
value that they try to capture or to protect, in competition with the others). 
Although national administrations cannot be asked to sacriﬁce their own 
national goals for the sake of their neighbours or the region, the driving 
force of their legitimate self-interest could be channelled to protect them 
from their neighbours’ mistakes in order to create sound competition with 
which to enforce respect for some shared rules of the regional game.
To set this value-added process in motion it is not necessary to wait 
for the emergence of mature institutions with good credibility. In fact, the 
opposite is true, since individual gains are directly proportional to the 
initial lack of credibility of the weakest. This is also valid for the initially 
best performers, since they also beneﬁt from the systemic consolidation 
resulting from their neighbours’ progress. There is thus genuine added 
value for all participants, or a net creation of wealth resulting from the 
transformation of better governance into higher sustainable growth 
(through lower risk premiums). Contrary to the zero-sum game of 
the prisoner’s dilemma, the credibility of regional monitoring is not 
determined by the average reputation for credibility of the individual 
countries , but tends to rise to a level higher even than that of the best 
performer of the group, thereby generating positive spillovers in growth 
and regional integration (a positive-sum game). 
Furthermore, the incentive mechanism is very simple since it relies 
solely on the universal principle of the self-interest of policy makers, which 
depends not on the initial quality of governance but on the stringency of 
monitoring. In the light of the growing importance of the teams of top-
level macroeconomists preparing the technical aspects of national policy 
mixes, the incentive mechanism activated through regional cooperation 
could be particularly forceful regarding the less effective incentives and 
means available to these macroeconomists for having an impact within 
their countries. 
This section leads to two important outcomes: 
(1) For LACs to distil from the European Union experience their own 
regional approach aimed at accelerating their institution-building 
capacities through a suitable combination of competition and 
cooperation among national administrations and policies appears 
attractive and feasible: some forms of regional subsidiary monitoring 
could compensate for national institutional weaknesses insofar 
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as they provide tangible gains to all participating national policy 
makers, reversing the cooperation-adverse incentive structure.
(2) REDIMA assumes that it would be easier and faster to establish such 
a regional monitoring scheme than to leave each country to its own 
devices when it tries, on its own, to reach the equivalent results in 
credibility and governance improvement. This approach is not a 
substitute for good national institutions and policies; on the contrary, 
its aim is to catalyze or even accelerate improved national policies 
and the reform of national governance. 
However, the regional option is not a panacea and should not be 
overworked, not only because past experiences in the region were not 
very successful but also because regional institutions generally expose 
policy-making to an additional risk of moral hazard This means that the 
regional option requires a cautious and progressive approach, which 
should be precisely one of the outcomes of the learning-by-doing process 
that would trigger the kind of regular macroeconomic dialogue proposed 
by REDIMA. Properly managing this still-insufﬁciently explored regional 
dimension could open a new dynamic approach for LACs.
Nevertheless, this option is inherently based on assumptions that 
can be veriﬁed only by experimenting with the self-validating process of 
quickly enhancing the credibility of national policies to break out of the 
prisoner’s dilemma. 
What are the conditions for and precise forms of such cooperation 
driven by participants’ self-interests? The answer lies in devising 
operational formulas to organize regular monitoring or activate existing 
mechanisms. This is the task of Latin American macroeconomists, but 
it is useful to provide a starting point by offering an example, open to 
criticism, such as that proposed in the next section. 
4. An example of a speciﬁc REDIMA proposal for 
organizing dynamic macroeconomic regional 
cooperation
This proposal relies on transparency, on a deliberately organized 
consensus-building mechanism and on simplicity in the determination 
and enforcing of rules. Contrary to the a priori approach, this does not 
entail revolutionary changes or sweeping institutional transformations, 
but rather introducing a radically inexpensive, new method for instituting 
the required checks and balances, countervailing powers and open public 
debates that could enhance the accountability and credibility of policy 
makers to their own beneﬁt. 
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This step, discussed below, entails only a minor institutional change 
—the creation by subregions of small independent technical-assessment 
bodies as complements to each subregion’s groups or committees. All the 
subregions of Latin American already have the technical and institutional 
foundations to monitor national policies with a collegial group of peers: 
MERCOSUR created the Macoreconomic Monitoring Group (GMM)28 
in June 2000, and in June 2001 the Andean Community created the 
Permanent Technical Group (GTP).29 These are the specialized teams of 
policy makers in charge of policy convergence and coordination. The 
two trade blocs also have regional decision-making levels through their 
respective ministerial councils and joint meetings with the central bank 
governors. The Central American states also have a regional decision-
making level, the Council of Ministers of Economic Integration, which 
includes their central bank governors, while at the technical level they 
beneﬁt from the experience of the Central American Monetary Council, 
a specialized group composed solely of central bank macroeconomists. 
Central America only needs to formally establish a specialized group 
allowing central bank macroeconomists and their colleagues from the 
ministries of ﬁnance to meet regularly.30 
The basic idea for strengthening and quickly guaranteeing policy 
credibility is to buttress the subregional level with a new, independent 
tool able to focus public attention on, and to spur technical monitoring 
and collegial assessment of, national exchange rates and macroeconomic 
policies. For macroeconomic policies, the deﬁcit of credibility and 
transparency points to the need for a radical, “fresh” approach, giving 
priority to open debates among professionals, independent assessments 
and local ownership and sensitivity. This is similar to Eichengreen, 
Haussmann and von Haguen’s proposal (1999) to create independent 
national ﬁscal councils, but with two signiﬁcant improvements: making 
such councils not only national but also regional and broadening their 
scope by extending the formula so as to also monitor monetary and 
exchange-rate policies. 
Speciﬁcally, this means the creation of a two-tier subregional system 
to enhance credibility by triggering a positive dynamic of open debates 
28 In MERCOSUR, the GMM is composed of top officials from the ministries of finance and 
economy and from central banks.
29 In the CAN, the GTP comprises top officials from similar institutions plus macroeconomists 
from the CAN’s General Secretariat in charge of preparing the meetings of the Consejo 
Asesor (Council of Ministers of Finance and Economy and central bank governors).
30 The CAMC has the option of inviting officials from finance ministries to working groups 
or meetings with central bankers, but this option is not used on a regular or permanent 
basis.
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capable of creating rewards or sanctions for national policies, through the 
markets and public opinion.
1. At the ofﬁcial level, national policy makers meeting as a collegial 
policy group: ﬁrst the preparatory and advisory group of ofﬁcial 
“experts” i.e., the Group of Ofﬁcial Macroeconomic Monitoring 
(GOMM), which consists of macroeconomists from the national 
policy agencies, generally top-ranking experts from national ﬁnance 
ministries and central banks; second, the decision-making body or 
the ministerial and central-bank president level, for decisions on 
technical proposals or advice; 
2. At the technical countervailing power level: a subregional, technical 
Group of Autonomous Macroeconomists (GAM), composed of a 
few prominent independent macroeconomists in charge of regularly 
monitoring regional exchange rates and national macroeconomic 
policies; rather than merely “shadowing” the GOMM, this group 
actively cooperates with it.
The independent GAM would be responsible for proposing 
subregional methods, criteria and targets, and for producing regular 
assessment reports on the evolution of subregional exchange rates and 
macroeconomic indicators and the corresponding national components 
and policy measures. It would submit all its results ﬁrst to the GOMM, 
which would debate the proposals and assessments and prepare, in the 
presence of the GAM, its own recommendations for the decision-making 
body, the Council of Ministers and Central Bankers (CMCB), which would 
issue the policy recommendations. 
To ensure a fair balance of power, the GAM would be guaranteed 
the option of issuing an annex (or parallel document) with its own 
recommendations and comments on the Council’s recommendations 
and of independently organizing public hearings with the media and the 
international macroeconomic and ﬁnancial community.
In such an institutional framework, the interplay between 
government and independent macroeconomists would allow for more 
systematic checks and balances and automatic, credible surveillance. This 
regional approach could be expected to lend a high degree of credibility, 
ﬂexibility and stability to decision-making in the eyes of national economic 
stakeholders and the public at large, as well as regional neighbours, IFIs 
and creditors. 
I propose suggesting to each subregion that it adapt this two-
tier regional system of mutual surveillance by carrying out two basic, 
interrelated activities:
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(1) Designing and implementing a rules-based subregional scheme for 
macroeconomic convergence with a view to reaching a Regional 
Monitoring Arrangement (RMA), which would gradually establish 
the supranational rules and quantitative convergence criteria 
(priority ﬁscal rules for sustainability keyed to each economy but 
following common principles); and 
(2) Supervising and assessing exchange rates with a view to establishing 
a common framework to monitor, discuss and, when possible, 
agree on each participating country’s rates at the subregional level, 
according to the general regional principle of mutual concern for 
exchange-rate credibility and stability known as Regional Exchange-
Rate Monitoring (REM).
As the RMA and the REM are mutually supportive, each subregional 
macroeconomic monitoring scheme would depend strongly on the 
exchange-rate regimes in the considered subregions, and the dynamics of 
the monitoring process would depend on the accumulated learning-by-
doing resulting from the collegial concern with the mutual exchange rates 
or the implementation of the REM. As explained above, understanding 
exchange-rate movements requires close scrutiny of each national policy 
mix; hence, the activities would inevitably be mutually supportive. 
Therefore, the initial stage of this “monitoring” would merely be 
a common framework for initiating a technical dialogue on exchange 
rates and policies. This would be the basic scheme for bringing about an 
operational macroeconomic dialogue, which could lead to an alignment 
towards the best of all the dynamic improvements expected from the 
creation of powerful checks and balances and peer pressure, with better 
mutual knowledge, the exchange of best practices and a more useful 
consensus on economic governance.
Since the proposal is based on gradually building mutual conﬁdence 
and associated beneﬁts, it would not require either intense previous 
negotiation or any formal commitment, but would merely need to be 
launched as a progressive self-validating process, which would fully 
safeguard national sovereignty. It is thus more realistic and politically 
acceptable than other formulas. 
Viewing this example not as a required outcome but only as a 
possible future scenario, one could also imagine that such as process could 
open the door to more extensive cooperation in subsequent stages.
To the extent that consensus emerges within the REDIMA network, 
policy makers might envision stepping up cooperation. Of course, 
REDIMA would not be responsible for any such decision, although 
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its participants would raise the issue to regional negotiation bodies or 
institutions after following existing procedures. 
(1) In some subregions, the next step beyond REDIMA might be to use 
the REM to reach a common position on sustainable exchange-
rate targets or on bands between partners, to enhance their mutual 
stability. Authorities would contribute to shaping market expectations 
by providing collegially agreed signals about the targetted exchange 
rates. The purpose at this stage would not be to ﬁx bilateral parities 
but to prevent gross misalignments inside the subregion. Of course, 
this is feasible only where there is the political will to move towards 
this kind of implicit monetary cooperation. In such cases, the process 
of building a consensus on each exchange rate would come ﬁrst from 
the GOMM level, with the technical opinion and possible support 
of the GAM. At the end of this ﬁrst technical step, if the GOMM 
and the GAM reached a common position on sustainable exchange-
rate targets, the CMCB would ideally announce recommended bands 
for exchange rates compatible with stated and expected national 
policies.31 This concept of recommended bands does not imply a 
system of ﬁxed bilateral parities or compulsory limits since it would 
also be applicable to ﬂoating rates. Initially these bands would be 
broad and non-binding, and would merely alert the markets to the 
existence of a consensual orientation of national policies. 
(2) A complementary tool for inﬂuencing market expectations would 
be to commission the REM to set up an arrangement for triggering 
formal (obligatory) consultations of the GOMM and, eventually, the 
CMCB, when the limits of the consensual broad bands were being 
approached. These compulsory consultations could encourage 
designing and implementing the rules and procedures set forth in 
the surveillance scheme (the RMA). The consultations would work 
by consensus; thus, veto power would be given to each member, even 
to a single national central bank, in an attempt to reach consensus on 
the policy adjustments to be submitted to national authorities. The 
most obvious tool for this second step is a “joint communiqué” publicly 
expressing the degree of consensus on the region’s fundamental 
indicators.
(3) The next degree of cooperation would be to decide on common 
actions beyond national policy adjustments and joint communiqués. 
Such common actions and tools include a broad range of options, 
31 Theoretical background data on the recommended-band approach can be found, for 
example, in Williamson (2003) and Krugman (1991).
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from launching convergence criteria and implementing compulsory 
rules of the game with rewards or sanctions to ad hoc cooperative 
actions, such joint interventions in favour of speciﬁc currencies or 
announcing new consensual bands or ad hoc coordinated policy 
adjustments to support observance of the bands. After a trial period, 
the system would likely be able to design a common procedure for 
exchange-rate orientation by anchoring market expectations through 
precise criteria and formal procedures, thereby providing transparent 
information on the respective policy stances behind the bands and 
the required adjustment path. 
(4) Gradually, the option of trying a real or a nominal band around a 
parity grid would be discussed if the participating members were 
able to achieve an effective degree of consensus and cohesion, 
as demonstrated by respecting the common criteria and rules 
established by the RMA. With the continued strengthening of 
the consensus in the context of a consolidation of real integration 
(increased mutual trade and nominal convergence), successive 
additional steps could transform the REM into a Regional Monetary 
System (RMS) and eventually into a Subregional Exchange rate 
Mechanism (SERM). Of course, this kind of rules-based managed 
ﬂoat requires a ﬁrm agreement between central banks and other 
national authorities. Such an agreement could be reached once the 
RMA and its convergence rules were sufﬁciently developed and 
their credibility demonstrated. 
The example of the possible orientation of this approach tries 
to illustrate that national administrations could reach a consensus to 
develop common rules and criteria and to enforce them at the appropriate 
subregional level, i.e., through peer monitoring under the scrutiny of 
economists and markets. Such a transparent approach would become 
a powerful catalyst for reforms and an appropriate mechanism for 
institutional-capacity building. Most of the urgent reforms needed by 
each economy could be designed, promoted and monitored through 
this regional cooperation-based method, allowing for economies of 
scale, trustworthy accountability and genuine regional alignment, 
triggering endogenous incentives and garnering social support from a 
sceptical public. In particular, exchange-rate and macroeconomic stability 
could more easily and sensibly become a common subregional issue, 
contributing both to democratic participation and to shaping a regional 
identity. Of course, as mentioned initially, this entire dynamic supposes 
a non-centralist, non-bureaucratic regionalism (strict subsidiarity and 
transparency) and the permanent possibility of opting out, to preclude 
free riding or moral hazard.
Fostering economic policy coordination in Latin America 143
Thus, it should be clear that the REDIMA proposal to build an 
RMS calls for neither the creation of a single currency nor the use of ﬁxed 
subregional bilateral parities but a system for increasing macroeconomic 
stability through an acceptance to deal explicitly and collegially with 
national exchange-rate policies and to explicitly consider their role in the 
policy mix as well as in development strategy. 
Hence, the method described above is much more comprehensive 
than are present IFI approaches, which only deal with individual national 
authorities on a bilateral basis. In particular, an effective monitoring 
system with rules and a capacity for enforcement would acquire the 
ability to act as a genuine subregional anchor. In such a situation, we can 
envision important consequences for the debate on the optimal ERR. 
The following aspects might be considered for further debates, 
although such a suggestion is merely speculative. 
An ideal macroeconomic-cooperation scheme at the subregional 
level is able to provide more credibility than purely national rules (such as 
ﬁscal responsibility or monetary independence laws) or dollarization (as 
through a currency board), while also being able to tailor rules and policy 
stances to each country-speciﬁc situation or to cyclical positions. With 
subregional macroeconomic cooperation, the ERR issue changes radically: 
the subregional monitoring system (RMA and REM) can activate the same 
kind of mechanism of tying politicians’ hands as does dollarization but for 
both monetary and ﬁscal policies, although without necessarily limiting 
their ﬂexibility (unlike a peg, which imposes an inappropriate external 
monetary policy), while this system would be expected to stabilize the 
real exchange rate and to prevent wild ﬂuctuations. 
This combination of advantages means that it would be possible 
to keep the beneﬁts of dollarization without its rigidity and exogenous 
nature, in addition to gaining the ﬂexibility provided by ﬂoating without 
exposure to the same risk of instability and overshooting. 
Hence, such a regional scheme could:
(1) simultaneously provide the advantages of both polar ERRs —
ﬂexibility and credibility, 
(2) without imposing its costs (rigidity or instability),
(3) while internalizing the spillover effects of national policies and 
allowing a common, coherent policy answer to the challenges of 
globalization to be devised and 
(4) actively promoting regional integration and identity. 
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More speciﬁcally, this means that the regional option would have 
the “alchemist’s power” of combining the advantages of both corner 
solutions without imposing their costs. This would give national policy 
makers signiﬁcantly more freedom.
Is such a simpler and more rational world really beyond the reach 
of policy makers?
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Chapter X 
The REDIMA I experiment (2000-2003)
The preceding chapters reﬂect on some results of the work undertaken 
through the implementation, from late 2000 to late 2003, of this joint 
United Nations-European Union experiment named REDIMA. This ﬁnal 
chapter gives a short presentation of this promising experiment.
1. Origin and deﬁnition of the REDIMA project
As a result of successive contacts between ECLAC and the European 
Commission starting in 1997, in May 2000 the two institutions decided 
to cooperate to promote regional macroeconomic convergence in Latin 
America. In particular, since 1997 ECLAC had been requesting that analyses 
of the European Union experience in macroeconomic convergence and 
economic policy coordination be disseminated with a view to progressively 
incorporating macroeconomic convergence into the priorities for regional 
integration among Latin American countries. The cooperation that was 
ﬁnally agreed upon included the secondment of a senior expert from the 
European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs (DG ECFIN) to the ECLAC macroeconomic team in Santiago, 
together with a small operations budget from the Commission to design, 
discuss and implement, by consensus with national administrations, a 
new method to promote economic-policy coordination among regional 
partners. Speciﬁcally, the challenge was to build a technical-dialogue 
network among senior ofﬁcials responsible for the main macroeconomic 
policy issues within a “peer-pressure system” and thereby ﬁll a vacuum 
in Latin America. The project was named REDIMA.
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2. Purpose, method and expected results
The REDIMA network’s main objective was to gradually break 
the prisoner’s dilemma that traps Latin American authorities into non-
cooperative attitudes. To this end, the project sought to encourage 
technical dialogue and subregional initiatives capable of contributing to 
macroeconomic convergence by inﬂuencing the national policy mix, the 
choice of exchange-rate regimes and the awareness of the advantages of, 
and the need for, a cooperative approach to macroeconomic problems so as 
to attain sustainable regional integration. The method, specially designed 
by ECFIN with ECLAC macroeconomists and other macroeconomists from 
the region, called for creating conﬁdential protected forums (networks) 
in each ofﬁcial integration area (that is, in each of the three subregions) 
to bring together macroeconomists in charge of the technical aspects of 
each economy’s policy mix (i.e., senior ofﬁcials from ﬁnance ministries, 
central banks and regional institutions). Moreover, REDIMA was 
conceived as a two-tier system: the three subregional networks, although 
autonomous, are also interconnected through an annual seminar and a 
permanent United Nations electronic conference (WebBoard). The basic 
aim is to allow ofﬁcials to become acquainted by freely exchanging their 
views without a need to make formal commitments on behalf of their 
institutions or governments; this explains why they are allowed to bypass 
formal diplomatic channels. The main advantage of the forum’s informal 
nature is that it instils trust and a regional culture among inﬂuential senior 
“experts”. This, in turn, ensures the continuity of technical contacts and 
a collegial approach, unconstrained by diplomatic negotiation agendas, 
subregional political vagaries and/or recurrent ﬁnancial/political crises. 
The resulting work was expected to create a climate of trust among 
different experts, generating a community-based culture and synergies 
through better communication and understanding among policy makers. 
On this basis, one could expect the emergence and development of 
endogenous initiatives, since these regional networks preﬁgure the 
institutional bodies that might later be formally created as a result of 
positive cooperative experiments. The two-tier system should allow 
each subregion to take advantage of its own peculiarities or institutions 
and ﬁnd its own speed, while the results of each experiment are made 
available to the others. It was hoped that this would create a positive 
emulation mechanism through a “benchmarking effect”. 
3. Implementation 
The design, presentation, discussion, testing and implementation 
for eighteen countries and three subregions were initially scheduled to 
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take two years. However, a third year was necessary as a result of the 
crises in the region and because of the self-managed nature of the three 
networks. Work started in earnest in October 2000, with a total operations 
budget initially estimated at € 653,850 (equivalent, at the September 
2000 exchange rate, to US$ 616,840) of which the Commission offered to 
contribute € 200,000 (although only about € 180,000 was effectively paid 
out, for procedural reasons).
REDIMA was launched, and it succeeded in working efﬁciently 
and reaching the most ambitious of its targets for the three subregions, 
despite an exceptionally difﬁcult environment (ﬁnancial and political 
crises in most of the participating countries).
4. Comparison of expected and effective results and 
activities
Expected results: According to its July 2000 Terms of Reference, “the 
project is expected to build consensus on the desirability of policy coordination, 
and demonstrate by concrete experience the usefulness of a regular process of 
close exchanges of views among national macroeconomic authorities and experts, 
whatever the degree of formality or commitment that may be reached. 
“Ideally, the best result which could emerge from the project would be 
the formal establishment of a two-tier system of macroeconomic dialogue and 
cooperation within and between the existing subregions (MERCOSUR, 
CAN, MCCA) and their member countries, which would establish their own 
macroeconomic cooperation schemes (which could be different as the subregions 
are at very different level of effective regional integration).
“More realistically, the project should produce concrete results in preparing 
for regional integration by improving the tools for decision-making: statistical 
harmonization, direct exchanges of views creating closer links between groups of 
national experts within and between subregions, building up a consensual view 
on common issues that would allow the preparation of studies published in the 
framework of the network and contribute to making progress towards genuine 
coordination schemes. The purpose of the network will be to create a concrete 
opportunity for creating such operational schemes as well as ensuring the 
diffusion to the whole region of the progress made (inter alia in the MERCOSUR 
area) in coordinating macroeconomic policies. The groups included into the 
network would also participate in promoting a formal dialogue for the whole 
region under the umbrella of the ofﬁcial ECLAC activities”. 
Scheduled activities: These targets had to be met through four main 
activities: (1) the creation and operation of a network of Latin American 
ofﬁcials and experts; (2) the organization of at least two internal workshops 
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per year for each subregion; (3) the organization of one annual regional 
seminar bringing the three subregions together; (4) the publication of 
working papers and policy blueprints.
Effective Results: Through these four categories of activities, co-
ﬁnanced by the European Community and ECLAC, the REDIMA project 
attained its two central objectives, i.e., (1) demonstrating the need for 
policy coordination so as to make regional integration sustainable, and 
(2) providing convincing evidence of the usefulness of regular, close 
exchanges of views among national macroeconomic authorities and 
experts. Furthermore, the “ﬁrst-best target” (considered, ex-ante, the 
maximum proof of success) was also clearly met in two of the three 
subregions (Andean Community and MERCOSUR), and partially in the 
third (Central America), since REDIMA provided an opportunity to launch 
organizational initiatives, whether or not formal (since each subregion 
behaves according to different models and institutions), but with an impact 
on regional cooperation among sovereign states or entities. REDIMA 
has created genuine momentum towards regional integration through a 
realistic new approach to cooperation between national administrations 
and central banks, thereby contributing to build a climate of conﬁdence 
and, progressively, a common culture.
5. Principal speciﬁc positive results  
(1) The operation of fully interconnected regional networks covering the 
three subregions (MERCOSUR, the Andean Community and Central 
America) and comprising some 50 senior macroeconomists from 17 
countries and central banks and 10 regional institutions, despite the 
severe crisis.32  These three informal networks operate independently 
and according to their own rules; they are self-managed by their 
members, with ECLAC acting as the technical secretariat and 
providing ﬁnancial support. All told, four hemisphere-wide meetings 
were held in Santiago (three plenary annual REDIMA meetings, in 
November 2001, November 2002 and October 2003, plus a special 
conference on exchange-rate regimes, in March 2002), compared 
with the two meetings initially planned. Likewise, 22 subregional 
workshops were held in different places, compared with a minimum 
of six that was expected. The resulting documents published by 
32 The eighteenth country, Mexico, was not included at this stage by decision of the 
Monetary Council of Central America and the network’s members, who wanted to 
enhance their internal cohesion as a subregion and to address their common problems 
before broadening the cooperation area. 
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REDIMA, in addition to the numerous working documents circulated 
on the electronic WebBoard, are listed in the appendix. 
(2) Impact on the integration strategy and institutional workings:
• In the Southern Cone network (REDIMA-SUR, i.e., MERCOSUR 
plus Chile), the early creation (before the launch of REDIMA) 
of a technical GMM was a joint initiative of Argentina and 
Brazil. However, it was indirectly inspired in previous bilateral 
discussions on the REDIMA project (in 1999 and early 200033) 
and implemented starting in June 2000.34 Its objective was to 
prepare the statistical basis for convergence monitoring. After 
a few months, a “MERCOSUR Mini-Maastricht” agreement 
was reached, with quantitative criteria, at the December 
2000 Florianopolis Summit. After this quick progress, 
implementation of the Florianopolis Agreement and the GMM 
work were severely undermined by Argentina’s economic 
and political crisis, in which there were changes of the entire 
economic team in March and April 2001, and its impact on 
Brazil and the two smaller members. Growing tension between 
Argentina’s Minister of the Economy Domingo Cavallo and 
the administration of Brazilian President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso led to the suspension of the formal GMM meetings. 
Hence, the GMM members conducted their efforts through the 
informal REDIMA-SUR, which shows the network’s effective 
function and the success of the formula by which it operates. 
It became the Southern Cone’s only conﬁdential channel for 
macroeconomic dialogue on crisis management. Three special 
technical workshops were held during the ﬁnancial turbulence 
of 2002 for dealing with the successive ﬁnancial crises and the 
macroeconomic aspects of the political transition in Brazil. One 
of the important outcomes of REDIMA-SUR was that it paved 
the way for resuming the GMM meetings in preparation for the 
December 2002 MERCOSUR Summit and the re-establishment 
of the Buenos Aires-Brasilia axis in 2003. 
33 See Ghymers (1999). The proposals given in the conclusion were followed up on with 
bilateral contacts and special information requests by some administrations. Decision 
6/99 of the MERCOSUR Council (June 1999) created a High Level Macroeconomic Policy 
Coordination Group, but it was only after the Buenos Aires Ministerial Declaration of 
April 2000 that the political will gave way to the creation of an informal technical group 
led by Machinea’s team. 
34 At the Buenos Aires Summit, June 2000, in which the GMM was created by the Common 
Market Council of Ministers (CMC decision of 30 June 2000).  
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• In the Andean Community, launching “REDIMA-CAN”, 
comprising ﬁve Andean countries, and its work directly led to 
signiﬁcant institutional initiatives: 
(i) the introduction of two macro-ﬁscal criteria for convergence 
and the launching of a work programme to ensure the 
sustainability of public ﬁnances;35 
(ii) the creation of a new ofﬁcial body, the “Grupo Técnico 
Permanente” (GTP), decided on in June 2001, pursuant 
to a proposal from the Andean Community General 
Secretariat, which was based on the result of the work of 
the REDIMA-CAN group.36 The purpose was to give this 
informal network an ofﬁcial ad hoc nature when necessary 
to transform REDIMA-CAN consensual conclusions on 
convergence and the follow-up work on them into formal 
initiatives or decisions, especially for enacting community 
legislation; 
(iii) the regular work of GTP through REDIMA-CAN workshops 
(or electronic conferences), despite serious political crises 
or changes in most of the Andean Community member 
states.37 One example is the enactment of the “Programmes 
for Convergence Actions” (PACs), despite the cancellation 
of the Advisory Council of Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Presidents in June 2002, because of the change of 
government in Colombia. A formal proposal was drafted 
and introduced by REDIMA, through the GTP, to take 
advantage of two REDIMA-CAN meetings (Caracas, 
May 2002, and Santiago, November 2002) to prepare and 
agree on Community legislation. The formal decision, 
Commission Decision 543, was made on 14 April 2003.38  
35 Decision of the Fifth Advisory Council of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Presidents 
(Consejo Asesor de Ministros de Hacienda o Finanzas, Bancos Centrales y Responsables 
de Planeación Económica de la Comunidad), taken on 21 June 2001 in Caracas. See Acta 
Final, §4, de la V Reunión del Consejo Asesor.
36 Decision of the same Fifth Advisory Council, Caracas; see Acta Final, §5.
37 The GTPs were held in tandem with REDIMA-CAN workshops and were attended by 
same officials. The only differences between the two were that the REDIMA meeting 
had an informal agenda while the GTP meeting had an official one, with clear mandates 
to the representatives, and meetings were chaired by the country holding the Andean 
Community Presidency. Neither ECLAC nor the EC attended GTP meetings. The GTP 
met four times outside REDIMA-CAN workshops (Caracas in May 2002, Santiago in 
November 2002, Quito in September 2003 and Santiago in October 2003). 
38 Decision of the Andean Community, 14 April 2003, session no. 85 of the Commission, 
Lima, Peru.
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It deﬁnes and uniﬁes the PAC format and establishes 
a follow-up procedure for convergence surveillance in 
the Andean Community. Another important success of 
REDIMA-CAN was the June 2003 approval by the VI 
Advisory Council of the REDIMA recommendation to 
set up a “group of independent economists” to critically 
monitor GTP surveillance of the convergence process.39 
In the same package of decisions, the Advisory Council 
asked for a revision of the common convergence criteria 
on inﬂation in the Andean Community economies;40 
REDIMA-CAN and the GTP undertook studies and held 
discussions in August, September and October 2003 (the 
Quito workshop, a meeting in Bogotá at the ofﬁces of the 
Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas (Latin American 
Reserve Fund; FLAR], and the Santiago workshop). 
One result of the REDIMA-CAN and GTP meetings was 
the cooperation agreed on by the central banks and the 
FLAR on inﬂation forecasting, bringing their econometric 
models into line with each other. Another example is 
the management of the October 2003 Bolivian crisis and 
its ﬁnancial consequences on the budget. The REDIMA-
CAN network was used intensively to organize collegial 
monitoring, which also expressed Andean solidarity for 
bargaining with some creditors. 
(iv) a proposal by Peruvian representatives at the September 
2003 Quito workshop, that REDIMA be used to manage a 
project to create a South American initiative for regional 
infrastructure (“Iniciativa de Infraestructura Regional 
de Sudamérica”; IIRSA), which would be responsible 
for selecting and ﬁnancing infrastructure for regional 
integration. Under the proposal, REDIMA-CAN would 
merge with REDIMA-SUR to streamline the management of 
large regional investments through a regional institution.
• In the CACM, the Monetary Council used the REDIMA-CA 
network to include ﬁnance ministries in its group of central 
bankers responsible for revising and improving the convergence 
criteria. Although the Monetary Council has not yet decided on 
a deﬁnitive institutional formula for creating a formal group 
like the GMM or the GTP for the two other subregions, some 
39 Acta Final del Consejo Asesor § 5, Bogotá , 26 June 2003.    
40 Ibid., § 2 of Acta Final.
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initiatives could emerge in the context of the 40th anniversary 
of the Monetary Council, in 2005. Although very supportive 
of the REDIMA method and formula, the Monetary Council 
considers that permanent technical assistance is needed in its 
region, without going through ECLAC, Santiago. The Council 
asked for additional assistance from the European Union, while 
ECLAC decided to commission its regional ofﬁce in Mexico to 
cooperate closely and directly with REDIMA-CA. 
(3) An incipient, yet signiﬁcant, inﬂuence on debates on policy mix 
and on the method of peer monitoring. In all subregions, signiﬁcant 
progress was made in raising awareness of, and in the quality of 
the technical analysis on, ﬁscal sustainability (except for Chile, all 
countries have a common sustainability problem), exchange-rate 
regimes and regional interdependencies. 
  In 2002, REDIMA participants expressed an interest in 
establishing a closer association between statistical and quantitative 
issues and the network’s activities. They also voiced a need for 
simulation models to analyze the spread of shocks from a regional 
perspective and to quantify the beneﬁts of policy cooperation. 
In response, the project received assistance from the Division of 
Statistics and Economic Projections of ECLAC (in addition to the 
current support received from the Development Division, which 
manages REDIMA). In this context, the Statistical Division conducted 
a series of activities in 2003 focusing on two major objectives: the 
uniﬁcation of subregional economic statistics and the development 
of econometrics models to simulate economic integration and 
macroeconomic coordination. ECLAC presented the ﬁrst objective at 
the Second Statistical Conference of the Americas, in Santiago, from 
18 to 20 June 2003. REDIMA objectives and the related collaboration 
between ECLAC and the European Commission were discussed, and 
the Conference endorsed the REDIMA proposal as one of its priorities 
for its 2003-2005 international work programme. Several institutions 
offered to cooperate with ECLAC on this issue. The second objective 
calls for developing interconnected subregional macroeconomic 
models able to synthesize trade and macroeconomic interrelations 
among countries participating in a regional integration scheme and 
to analyze the sustainability of growth scenarios under balance-
of-payments constraints. The related activities were organized by 
subregion.
• REDIMA-Sur, in addition to preparing convergence criteria 
and continuing with the statistical-harmonization efforts 
undertaken by the GMM, decided to analyze spillovers among 
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partners by pooling the efforts of the main research centres that 
conduct econometric modelling. However, this programme, 
partially supported by the ECLAC Statistical and Forecasting 
Division, will require the resources from a second phase of 
REDIMA announced by the Commission. 
• In the CAN, and within a context of growing political tensions 
and changes in the economic teams of the ﬁve member countries, 
the continuity and ﬂexibility of the REDIMA-CAN network 
enabled a consensual approach to be introduced and long-run 
work programmes to be launched on: (i) ﬁscal sustainability 
through the enactment of regional ﬁscal rules, a study of the ﬁscal 
impact of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and the 
need for ﬁscal harmonization; (ii) statistical harmonization and 
the deﬁnition of macro-ﬁscal criteria within the framework of 
speciﬁc, common PACs; (iii) a monitoring system to make peer 
pressure effective; (iv) building harmonized econometric models 
for addressing integration issues (two technical workshops 
were already held by ECLAC in Santiago), particularly given 
that, in the context of the review of inﬂation criteria, central 
banks exchanged their own forecasting models and launched 
bilateral cooperation (REDIMA-CAN in Quito and the FLAR 
seminar in Bogota); (v) ways to improve ﬁnancial integration 
inside the Andean Community. 
• Also in the CACM, REDIMA-CA produced concrete results by 
raising awareness on a potential ﬁscal problem, and a common 
method for analyzing sustainability was prepared and the 
ofﬁcial convergence criteria were revised. The econometric 
work is being launched by ECLAC-Mexico (one workshop has 
already been held there), and it will require additional assistance 
in the second stage.
(4) The conﬁrmation of the suitability of the REDIMA approach, as 
follows: informal networks with key ofﬁcials from ﬁscal and monetary 
authorities, based on a neutral entity, ECLAC, which offers the most 
convenient vehicle for utilizing and internalizing the European 
experience to ensure efﬁcient, simultaneous access to 18 countries 
and for managing the three networks in a manner consistent with the 
three different integration schemes. 
6. Conclusions and proposed actions
In this ﬁrst stage of REDIMA, a new, self-managed instrument 
was implemented and successfully tested, and made available to Latin 
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American policy makers. This important experiment demonstrated 
the need for the further development of such a technical forum in each 
subregion as well as at the regional level. 
In sum, the main lessons drawn from the REDIMA philosophy are 
that:
1. The regional dimension is a powerful tool with which to make 
up for institutional failures, insofar as it provides tangible net 
gains to national policy makers; this holds to the extent that the 
chosen formula strikes the right balance between cooperation and 
competition among national administrations; this means that the 
prisoner’s dilemma has to be solved at the level of national policy 
makers. 
2. REDIMA has proven to be a feasible way out of this suboptimal 
status quo that locks Latin America into a low level of cooperation, 
since it offers ways to change the perception of the balance of risks 
by creating operational incentives at the level of the active player. 
3. Although macroeconomic coordination relies on a few universal 
principles (chapter V), these higher-order rules do not translate 
into unique institutional arrangements and they must match local 
capabilities and existing institutional opportunities.
4. Consequently, it is up to Latin American experts to “do the hard 
work at home” by collectively conceiving and designing their own 
cooperative paths in each subregion, without ideological lock-in or a 
priori institutional formula.
5. The subregional level is the main building block for macroeconomic 
cooperation among national administrations but also for 
dissemination and discussion among the different subregions of 
Latin America and with other regions (the European Union, NAFTA, 
ASEAN). In addition, this intermediate level provides an attractive 
ambit both for IFIs and for national governments in their ﬁnancial 
and policy negotiations. Indeed, individual countries would ﬁnd 
regional support and strategy advice, while for IFIs and creditors, 
the positive effects on national governance and transparency of the 
regional monitoring and peer pressure would represent a signiﬁcant 
advantage. 
6. In this ﬁrst phase of the REDIMA experiment, participants expressed 
an interest in potential areas of development for subsequent stages, 
mainly regarding technical works on convergence, including 
indicators and econometric simulations, as well as ways to 
establish carrot-and-stick mechanisms for cooperation. In addition, 
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encouraging, alongside closed-door workshops, an open public 
debate and fostering an appropriate internalization by selectively 
extending networks to professional macroeconomists and to civil 
society would appear to be a suitable course of action. Another 
possibility, mentioned in REDIMA, would be the establishment of 
closer ties between statisticians and econometricians in subsequent 
stages, as a way to bypass some limitations of tools and measurement 
by closing the gap between demand (policy makers) and supply 
(statisticians and academicians) in order for the technical priorities 
on creating appropriate tools for addressing national policy debates 
to be jointly determined.

Fostering economic policy coordination in Latin America 157
Appendix 
Main publications on REDIMAʼs work
Documents published by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in the series Macroeconomía del desarrollo:
• C. Ghymers, “La problemática de la coordinación de políticas 
económicas”, Macroeconomía del desarrollo series, No. 10 (LC/L.1674-
P), Santiago, Chile,  December 2001. United Nations publication, 
Sales No. S.01.II.G.209.
• Luis Miotti, Dominique Plihon and Carlos Quenan, “Euro and the 
Financial Relations between Latin America and Europe:medium 
-and long-term implications”, Macroeconomía del desarrollo series, 
No. 13 (LC/L.1716-P), Santiago, Chile, March 2002. United Nations 
publication, Sales No. E.02.II.G.27.
• Hubert Escaith, Christian Ghymers and Rogerio Studart, “Regional 
integration and the issue of choosing an appropriate exchange-rate 
regime in Latin America”, Macroeconomía del desarrollo series, No. 
13 (LC/L.1732-P), Santiago, Chile, August 2002. United Nations 
publication, Sales No. E.02.II.G.86.
• Hubert Escaith and Carlos Quenan (coords.), “Emergencia del Euro 
y sus implicaciones para América Latina y el Caribe”, Macroeconomía 
del desarrollo series, No. 20 (LC/L.1842-P), Santiago, Chile, January 
2003. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.03.II.G.7.
• Hubert Escaith and Igor Paunovic, “Regional integration in Latin 
America and dynamic gains from macroeconomic cooperation”, 
Macroeconomía del desarrollo series, No. 24 (LC/L.1933-P), Santiago, 
Chile, July 2003. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.03.II.G.92.
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Publications in external reviews: 
• C. Ghymers, “Macroeconomics and Regionalization”, document 
presented at the the XIII Regional Seminar on Fiscal Policy, Santiago, 
Chile, ECLAC/IMF/IDB/World Bank, 2001, unpublished.
• C. Ghymers, “Monitoreo macroeconomico regional y sostenibilidad 
ﬁscal: algunos aspectos pragmaticos para los paises andinos”, Boletín 
FLAR, March 2002.
• C. Ghymers, “America Latina y la coordinación de políticas 
económicas: hacia un Maastricht Latinoaméricano?”, Estudios 
internacionales, Santiago, Chile, University of Chile, July-September 
2002. 
• C. Ghymers, “The Euro and the IMS”, Papers and Proceedings 
of the Third International Conference on Finance, London, 2004, 
unpublished. 
• C. Ghymers, “Una repuesta regional a la globalización”, document 
prepared for the ﬁfth international meeting on globalization, La 
Habana, Cuba, February 2003. 
• C. Ghymers, “Macroeconomic coordination and regional integration”, 
document presentes at the Seminar RINOS (Réseau Intégration Nord 
Sud), Paris, May 2003.  
• C. Ghymers,  “Metodología para estimar indicadores de sostenibilidad 
ﬁscal”, San José, Central American Monetary Council, July 2002. 
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Acronyms used 
ASEAN  Association of South-East Asian Nations
CARICOM Caribbean Community 
CDs  Certiﬁcates of Deposit
CEI   Centro de Economía Internacional
CMCB  Council of Ministers and Central Bankers, 
ECLAC  Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean
ECOFIN European Council of Economic and Finance Ministers
EMS   European Monetary System, EMS
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union
FLAR  Latin American Reserve Fund
FTAA  Free Trade Area of the Americas
G-7   Group of Seven
GAM  Group of Autonomous Macroeconomists
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GMM  Macroeconomic Monitoring Group
GOMM  Group of Ofﬁcial Macroeconomic Monitoring
GTP  Permanent Technical Group
IBRD  International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IFIs   International Financial Institutions
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IMS  International Monetary System
LDCs  Least Developed Countries
OEEC  Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
PACs  Programmes for Convergence Actions
REM  Regional Exchange-rate Monitoring 
RMA  Regional Monitoring Arrangement
RMS  Regional Monetary System
SERM  Subregional Exchange Rate Mechanism
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